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Chapter 1
The policy mix concept as a basis for R&D and innovation
policy
Introduction, scope and main results of the thesis
At the end of the rst decade of the twenty-rst century, an unprecedented nancial
crisis hit the world economy. This crisis deepened an already downward cyclical
trend, and subsequently initiated one of the most virulent recessions in decades
(OECD 2010a). Stabilizing the world economy has required governments to act
with great urgency and respond with drastic measures (OECD 2010a) (Commission
of the European Communities 2010). These turbulent times however also indicate
again the importance of policies aimed at creating stable and sustainable economic
growth (OECD 2008). For the industrialized countries in the world, this implies
that remaining competitive in the future demands not only intervention in (nan-
cial) markets and the way they function. It requires also increasing labour produc-
tivity levels by strengthening their research and innovation capacity. The limits of
further capital deepening have been reached and future demographic changes and
an ageing population will hinder increasing deployment of labour (Commission of
the European Communities 2010).
The OECD and the European Commission have encouraged countries to adopt the
concept of policy mix as a basis for long-term innovation driven growth strategies
(OECD 2010b) (Commission of the European Communities 2010). This concept
is rather new, and a clear, univocal and widely adopted denition is still lacking
(Flanagan et al. 2010): "The concept in itself is seen as self-explanatory and
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unproblematic. [...] Imported from economic policy debates, the term implies
a focus on interactions and interdependencies between di¤erent policies as they
a¤ect the extent to which intended outcomes are realized. The recent popularity
of the term seems to reect, then, an aspiration towards a more realistic approach
to policy complexity. However, we argue that in practice the term is largely used to
black box this complexity." Concerning the role of the policy mix concept in policy
formulation, it is argued that (OECD 2010b): "[...] the task of policy makers is
to develop an optimal mix of policies and instruments for stimulating innovation
performance that takes into account possible positive and negative interactions
among instruments. [...] In practice, given the uncertainties and limitations faced,
the policy mix should be su¢ ciently good in terms of the overall net benets."
In Section 1.1 of this chapter we dene the characteristics of the policy mix con-
cept. We subsequently outline how the concept of policy mix supports the process
of policy formulation in Section 1.2. We then describe in Section 1.3 the current
approach concerning the formulation of R&D and innovation policy, and its short-
comings with respect to designing a policy mix. In Section 1.4 we present the
results of our research, and how they contribute to the further implementation of
the concept of policy mix. In Section 1.5 we summarize the implications of our
result for the current instruments aimed at strengthening the innovation system.
1.1 Characteristics of the policy mix
For our denition of the concept of policy mix, we build on (Boekholt et al. 2006),
(Flanagan et al. 2010) and (OECD 2010b):
Denition 1.1 A policy mix is the combined set of interacting policy instruments
of a country addressing R&D and innovation.
Implementation of a policy instrument results from a government intervention
originating from a public policy. We dene public policy and policy instruments
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based on (Schram et al. 2004) and (Howlett and Ramesh 2003)) as:1
Denition 1.2 A public policy is a deliberate plan of action by a government to
guide decisions, and achieve rational outcomes which are set out in broad objectives
and goals.
Denition 1.3 A policy instrument (also called measure or tool) translates the
plan of action and its accompanying objectives and goals as dened by a public
policy into concrete interventions.
The interaction of measures as mentioned in the denition is an important aspect
of the policy mix concept. The impact of an instrument addressing R&D and
innovation is inuenced by other measures belonging to the mix. In other words:
the e¤ect of a specic measure is determined by its own characteristics, and by
the impact of other instruments with which it interacts. This interaction occurs in
di¤erent ways: instruments could for example complement each other, strengthen
each others impact, or act as substitutes.
The policy instruments belonging to the policy mix are limited to those with the
following characteristics:
 They stem from a wide variety of di¤erent policies, which in some way refer
to R&D and innovation. The advanced economies in the world all have imple-
mented public policies aimed at enhancing prosperity, stability and growth.
A subset of all the instruments originating from these policies addresses R&D
and innovation, and therefore belongs to the policy mix. Obvious examples
are: macro-economic policy, education and research policy, innovation pol-
icy, and labour policy. But also other policies on for example defence and
health generally cover certain aspects of research and innovation.
 They address di¤erent phases of the R&D and innovation process: from
knowledge creation to knowledge transfer to the translation of knowledge into
1There are already well-known denitions on policy in the literature. These denitions are
however inadequate within the framework of this research, as they do not discern policy instru-
ments clearly from public policy.
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market applications. The scope of the instruments belonging to the policy
mix is limited to what is allowed under the EU State Aid rules (Commission
of the European Communities 2006) andWTO Disciplines on Subsidies, and
refers to the creation of new knowledge and new applications.
 They cover generic as well as specic R&D and innovation within specic
technologies or sectors.
 They focus on di¤erent actors involved in R&D and innovation such as (new
or existing) rms and the (public) research infrastructure, or on collaboration
between the actors.
 They o¤er di¤erent modalities of support such as various types of funding,
taxation, regulation and providing of information.
In order to describe and cluster instruments that constitute a policy mix, it is es-
sential to adopt a framework that allows for an assessment of their characteristics,
the actors involved and their interaction. Early e¤orts in research on policy have
resulted in di¤erent methods for describing instruments, such as in (Clark 1985)
and (Llerena and Avadikyan 2005). They have however never been widely adopted
by policy makers involved in R&D and innovation policy because of their inability
to capture the diversity and complexity of especially recent measures. Specic
valuation criteria for policy instruments addressing the process of innovation and
research have been suggested by for example (Elmore 1987) and (Schneider and
Ingram 1990). Also their approach has not been embraced, as the identied cate-
gories are so large that they are not mutually exclusive (Linder and Peters 1990).
The approach suggested in this study builds on the concept of System of Innovation
(SI) (Nelson 1993), (Lundvall 1992).2 According to the SI approach, innovation is
an interactive, non-linear process in which rms interact with a manifold of other
organizations (e.g. research institutes, customers, authorities, nancial organiza-
tions) and institutions (e.g. Intellectual Property Rights, regulations, culture).
The framework enables the identication of the actors involved in R&D and in-
novation, and the analysis of their role and functioning, based on the assessment
2In practice, our approach to describe the policy mix is a simplication of the approach
suggested in (Flanagan et al. 2010) and (OECD 2010b).
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of the ows of funding and knowledge between the stakeholders (Barber 2003).
The SI approach has been adopted by many policy makers as a basis for policy
formulation (Klein Woolthuis et al. 2005). Our framework gives a representation
of the relevant actors in the system, and their role in the research and innovation
process. It introduces three dimensions that allow for the unambiguous clustering
and description of instruments:
 Actor, which refers to the targeted group of the measure: Industry, Research
Institutes (public as well as private) and Higher Education (i.e. universities
and polytechnics).3
 Objective, which describes the phase of the R&D and innovation process that
is addressed by the measure:4
Education and Training of Human Resources, as people are "carriers"
of knowledge, and therefore play a role in the transfer of knowledge.
Knowledge Creation (i.e. R&D oriented measures).
Knowledge Transfer and Application (i.e. innovation oriented measures
including creation of spin-o¤s).
 Modality, which refers to the functionality of the measure (i.e. how it ac-
commodates cost for R&D and innovation):
Regulations such as Intellectual Property Rights (IPR), regulations ad-
dressing functioning and interaction of actors to allow cooperation (be-
tween rms and other actors of the innovation system) and collaboration
(between rms)
3It should be noted that certain instruments focus on several actors (such as tools aimed at
supporting cooperation and collaboration), or just a selection within groups of actors (such as
measures addressing specic technologies or sectors).
Bridging Institutes are not identied as Actor, but as an instrument addressing actors by
providing advice for example concerning Knowledge Transfer and Application.
4Important to mention within the framework of this dimension are measures providing basic
funding for institutions (such as universities). The objective of these measures is equal to the
objective of the corresponding organizations.
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Taxation such as scal measures o¤ering a tax relief on turnover or
prot from products resulting from R&D and innovation.
Direct Funding such as subsidies and grants, but also basic funding. It
involves a transfer of actual funds, which are not recoverable by the
government from the actors.
 Indirect Funding such as access to research infrastructure, vouchers,
rebate on social insurance, and advice. With this kind of support a
government tries to compensate for the cost not by transferring funds,
but by providing in kind resources.
Loans and Guarantees involves an actual funds, but which have to be
reimbursed by the actors to the government (sometimes with a certain
interest rate).
1.2 An optimal policy mix: e¤ectiveness and ef-
ciency
The concept of policy mix originates from economic policy literature from the
1960s. It refers to the coordination of scal and monetary policy to attain the
economys macro-economic goals (Friedman 1968). The concept has more recently
been adopted by international organizations, such as the OECD and the European
Commission, when advising governments on their research and innovation policies
(OECD 2010b).
When intervening to strengthen the innovation capacity of a country, governments
are looking for: "[...] the cheapest one (i.e. measure) to implement, which least
distorts the market whilst still achieving its objective." (Flanagan et al. 2010) The
policy mix concept now provides policy makers with a conceptual framework that
allows them to consider the design of an optimal set of instruments. Optimal in
this respect refers to e¤ectiveness in initiating R&D and innovation, and subse-
quently create sustainable economic growth, and e¢ ciency concerning the cost of
the intervention. Optimizing the policy mix towards higher levels of e¤ectiveness
and e¢ ciency is referred to as coordination of measures (Boekholt et al. 2006).
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The coordination in policy design in order to compose an optimal set of instru-
ments indicates a change from the past. In the framework of a more traditional ap-
proach towards policy formulation, the innovation system is supported by di¤erent
dedicated research, education and innovation policies and instruments addressing
specic but single market or system imperfections. The impact of, and interac-
tion with other instruments is hitherto not considered. As a consequence, the
policy mix e¤ective in a country is as a product of previously developed coexisting
instruments, which interact de facto (Boekholt et al. 2006).
There are clear di¤erences in the design and scope of the existing policy mixes
amongst countries. This is caused by for example the structure of the economy and
its industry, the role of universities and research institutes, the interaction between
the actors involved in research and innovation, and the process of policy making.
An average sized EU member state such as the Netherlands has about a hundred
instruments addressing research performed by actors from the (public) research
infrastructure, and about a hundred measures addressing R&D and innovation
conducted by industry.5
Further implementation of the policy mix concepts will change the set of instru-
ments into a construct resulting from an intentional combination of policy in-
struments shaped ex ante by policy-makers. The rationale for coordination of
instruments towards higher levels of e¤ectiveness and e¢ ciency is the apparent
di¤erence in impact between publicly funded research and privately funded R&D.
The contribution of R&D and innovation to productivity and growth has been
established by for example (Jones 2002) (Mankiw et al. 1992) (Baumol 2002). Re-
sults of empirical analysis however are ambiguous with respect to the e¤ectiveness
of instruments supporting (industry-oriented) research, and give a negative view
concerning their e¢ ciency. In (David et al. 2000) it is argued that "[...] econometric
results tend to be running in favour of ndings of complementarity between public
and private R&D investments, but that reading is simply an unweighted summary
based upon some 30 diverse studies: it is not a conclusion derived from a formal
statistical meta-analysis." The results in (González et al. 2006) suggest that: "[...]
subsidies stimulate R&D activities, and [...] some rms would stop performing
these activities in their absence, but also reveal that most actual subsidies go to
5Source: www.nlinnovatie.nl and www.nwo.nl. Inventarisation of June 2011.
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rms that would have performed R&D otherwise. In these rms, however, subsi-
dies are found to increase R&D spending with no crowding out of private funds."
This last conclusion is refuted in (Wallsten 2000), which concludes, based on an
assessment of the SBIR programme that: "[...] grants crowd out rm-nanced
R&D spending dollar for dollar."6 The decisive argument for further coordination
of instruments is given in (David et al. 2000), where it is concluded that: "The
burden of econometric ndings concerning the productivity growth e¤ects of R&D
seems to be that there is a signicantly positive and relatively high rate of return
to R&D investments at both the private and social levels. Yet, quite generally,
privately funded R&D in manufacturing industries is found to yield a substantial
premium over the rates of return from own productivity improvements derived
from R&D performed with government funding."
1.3 Further implementation of the policy mix
concept
The current practice concerning policy formulation
The rationale for government intervention supporting research has been established
by (Nelson 1959) and (Arrow 1962). They argue that the di¢ culty of selecting
potentially marketable research and the uncertainty with respect to its successful
outcome limits incentives of industry to conduct R&D. The indivisible and nonex-
cludable character of basic research, and the fact that its results are almost freely
available in scientic publications further enhances the tendency to under-invests
in R&D. Since such research is socially benecial there is a strong argument for
government to fund this investment.
This market failure argument has been further sophisticated by considering the dif-
ferent types of spillovers that occur during the R&D and innovation process. These
spillovers refer according to (Ja¤e 1996) to: (a) the appropriability of knowledge
(for example through imitation), the benets to users of the innovation not cap-
tured in its price, and (b) to network spillovers (when successful innovation relies
6SBIR: "Small Business Innovation Research" programme. See www.sbir.gov.
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upon developments in related technologies) .
The arguments above constitute the rationale for intervention in public sector
science and for nancial support in the early stages of industrial research. In the
latter case, the argument is that R&D, particularly when it is further from the
market (i.e. pre-competitiveresearch), merits investment, but that development
activities should be left to the market (Georghiou et al. 2003).
The concept of market failure remains the guiding principle for countries as the
rationale for government intervention (Martin and Scott 2000). But this approach
has limitations when applied as a basis for the formulation of the policy mix.
Market failure as such is very di¢ cult to demonstrate, and even more di¢ cult to
translate into policy and supporting measures. Moreover, by applying the market
failure argument, it is not possible to address the complex process of innovation
as a whole. Instead it is limited to sub-problems within this bigger entity. The
basis for policy formulation in most countries is therefore the already mentioned
concept of System of Innovation.
Within the framework of the SI approach, innovation is considered an interactive,
non-linear process in which rms interact with a manifold of other organizations.
By analyzing the interactions between the actors in the system, the SI approach
allows for the identication of actors and mechanisms that lead to successful in-
novation. It also enables the detection of issues that hinder the creation and
application of knowledge,that are left untouched by the market failure approach.
As a result, it is argued that "[...] it o¤ers a greater potential for identifying
where public support should go. This model is more helpful for policy makers
from a practical and specic point of view." (Edquist et al. 1998). By introducing
this alternative view on innovation, the SI approach has provided a basis for the
identication of new rationales for government intervention, the so-called system
failures.
In practice, the SI model is used by policy makers in the process of policy formula-
tion as a basis for the comparison of the actors, interactions, and ows of knowledge
and funding of their system with those of their peers. These peers are normally
best practice examples of systems in other countries. Based on this assessment,
strengths and weaknesses (typied as system failures) of their innovation system
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are identied, which are then addressed by the policy with its accompanying spe-
cic instruments.7 When formulating policy and instruments, countries seem to
adopt the main features of policy and measures implemented by countries iden-
tied as best-practices addressing similar system imperfections. This tendency is
reected in the many institutionalized consultative bodies initiated by the OECD
and EC focussing on policy learning.
SI approach as a basis for coordination of tools
Optimizing the policy mix is about dening a set of instruments that addresses
the right actors and supports the appropriate objectives, such that it is e¤ective
in initiating R&D, and e¢ cient with respect to the contribution required. Based
on an analysis of the discussions on the formulation of public policy within the
framework of the many institutionalized consultative bodies initiated by the OECD
and EC, we conclude that the countries that have adopted the policy mix concept
seem to focus on two major policy questions when coordinating their instruments.8
The rst issue of concern for the countries adopting the policy mix concept is which
combination of instrument (i.e. which modalities) to use. In order not to impede
future economic recovery, most countries have decided to further rationalize their
national budgets. The consequential retrenchments of public expenditure requires
them to consider the e¢ ciency of instruments in initiating R&D and innovation.
7In (Klein Woolthuis et al. 2005) eight of such system failures are identied: (1) Infrastructural
failures, referring to the physical infrastructure that actors need to function and the science and
technology infrastructure. (2) Transition failures, which involve the inability of rms to adapt
to new technological developments. (3) Path dependency failures, which refer to the inability
of complete systems to adapt to new technological paradigms. (4) Hard institutional failure
resulting from the framework of regulation and the general legal system. (5) Soft institutional
failure being failures in the social institutions such as political culture and social values. (6)
Strong network failures being the blindness that evolves if actors have close links and as a result
miss out on new outside developments. (7) Weak network failures, referring to the lack of linkages
between actors as a result of which insu¢ cient use is made of complementarities, interactive
learning, and creating new ideas. (8) Capabilitiesfailure which refers to the phenomenon that
rms may lack the capabilities to learn rapidly and e¤ectively and hence may be locked into
existing technologies, thus being unable to jump to new technologies.
8See www.proinno-europe.eu and www.ec.europa.eu/invest-in-research (and especially
www.ec.europa.eu/invest-in-research/coordination/coordination01_en.htm).
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The second issue is whether a government, in order to e¤ectively enable future
sustainable economic growth, should implement a generic set of instruments, adopt
a thematic policy focus, or embrace a combination of both policy settings. In
case of a thematic policy, a government identies and selects specic sectors or
technologies, and implements a dedicated set of instruments directing support
towards this specic target. In this way, a government tries to create additional
growth by focussing its limited resources on specic sectors or technologies that
have the potential to create high returns. The subsequent question is how to
identify the most promising specic technology eld or sector. A government will
conversely implement a generic policy mix if it assumes that the innovation system
will either create new scientic or technological paradigms by itself, or adopt that
technology which is most promising for growth. Either way, the government feels
that it is not able, or not in the position, to identify the appropriate sector or
technology eld.
We argue that the currently common methodology for policy formulation (i.e. the
SI approach) is not appropriate for the design of an optimal policy mix. It is sub-
sequently also not able to address the main policy questions as formulated above.
The SI approach allows for the analysis of ows of funding and knowledge between
the actors of the system. But because of its basic principles, it does not provide
insight in the behavior of the actors (and the underlying rationale), resulting from
intervention by the government in the market place. As a consequence, with the
help of the SI approach, it is not possible to assess the e¤ectiveness of instruments
in initiating research. It also does not allow for the consideration of the e¢ ciency
of tools, as it is not possible to evaluate the contribution required to start R&D
and innovation.
1.4 Main results of the thesis: contribution to
the policy mix concept
With this thesis we contribute to further implementation of the policy mix by
addressing the issues that dominate the current discussion on the formulation of
public policy: which instruments to select, and what should be there scope.
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Theoretical framework for the selection of instruments
Analysis of the literature reveals that little is known about the performance of a
single instrument (i.e. e¤ectiveness and e¢ ciency) in comparison to other tools
(Boekholt et al. 2006). It is even argued that "[...] from a purely logical and techni-
cal point of view, policy tools appear to be perfectly interchangeable." (Landry and
Varone 2005) Theoretical research on policy formulation focusses on the impact
of measures enabling collaboration in research between rms, in combination with
subsidies and generic tax measures (Hinloopen 2001) (Spencer and Brander 1983)
(Inci 2008). Empirical research, such as (Guellec and De La Potterie 2003), ad-
dresses substitution e¤ects between government funding and tax incentives. Policy
evaluations seem limited to individual measures, and do not address a set of in-
struments (Flanagan et al. 2010).
With no methodological framework to guide the process of policy formulation,
and no empirical basis for decision making, we see that: "The choice of which
instrument to use to put a decision into e¤ect is often no less contentious than
the decision itself and is very much the subject of discussion, deliberation, and
dispute amongst subsystem members active in the policy process." (Howlett and
Ramesh 2003)
We dene a theoretical framework for the selection of instruments supporting
industry-oriented R&D and innovation. Because of the complexity of the policy
mix concept, we are not able to address all of its the dimensions as identied in our
model. We limit our scope to industry-oriented research and innovation. Moving
further towards innovation driven growth requires a change in behavior from the
actors of the innovation system. It involves the creation of renewal within the
economy: in technologies, products and markets. Industry has a fundamental role
in instigating this change.
The environment in which rms conduct research has changed dramatically in
the recent decades. As a result, rms have changed the way R&D activities are
organized, implemented, and managed (OECD 2010b). As an example, due to in-
creasing global competition, the market position of rms is constantly challenged.
Firms subsequently have reconsidered their approach towards research and adopted
a more result-oriented R&D strategy that supports their overall strategic objec-
1. The policy mix concept as a basis for R&D and innovation policy 13
tives (Chesbrough 2003) (Coombs et al. 2001). For pre-competitive research and
knowledge, they consequently rely more on more on the results from the public
research infrastructure (Chesbrough 2003) (OECD 2001).9
Another important driver for change is the increased complexity of the di¤erent
stages of the innovation process, and the shortened time-to-market for new prod-
ucts and services. This induces rms to collaborate in R&D with the other actors
from the innovation system, as they are not able to maintain in-house all the
required competencies (Chesbrough 2003).
In order to address the current practice concerning industry-oriented R&D and
innovation, we adopt a series of specic assumptions concerning the innovation
process. These assumptions reect the behavior of rms concerning their decision
on conducting research, and the way they are supported in this by governments.
We embrace a problem driven innovation model, in which research originates from
an idea addressing a specic problem. We assume this research is conducted within
the framework of a predened project with corresponding xed cost, based on
an estimation of the required input (e.g. use of equipment and deployment of
researchers). Such a set-up of the project is in line with for example what is
suggested according to the best practice guidelines for industry-oriented research
by the US National Science Foundation.10 Just a subset of the total population
of rms will be involved in the research project, collaborating in a Research Joint
Venture (RJV). We ignore immediate spill-over e¤ects from the consortium to
those rms not involved in research.
We assume that successful execution of the research project involves a certain risk,
as argued by (Stiglitz and Mathewson 1986). We presume however that the out-
come of the R&D process in case of successful completion of the research project,
and the corresponding impact it will have on the rm (i.e. the eventual return)
is predetermined. This is in line with what is argued by (Rogers 1995): "The
innovation-development process often begins with the recognition of a problem or
need, which stimulates research and development activities designed to create an
9This development is illustrated for example by the closing of the Philips Natlab in 2001 and
the subsequent setup of the High Tech Campus Eindhoven, and the changes in structure of the
Bell Labs.
10See www.erc-assoc.org.
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innovation to solve the problem or need. [...] Scientists [...] perceive a future
problem and launch research to nd a solution." In practice only a limited number
of sectors appear to be able to sustain an innovation model which is not problem
driven, but which is purely R&D based. For these sectors, potential technological
breakthroughs are likely to result in a dominant competitive advantage with high
payo¤s exceeding the considerable and risky investments (Chesbrough 2003).
With these assumptions, we argue that a rm will decide on conducting research
by comparing the expected gross gain in prot resulting from successful implemen-
tation of the new technology (i.e. the amount the rm is willing to invest in the
project), with the foreseen project cost. In practice, this is as a decision under risk,
given the probability of success and cost of the project, and the foreseen impact
on the rm.
If there is a shortfall in what the rm is willing to invest in comparison to the
project cost, a government has the possibility to intervene. The corresponding
support should be such that it is e¤ective in changing behavior of rms regarding
investment in research, and e¢ cient concerning the cost of the intervention. We
therefore argue that a government should dene its intervention such that it min-
imizes its expenditure on a single project, such that it is just enough to initiate
the research. If we assume that a government has a limited budget, this allows
for support of other additional research, thereby creating additional surplus. The
actual intervention is limited: a government should provide support only if im-
plementation of the research results (with corresponding cost for the government)
lead to an increase in social surplus.
We model the government intervention such that it is directed towards those in-
volved with the R&D project. The suggested set-up of the intervention, aimed at
supporting a predened research project, is also in line with the current practice
concerning government support for industry-oriented R&D and innovation as gov-
erned by the EU State Aid rules (Commission of the European Communities 2006)
and WTO Disciplines on Subsidies.
With these assumptions concerning industry-oriented R&D and innovation, the
investment decision in research by rms, and the way it is supported by govern-
ments, we progress towards the formulation of a framework for the selection of
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instruments constituting an optimal policy mix.
In Chapter 2 of this thesis, we assess the e¤ectiveness and e¢ ciency of the instru-
ments we identied in Section 1.1 with the help of a multi-stage strategic invest-
ment game. The set-up is such that in the nal stage, rms involved in research
dene what they are willing to invest in the R&D project, based on the foreseen
change in prot and the probability of failure of the research. We assume the
rms o¤er a homogeneous product in a market competing on output (i.e. classical
Cournot competition model). For the computation of this willingness to invest,
we assume a linear perception of risk and prot. In the rst stage of the game, the
government denes the optimal set of instruments in order to address the shortfall
in the willingness to invest from the rm (i.e. it denes the intervention such that
it minimizes the contribution required to initiate the R&D project). The game is
solved by means of backward induction.
Our results indicate that funding (e.g. subsidies or in kind contributions), tax
measures and loans perform equally well: they initiate similar levels of innovation,
and require similar levels of expected contribution. Implementation of a regulatory
framework allowing for collaboration between rms entails the lowest cost for the
government in comparison to the other tools. Allowing for collaboration however
is not always su¢ cient to initiate research. In other words: regulations are the
most e¢ cient, but not always e¤ective.
In Chapter 3 of the thesis, we repeat the analysis for di¤erent types of competi-
tion: a market o¤ering homogeneous products competing on price (i.e. classical
Bertrand competition model), and a market with di¤erentiated products com-
peting on price and on quantity (i.e. Bertrand and Cournot for di¤erentiated
products).
The results show that for certain market structures, allowing for collaboration
between rms does not change their willingness to conduct research. As a conse-
quence, regulations are in that case not e¤ective at all. The order of performance
of the other tools remains the same.
Based on our ndings in these two chapters, we formulate a generalized framework
for the design of an optimal policy mix, which is applicable for di¤erent market
structures. We argue that if a rm is not willing to invest in a predened research
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project, then a government should rst consider the possibility of allowing for
collaboration with the help of a regulatory framework. If regulations are not
e¤ective, a government should provide nancial support, allocated either by means
of funding, tax measures or loans. The government should impose the appropriate
number of partners in the consortium, such that it minimizes its contribution.
In the following chapters of the thesis, we analyze the functioning of specic mea-
sures to further contribute to the framework for the selection of instruments. In
Chapter 4 we analyze the e¤ectiveness of regulations for a hybrid market form of
perfect competition and monopolistic competition. Within the framework of this
market structure (as introduced by (Varian 1980)), some consumers seek to buy
at the lowest price without regard for product characteristics, whereas others have
a brand preference (e.g. the automobile market).
The results indicate that if a rm with an idea for innovation decides on investing
in research under this form of competition (i.e. the expected gain in prot meets
the project cost), it will either conduct the project all alone, or it will establish
a RJV with all rms of the population as its partners in the consortium. This
is di¤erent than for the market structures we analyzed in the previous chapters,
where other optimal sizes for the RJV are also feasible.
In Chapter 5 we assess the e¢ ciency of funding, tax schemes, and loans. We apply
Prospect Theory as introduced by (Kahneman and Tversky 1979) to describe the
behavior of rms concerning their decision on investment in research. In practice
this implies that we assume a non-linear perception of risk by the rms involved
in R&D.
Our analysis indicates that there exists a critical value for the probability of success
of the project at which the modality of the most e¢ cient instruments changes.
For a probability of success smaller than the critical value, a tax measures o¤ering
support only in case of successful completion of the project is preferred. For a
probability exceeding the critical value, a loan is most e¢ cient. The value of the
critical probability depends on the perception of risk and loss aversion of the rm
involved in the research.
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Assessment of the e¤ectiveness of thematic policy
When designing a set of measures supporting the innovation system, many govern-
ments seem particularly concerned with how to identify sectors (or technologies)
that, in comparison to others, have the potential to create additional growth.
Analysis of the relevant literature indicates however that there is no theoretical or
empirical evidence that specic policy is preferred over generic policy. The history
of research and innovation policy includes examples where government policies
have had an inuence on the speed and direction of technological change. But
there are also many other unsuccessful examples of thematic policies and instru-
ments. We argue in line with (Arnold et al. 2007) that priority setting is context
dependent, changes over time in rationale and goals, and alters for di¤erent inno-
vation systems. In practice, "[...] it is not appropriate to give a general assessment
of whether these type of programmes work or not. The outcome depends on the
specic context of each of these programmes (e.g. scope, size, match with ex-
isting actors, programme management, timing, etc.). An overall and systematic
assessment of all innovation programmes in a country is hardly ever done."
Within the framework of this thesis, we intended to analyze the e¤ectiveness of
thematic R&D and innovation policy as a basis for the choice of the scope of the
policy mix. Chapter 6 outlines our approach for the assessment of the impact
of government intervention on labour productivity growth for di¤erent countries,
with a divergent approach towards focus in policy. Labour productivity growth is
chosen as the dependent variable because it reects the innovative performance of
the entire innovation system as addressed by the policy mix. The characteristics
of the mix itself, such as focus, modality and intensity of support, are represented
in the explanatory variables.
Based on the results from the data-collection process, we conclude that an empir-
ical analysis of the impact of specic policy supporting R&D and innovation on
labour productivity on sector level is not feasible. Due to a lack of publicly avail-
able data on the characteristics of policy, and contribution allocated by means of
the supporting instruments, it is not possible to conduct an econometric analysis
that will result in reliable conclusions. Such an analysis would require the set-up
of a database with information on the characteristics of the policy mix for coun-
tries for which labour productivity data on sector level are available. A rst step
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would be the collection of data on allocated funding and other forms of support
at micro-level (i.e. rm-level), as administered by organizations involved in policy
delivery. A next step would be the gathering of information on the scope of the
measures constituting a policy mix from local data-sources (i.e. on country-level).
1.5 Conclusions and recommendations
The policy mix concept has been embraced by many of the industrialized coun-
tries as a basis for consultation and debate on the design of R&D and innovation
policy.11 But further adoption of the concept as a basis for policy formulation is
hindered by the lack of a clear denition and scope.
We dene a policy mix as: A combined set of interacting policies and their sup-
porting instruments, addressing R&D and innovation.Application of the concept
provides a basis for the coordination of measures, such that they are e¤ective in
initiating research (and subsequently create sustainable economic growth), and
e¢ cient with respect to the cost of the intervention.
The rationale for coordination of instruments is the apparent di¤erence in impact
between publicly funded research and privately funded R&D. We dene a theo-
retical framework for the selection of instruments which supports the design of an
optimal intervention, and consequently addresses this di¤erence in impact.
Our research results contribute to the estimation of what a rm is willing to
invest in R&D given the characteristics of a research project, for di¤erent market
structures. Based on the potential shortfall between the willingness to invest
and the project cost, we are able to dene the optimal intervention such that
the contribution required from the government is minimized, and exactly enough
to initiate the R&D. Our research subsequently also identies the most e¢ cient
instrument to implement in case a nancial contribution is required, based on the
characteristics of the rm (i.e. risk aversion and perception of risk).
Based on our results, we conclude that an optimal intervention di¤ers for each
project, and is dened by the expected change in prot and cost of the project,
11See for example www.ec.europa.eu/invest-in-research/coordination/coordination01_en.htm.
1. The policy mix concept as a basis for R&D and innovation policy 19
as well as the form of competition in the market. Flexibility in the modality of
support would subsequently contribute for example to limiting the crowding out
e¤ects between public and private expenditure on R&D.
Our conclusions do have an immediate relevance for the current practice con-
cerning funding of (collaborative) research. As an example, the State Aid rules
(Commission of the European Communities 2006) governing government support
for industry-oriented R&D and innovation (which are endorsed also by the WTO
Disciplines on Subsidies) foresee in a xed contribution to the cost of a project. The
contribution is not based on the characteristics of the project (i.e. risks involved in
the R&D, expected outcome, and structure of the market), and the corresponding
willingness to invest by the rm, but dened by the type of research conducted
(e.g. experimental research, or industry-oriented research close to the market), or
actor involved (e.g. SMEs, MNFs).12 Based on our model we argue that under
this legal framework, projects requiring a higher level of support will not be con-
ducted, as a rm will not receive su¢ cient funding to make up its willingness to
invest in the required research. We therefore claim that under these conditions
the measures are not e¤ective as they are not able to change the behavior of the
rm. We also argue that projects which have been conducted with the help of
support according to State Aid rules in practice most likely would have required
less contribution than provided. We therefore contend that under these conditions
the instruments are not e¢ cient.
Our framework for the selection of instruments has limitations that should be
considered when applying the results in practice. We ignore immediate spillover-
e¤ects from the RJV to the rms not involved in the research. This has an impact
on the market in equilibrium. In practice, the amount a rm is willing to invest will
as a consequence be lower than estimated with our model. Firms will furthermore
have an incentive to exaggerate the risks involved in the project and downplay the
expected change in prot. This will intensify their shortfall in the willingness to
invest such that they are eligible for an extended contribution by the government.
Successful adoption of the policy mix concept however requires further insight in
the factors which dene the investment decision of rms (i.e. perception of risk
12In general (e.g. for almost all of the instruments of the industrialized countries) the contri-
bution for industry-oriented research equals 50% of the project costs.
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and loss aversion), and how they vary (e.g. for type of rm, or sector). Additional
empirical analysis is needed to conrm our theoretical ndings. Important in
this respect is that governments record policy development, and monitor policy
delivery. Consistent and comprehensive data on characteristics of policy in time
are required, which are currently not available. Further implementation of the
policy mix concept entails that we learn from the past in order to be able to
design an optimal policy mix in the future.
Chapter 2
Framework for the design of a policy mix supporting R&D
and innovation
The OECD and the European Commission have encouraged countries to adopt the
concept of policy mix as a basis for long-term innovation driven growth strategies
(OECD 2010b) (Commission of the European Communities 2010). This concept
is rather new, and a clear, univocal and widely adopted denition is still lacking
(Flanagan et al. 2010). We built on (Boekholt et al. 2006), (Flanagan et al. 2010)
and (OECD 2010b), and dene a policy mix as: A combined set of interacting
policies and their supporting instruments, addressing R&D and innovation.
The policy mix concept provides policy makers with a conceptual framework that
allows them to consider the design of an optimal set of instruments. Optimal in this
respect refers to e¤ectiveness in changing behavior of rms regarding investment in
research, and e¢ ciency concerning the cost of the intervention. When intervening,
countries are looking for: "[...] the cheapest one (i.e. measure) to implement,
which least distorts the market whilst still achieving its objective" (adapted from
(Flanagan et al. 2010)).
Optimizing the policy mix towards higher levels of e¤ectiveness and e¢ ciency
is referred to as coordination of measures (Boekholt et al. 2006). Analysis of
the literature indicates that little is known about the performance of a single
instruments in comparison to other tools (Boekholt et al. 2006). It is even argued
that "[...] from a purely logical and technical point of view, policy tools appear to
be perfectly interchangeable" (Landry and Varone 2005).
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In this chapter, we present a theoretical framework which allows for the assessment
of the e¤ectiveness and e¢ ciency of instruments supporting industry-oriented re-
search and innovation. For our analysis, we cluster instruments according to the
following modalities of support (i.e. types or functionalities): funding (e.g. sub-
sidies or in kind contributions), tax schemes, loans and regulations allowing for
collaboration.1 Based on a comparison of the performance of these instruments
we dene the optimal set of measures constituting a policy mix.
We build on the results of a multi-stage strategic investment game from indus-
trial organization theory on R&D expenditure and cooperation as introduced by
(dAspremont and Jacquemin 1988). This paper analyses the behavior of rms
concerning investment in research for di¤erent forms of collaboration. A research
driven innovation model is therefore adopted, in which all rms of the population
get involved in R&D. The impact of this research, conveyed as a decrease in mar-
ginal cost, is dened as a function of investment in R&D. The game introduced
involves a stage where all rms determine their input on R&D, given a certain
level of spillover from research activity. This spillover coe¢ cient reects the level
of coordination in research. In the nal stage the rms engage in competition to
dene market price and output in equilibrium. The game is solved by means of
backward induction.
Important contributions to the theory include the analysis of asymmetric equilibria
resulting from for example product di¤erentiation (Lambertini and Orsini 2000),
asymmetric spillovers (Atallah 2007), and cost functions (Amir et al. 2008). Rele-
vant for our study is the paper by (Poyago-Theotoky 1995), which analyses expen-
diture on R&D in equilibrium if only a subset of the total population establishes
the highest level of coordination in the form of a Research Joint Venture.
Multi-stage strategic investment game theory has been applied before as a basis for
formulation of R&D and innovation policy. In (Hinloopen 2001) and (Inci 2008)
the e¤ects of R&D cooperation and direct R&D subsidies on private investment
in research are analyzed. The assumptions concerning impact of research and in-
1Almost all industrialized countries have implemented these types of specic and dedicated
measures. Some governments limit their set of eligible modalities of support because of in-
stitutional settings, or because of tradition. For an overview, check: www.proinno-europe.eu,
www.cordis.europa.eu/erawatch, or www.oecd.org.
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novation model are as in (dAspremont and Jacquemin 1988). In order to dene
the intervention a model is adopted, introduced in (Spencer and Brander 1983),
which ordains how governments could encourage rms to conduct research. It is
suggested that taxes on prots or price are reallocated in the form of a subsidy to
rms conducting R&D. In practice this implies that a generic intervention reallo-
cates ows of money such that it incites all rms to conduct research. The set-up of
the corresponding game is as in (dAspremont and Jacquemin 1988), but preceded
by a stage aimed at determining the level of taxation and subsidizing required to
establish the socially desirable level of rm-nanced R&D spending.
We argue that the assumptions made in the current literature do not reect the
current practice concerning industry-oriented R&D and innovation, and the way
it is supported by governments (see Chapter 1). As a consequence, it does not
accurately describe the impact of di¤erent instruments on the behavior of rms
concerning their decision on conducting research. In order to dene an optimal
policy mix, we therefore deviate from the existing theory. We adopt a problem
driven innovation model, in which research originates from an idea addressing a
specic problem. We assume this research is conducted within the framework of a
predened project with corresponding xed cost. The outcome of the R&D process
and the impact it could have on the marginal cost of production is predetermined.
Just a subset of the total population of rms will be involved in the research
project, operating as a Research Joint Venture (RJV). Application of the foreseen
results depends on the successful execution of the project, which involves a certain
risk.
Because of our assumptions, also the setup of the game deviates from the existing
literature. In the nal stage rms involved in research dene the foreseen changes in
market price and output in equilibrium resulting from successful implementation of
the project results. Based on the corresponding change in prot and the probability
of failure of the research, rms decide on what they are willing to invest in the
R&D project. For the computation of this willingness to invest, we assume a linear
perception of risk and prot. If the willingness to invest does not meet the foreseen
project cost, a rm will decide not to conduct the research. We consequently argue
that a government could decide to intervene and provide support by means of the
di¤erent measures identied. The intervention is directed towards those involved
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in research. In the rst stage of the game the government thereupon denes the
optimal set of instruments. This implies that we assume that the government
denes its intervention such that it minimizes the contribution required to initiate
the R&D project. The change in total surplus resulting from implementation of
the research results constitutes the rationale for this intervention.
The suggested set-up of the intervention, aimed at supporting a predened re-
search project, is in line with the current practice concerning government support
for industry-oriented R&D and innovation as governed by the EU State Aid rules
(Commission of the European Communities 2006) and WTO Disciplines on Sub-
sidies.
Based on the assessment of the performance of the individual measures, we con-
clude that an optimal policy mix allows for the collaboration of rms by means
of regulations. If the foreseen expected gain in prot ensuing from implementa-
tion of the research results is not su¢ cient to cover the shared project cost by the
project partners, a government should provide additional nancial support in order
to initiate research. This contribution could subsequently be allocated either by
means of funding, tax measures or loans. The government should however impose
the appropriate number of partners in the consortium, such that it minimizes its
contribution. We argue that minimizing contribution per project allows for the
support of other additional research, thereby creating additional surplus.
In the next section, we dene a model to assess the willingness of a rm to invest
in a research project. We subsequently establish the basis for intervention for a
government. This constitutes the framework for the assessment of the performance
of the instruments. In Section 2.3 we calculate market equilibria and total surplus
for a market under Cournot as a function of the size of the Research Joint Venture.
We use this result in Section 2.4 to describe the behavior of the rms resulting
from implementation of the di¤erent instruments. We compare the cost for the
government to alter the investment decision of rms concerning research for each
of the tools. Based on this assessment, we dene the optimal policy mix in Section
2.5. In Section 2.6 we describe implications for policy formulation and future
research.
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2.1 Investment in R&D by rms
As starting point for the formulation of a model for our multi-stage strategic
investment game, we assume that there is a total and xed populationN containing
n rms . We furthermore assume that there is a variable sub-population R  N
containing r rms conducting R&D. The rms operate in a market o¤ering similar
products. The corresponding inverse demand function equals:
P (r) = a  b
hPr
kQk +
Pn
i6=kQi
i
(2.1)
with P as the market price, Q as the quantity sold, and i 2 N , k 2 R.
We consider the initial marginal cost c of production to be equal and constant
for all rms, and determined by the state of the art in production technology
within a certain industry or sector. Reduction of the marginal cost results from
successful completion of a predened research project implemented to explore a
specic idea to improve the production process. As a consequence the impact of
the results on the change in the cost of production is foreseen. We subsequently
dene the marginal cost as ck = C for k 2 R and ci = C for i 2 N ^ i 6= k,
with 0 < C < C < a. The change in marginal cost resulting from a successful
completion of the research project is represented as C = C   C.
We assume that for r > 1 the rms involved in R&D will form a RJV. These
rms will coordinate their research activities by sharing R&D cost and results,
and by avoiding duplication for the duration of the project. This implies that we
assume that the internal spillover coe¢ cient equals 1 (Kamien et al. 1992). We
ignore immediate spill-over e¤ects to and from rms from outside the RJV while
the research project is conducted.
Conducting the research project involves a certain risk of failure. We dene
p 2 [0; 1] as the probability of failure of the project. This probability depends
on the current level of knowledge concerning production for this sector. If the re-
quired knowledge is not available, and lies beyond the current state of the art, the
probability of failure will be close to one. If the required knowledge is available,
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this probability will be close to zero.2
We assume that the project cost K of the research are xed, and based on an
estimation of the required input (e.g. use of equipment and deployment of re-
searchers). When producing we suppose that these rms face no xed cost.
Based on the above, we get the following prot functions:
i(r) = P (r)Qi(r)  CQi(r) (2.2)
k(r) = P (r)Qk(r)  CQk(r) K=r (2.3)
with k(r)  P (r)Qk(r) CQk(r) as the gross prot for rm k (i.e. the maximum
possible prot).
We argue that a rm k will decide on joining the RJV and conducting the required
R&D by comparing the expected prot resulting from conducting the research
with the initial prot. If we dene i = 0 as the initial prot in equilibrium,
and (i (r) ; k (r)) = (  (r) ; + (r)) as the prot in equilibrium after successful
implementation of the research results, we get that this investment decision can be
represented as:
(1  p)  +(r) K=r+ p  0  K=r ? 0 ,
(1  p)  +(r)  0 ? K=r
The inequality shows that rm k will decide by comparing what it is willing to
invest in R&D (i.e. the expected gross gain in prot) with the individual project
cost. Behavior of rms concerning investment is pivotal in our framework for the
selection of instruments. We will represent the willingness to invest in R&D as:
x(r; p) = (1  p)  +(r)  0
with x(r)  +(r)  0 as the gross investment in R&D.
2Within the framework of this paper, we ignores immediate spillover e¤ects. The impact
of knowledge creation however is ultimately captured in the probability of failure of research
projects.
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2.2 Intervention by the government
Firm k will conduct the R&D if the probability of failure of the project is such
that x(r; p) > K=r. But if the rm is not willing to cover the individual project
cost (i.e. x(r; p)  K=r), then k will not consider implementing the project as the
required investment would lead to an expected prot lower than (or equal to) that
in the initial situation. We dene the corresponding shortfall S of the willingness
to invest as:
S (r; p) = K   x(r; p) (2.4)
If the willingness of the rm does not meet the project cost, a government has
the possibility to intervene, and implement measures such that the rm will alter
its behavior, and decide on conducting the research. A medium-sized country like
the Netherlands for example has implemented about a hundred measures aimed at
supporting industry oriented R&D and innovation on national level.3 We identify
four modalities of support which we will analyze in this chapter:
 Funding: direct support in the form of subsidies, grants or a rebate on social
insurances, and indirect support such as vouchers and access to research
infrastructure (i.e. in kind contributions).
 Taxation: scal measures o¤ering a tax relief on turnover or prot from
products resulting from the research project.
 Loans: support which has to be reimbursed by the rms involved in research
to the government.
 Regulations such as Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) and laws governing
the functioning and interaction of actors, aimed at establishing cooperation
(between rms and actors of the research infrastructure) and collaboration
(between rms).
The objective of our research is to design an optimal policy mix, constituted by
a set of instruments which is not only e¤ective, but also e¢ cient. We therefore
3Source: www.nlinnovatie.nl on January 2011.
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argue that a government should dene its intervention such that it minimizes
its expenditure on a single project. This allows for support of other additional
research, thereby creating additional surplus.
Rationale for intervention by a government is the expected increase in surplus
resulting from conducting the project. The intervention as such is limited: the
corresponding government cost (on project level) for the intervention should never
be too high, in that they should not undo the gain in social surplus. This rationale
for intervention and corresponding condition for support will act as our set of
criteria to assess the design of an optimal policy mix.4
2.3 Prot and surplus in equilibrium
In order to assess the amount rms are willing to invest in research, we need to
get insight in the prot in equilibrium. In this chapter, we analyze the optimal
policy mix for a market under Cournot. Given the demand function (2.1) and the
prot functions (2.2) and (2.3), we get that (see Appendix A for computations):
0 =
 
a  C2
b (n+ 1)2
+(r) =
8>>><>>>:
k(r) for rC < a  C
Ok (r) for rC  a  C
 (r) =
8>>><>>>:
i (r) for rC < a  C
Oi (r) for rC  a  C
(2.5)
4In practice, a government could condition its intervention, and limit support to projects that
exceed a certain threshold concerning probability of success or foreseen change in marginal costs
(or a combination of the two). Selection on the basis of these project characteristics normally
is associated with a certain thematic focus in policy. The e¤ectiveness of thematic policy is
addressed in Chapter 6.
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with:
k(r) =
[(a  C) + (n  r)C]2
b (n+ 1)2
 K=r
i (r) =
[
 
a  C  rC]2
b (n+ 1)2
Ok (r) =
(a  C)2
b (r + 1)2
 K=r
Oi (r) = 0
We can see from the expression for i (r) in (2.5) that the rms not conducting
R&D remain producing only in case rC < a C. We dene this as an incremental
change in marginal cost. These rms however cease production if rC  a   C.
We dene this as a radical change in marginal cost. The members of the RJV will
in that case act as an oligopoly.5
Figure 2.1 shows as an example the gross prot in equilibrium as a function of
r for 1 <
 
a  C =C < n. The gross investment x(r) for a certain r can be
graphically visualized as the distance between +(r) and 0. The gure indicates
that under Cournot, + (r)  0 >   (r). This implies that a rm has a clear
incentive to pursue research lowering its marginal cost.6
Successful application of the research result leads to a change in surplus. This
change connes support by a government, as dened in our criteria for intervention.
5Note that the number of rms in the market after the implementation of the research results
(i.e. whether the change in production is either incremental or radical) does not depend only on
the quality of the idea, which is reected in C. It also depends on the number of rms of the
population involved in the research project, which is represented by r.
6We argue that for p = 0, the project itself does no longer refer to research, but should be
seen as a regular investment. Theory developed within the framework of this paper is in that
case as a concequence no longer relevant.
In case p = 1, rm k will not invest in the research project. The government should in that
case not intervene.
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Figure 2.1: Prot for 1 <
 
a  C =C < n
The total surplus is given by (see Appendix A for computations):
W 0 =
1
2
n (n+ 2)
"
(a  C)2
b (n+ 1)2
#
W+(r) =
8>>><>>>:
W (r) for rC < a  C
WO(r) for rC  a  C
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with:
W (r) =
(n+ 2)

(n  r) (a  C)2 + r(a  C)2
2b (2 + (n  1))2 +
(2n+ 3) r (n  r)C2
2b (2 + (n  1))2  K
WO(r) =
1
2
r (r + 2)
"
(a  C)2
b (r + 1)2
#
 K
and W 0 as the initial surplus, and W+(r) as the surplus after implementation of
the research results. We dene W
+
(r) as the gross surplus.(i.e. the total surplus
without the cost of the project).
2.4 Assessment of instruments
In this section, we assess the e¤ectiveness and e¢ ciency of the instruments we
identied. As a starting point we consider a single rm k from the total population
of rms N , which has an idea for an improvement of its production technology. We
assume that the characteristics of the corresponding research project are such that
the willingness to invest does not meet the project cost: x (p)  K (see Figure
2.2).
We model the di¤erent modalities of the measures by varying the moment of inter-
vention in the innovation process, and by changing the conditionality of support
with respect to the outcome of the project. In practice, we cover all relevant
possibilities for intervention.
We also model the instruments such that the willingness of the rm exactly equals
the project cost. In this way we are able to compute, and therefore compare, the
exact contribution required for each of the instruments to initiate research.
Note that we assume that each intervention is targeted, and therefore limited, to
those involved in research.
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Funding
A government could choose to contribute to the project cost of rm k by means of
Funding (F ) o¤ered in direct or indirect means. A rm will consider conducting
the research project if a government provides resources lowering the cost of the
project from K to KF (see Figure 2.2).
Figure 2.2: Funding
The contribution is o¤ered at the beginning of the project, and unconditional with
respect to the outcome. If F is the minimum amount of funding required to initiate
the research project, then:
(1  p)  +   0+ F = K
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Taxation
A government could also choose to contribute to the project cost by means of
Taxation. We identify two di¤erent options for o¤ering a tax relief: a reduction in
case of the successful implementation of the research results, and a reduction for
rms conducting research, unconditional to the outcome of the project. Note that
we model tax measures such that they contribute to prot.
Conditional tax-rebate
By o¤ering a tax relief on turnover or prot from products resulting from the
project, a government could try to increase the gross investment x of a rm to
xT such that the corresponding willingness to invest meets the project cost (see
Figure 2.3)
Figure 2.3: Conditional tax-rebate
The percentual increase t of the prot required to to initiate the research should
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be such that:
(1  p)  (1 + t)+   0 = K
The actual contribution T in case of successful implementation of the research
results equals:
T =
 
xT   x = K   x(p)
1  p
Figure 2.3 indicates that the actual contribution to the rm is higher than shortfall
in its willingness to invest.7 The resulting tax surplus should be considered as a
premium for the rm for taking the risk of not receiving support in case the project
fails.
Unconditional tax-rebate
An alternative form of tax relief can be o¤ered to a rm for conducting research
regardless of the outcome of the project. The corresponding percentual increase 
required to alter the investment decision of the rm is in that case computed with:
(1  p)  +   0+   (1  p)+ + p0 = K
The actual contribution   is dened by the probability of failure of the research,
and depends on the outcome of the project:
  =
8>>><>>>:
K x(p)
(1 p)   p

(1 p)
0 for successful completion of the project
K x(p)
p   (1 p
)
p 
+ for unsuccessful completion of the project
Loans
In case the willingness of a rm to invest does not meet the project cost, a govern-
ment could also consider providing the support required to initiate the research
project in the form of a Loan (L). We assume that the rm will have to redeem
the loan only in case of successful completion of the research project, and that no
interest will be charged.
7Nota that the contribution T is as the projection of K   x(p) on the left vertical axis from
p = 1:
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Figure 2.4: Loans
If a rm accepts a loan to cover its shortfall in investment, it would in practice
lower its gross investment such that xL = x L. This is shown in Figure 2.4 on the
left vertical axis. The loan required to initiate the research should consequently
be such that the loan itself plus the resulting actual investment meet the project
cost:
L+ (1  p) (x  L) = K
The actual contribution L in case of failure of the research equals therefore:
L =
 
xL   x = K   x(p)
p
Figure 2.4 indicates that also in this case the actual contribution to the rm is
higher than shortfall in its willingness to invest.8 The resulting surplus should
8Note that the loan L is as the projection of K   x(p) on the right vertical axis from p = 0.
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again be considered as a premium for the rm, for taking the risk of having to pay
back the support. Note that a loan can be applied in theory only if K  x.
Regulations
In order to initiate industry-oriented research and innovation, a government could
also try to establishes the necessary preconditions for collaboration between rms
within an R&D project. Collaborating rms are able to share the risks and thereby
the cost of the research project such that its individual project cost will be lowered
to K=r. Their prot however will also decrease. Firm k will therefore try to select
an optimal number of research partners, such that it maximizes its individual prot
while covering the individual project cost.
In practice, establishing collaboration requires a legal framework that allows for the
formalization of agreements into binding contracts, regulates their compliance, and
protects foreground and background knowledge of rms participating in a RJV.
Lemma 2.1 Firm k will establish a RJV with r+ consortium members if x(r+; p) >
K=r+ such that:
br =
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
r : + (r) = max (+; + (r) ; + (n)) ;
fr 2 R : r 2 [1; n]g for  a  C =C  n
r : + (r) = max
 
+; + (r) ; +
  
a  C =C ;
r 2 R : r 2 1;  a  C =C	 for 1 <  a  C =C < n
1 for 1   a  C =C
with:
R =
8>>><>>>:
 	  1
2
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p
3 + 1
2

+
1
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(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given that:
	 =
3
vuuut    2273 +    2273 + 2 + 4( 13(+5))327  12
2
 =
 2C [(a  C)  nC]
2 (C)2
 =
Kb (n+ 1)2
2 (C)2
Proof. The optimal size of the consortium, such that rm k will maximize its
prot, is computed with:
max
r
 
+ (r)

(2.6)
subject to :
x(r; p) > K=r (a)
1  r  n (b)
Constraint (2.6 (a)) stipulates that if it is not possible to formulate a RJV such that
the willingness to invest meets the individual project cost, no research consortium
will be established, and rm k will consequently decide not to conduct the R&D.
The optimal size of the consortium depends on the impact of the research result on
the market. Optimizing for an incremental change in marginal cost gives + (r) =
k (r). On r 2 (0;1) this prot function is continuous, and increasing and concave
for r # 0 and convex and increasing for r ! 1. On the interval as dened by
constraint (2.6 (b)), none of the extremes of the solution set bR 2 C can be excluded
beforehand, or subsequently be identied as a local maximum or minimum. The
computation for the solution set bR is given in Appendix B.
For a radical change in marginal cost we get that + (r) = Ok (r). The prot
for rms acting as an oligopoly decreases with an increasing number of rms in a
RJV (see Appendix C ). Firm k has therefore an incentive to limit the number of
partners in the research project.
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Comparison of tools
With the help of our framework, we demonstrate the functioning of each instru-
ments (i.e. the way it changes the investment decision of the rm). We therefore
argue that we are able to assess the e¤ectiveness of the di¤erent tools. We also
dene for each of the instruments the exact contribution required by a rm to
initiate research when its willingness to invest does not meet the cost of an R&D
project.9 We therefore conclude that we have dened a framework for the selec-
tion of instruments, such that they are e¢ cient. We consequently argue that we
are able to compare the instruments, as a basis for the formulation of an optimal
policy mix.
Lemma 2.2 The expected contribution by a government required to initiate re-
search is equal for Funding, Taxation or Loans.
The previous section indicates that these measure induce a similar level of e¤ort
in R&D. The support necessary to alter the investment decision of the rm di¤ers.
The expected contribution however is identical for the di¤erent tools, and equal
to the shortfall in investment:
S = F = (1  p)T =   (1  p)+ + p0 = pL
Lemma 2.3 Regulations are most e¢ cient in inducing research by rms. They
are however not always e¤ective.
Measures aimed at allowing collaboration between rms do not require a contribu-
tion to the cost of the research. As we have seen however, it is not always possible
to establish a consortium with an appropriate number of participants.
The actual implementation of instruments aimed at supporting industry-oriented
research brings about more cost than the contribution required to initiate the R&D
project. From a government perspective, these additional cost result from policy
9The expected gain in prot results from the foreseen implementation of the research results,
and not from the transfer of support. The contribution itself is appropriated merely to amend
the expectations of the rm such that it will initiate the project.
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delivery. We represent these as implementation cost I and dene them as all cost
of the intervention not part of the contribution required to address the shortfall
in investment. For simplicity, we will assume that the cost of implementation are
equal for all instruments, resulting from evaluation of the project proposal and
monitoring of the progress and results of the project. We will consequently not
alter our conclusions concerning the preference of the instruments.10
2.5 Main result: combination of measures in a
policy mix
The assessment of the instruments in the previous section forms the basis for the
formulation of an e¤ective policy mix for the support of industry-oriented R&D
and innovation. For the formulation of the actual set of tools, we will have to
analyze if they comply with the restrictions as set by our criteria for intervention.
Theorem 2.4 If a rm k is not willing to invest in a predened research project
because the expected change in prot does not cover the corresponding xed cost,
then a government should consider allowing for collaboration. In other words, if
x(p)  K a government could implement regulations.
If it is not possible to formulate a RJV such that the cumulative willingness of the
10The cost for policy delivery could in practice change with the modality of instruments,
because of the moment of intervention or conditionality of support with respect to the outcome
of the project. In case a government for example considers providing support by means of a
loan, it will have to allocate an actual contribution higher than the shortfall in investment, at
the beginning of the project. And although the expected contribution equals that for other
instruments, its implementation cost would be higher because of the opportunity cost of the
associated surplus in support.
Also operational aspects of the policy delivery process a¤ect the cost for implementation.
Evaluation of a Dutch measure called WBSO ("Wet Bevordering Speur- en Ontwikkelingswerk"
or "R&D Work Stimulation Act") indicated, on the basis of results of a questionnaire, that
rms and the government prefer scal measures over other forms of nancial support, because
of the simplicity of application, and the fact that a large part of the infrastructure required
for the policy delivery is available (Brouwer et al. 2002). Especially this last issue reduces the
implementation cost in comparison to other means of support.
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members covers the total project cost, then a government might consider contribut-
ing to the cost of the project. This implies that if x(br; p)  K=br a government
could implement regulations, accompanied with funding, tax measures or loans.
The government however should impose a size er of the RJV that minimizes its
expected contribution to K   x(er; p), with:
er =
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
r : + (r) = max (+; + (r) ; + (n)) ;
fr : r 2 [1; n]g for  a  C =C  n
r : + (r) = max
 
+; + (r) ; +
  
a  C =C ;
r : r 2 1;  a  C =C	 for 1 <  a  C =C < n
1 for 1   a  C =C
and:
r =
2 ((a  C) + nC) 
h
((a  C) + nC)2 + 3  a  C2i1=2
3C
The actual intervention is constrained. In practice, a government should intervene
only if:
(1  p)

W
+
(r) W 0

 I +K (2.7)
The decision tree for an optimal the intervention supporting industry-oriented can
consequently be depicted as in Figure 2.5 of Appendix C.11
Proof. We build on Lemma 2.1, Lemma 2.2 and Lemma 2.3. Our analysis indi-
cates that because of its e¢ ciency, a regulatory framework is preferred as a basis
11Note that if we assume that all rms are involved in research (i.e. r = n, as in line with the
current multi-stage strategic investment game literature on policy formulation), our conclusions
concerning the order of performance of the instruments providing a nancial contribution still
hold. The intervention as such however might not be e¢ cient.
Because of our objectives and corresponding assumptions with which we deviate from the
current literature (e.g. predened project with xed cost, no immediate spill-overs, objective
function for the government), our results are not comparable with those from the existing liter-
ature.
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for a set of measures supporting R&D. But regulations alone are not always suf-
cient to initiate research. The policy mix becomes e¤ective if regulations are
accompanied with measures contributing to the cost of the project.
Minimizing the government contribution given the constraints about intervention
and the size of the population is computed according to:
min
r

r

K
r
  x(r; p)

(2.8)
subject to :
x(r; p)  K=r (a)
1  r  n (b)
In practice this implies computing the size of the consortium that generates the
highest cumulative willingness to invest.
Constraint (2.8 (a)) stipulates that a government should contribute to a consortium
only if it is not possible to formulate a RJV such that the partners are willing and
able to cover the total project cost.
The optimal size of the consortium in depends also in this case on the impact of
the research result on the market structure. For an incremental change in marginal
cost, with + (r) = k (r), we get that the cumulative willingness to invest has a
maximum at er (see Appendix D). The actual size of the consortium depends on
the orientation of er with respect to the interval as dened by constraint (2.8 (a)).
For a radical change in marginal cost we get that + (r) = Ok (r). The cumulative
willingness to invest for rms acting as an oligopoly decreases with an increasing
number of rms in an RJV (see Appendix D). A government therefore has an
incentive to limit the number of partners in the research project.
A government should test the actual intervention against the criteria for support.
First, a government should only contribute to the cost of the project if it leads to
an expected increase in the total surplus. Second, the total government cost should
not exceed the gain in surplus created by the change in marginal cost. Combining
this gives:
(1  p)

W
+
(r)  rx(r; p)

+ p
 
W 0   rx(r; p) W 0  I + (K   rx(r; p))
42 2.6. Conclusions and recommendations
Reformulating this gives an expression according to (2.7) as a condition for inter-
vention.
We argue that if the criteria for intervention or any of the other conditions are
not met, a government should not support the research project. It should instead
focus its e¤ort on other projects.12
We are aware that a government is not always willing to restrict the intervention,
or even impose the optimal size of the consortium. It might wish to create a
competitive advantage for rms in comparison to their foreign competitors. We
argue however that this type of support should be considered as industry policy,
and not R&D and innovation policy.
2.6 Conclusions and recommendations
For the formulation of an e¤ective policy mix, we have made assumptions with
which we deviate from the existing literature (see Table 2.1 in Appendix E for
an overview of our assumptions, and how we deviate from those in the existing
literature). We assume that investment in R&D is as a decision under risk about
conducting a predened research project with corresponding outcome and xed
cost. We argue that this approach is a more accurate representation of the cur-
rent practice concerning industry-oriented competitive R&D and innovation. The
resulting impact of the research on the market is thereupon also a more realistic
reection of reality. Our model shows that if research is conducted successfully,
it creates a competitive advantage for the members of the RJV over those not
involved in R&D, such that they might capture the entire market.
Because of our di¤erent assumptions, also the set-up of the corresponding multi-
stage strategic investment game di¤ers from the existing literature (see Table 2.2
in Appendix E). Our model for intervention allows furthermore for an estimation
of the shortfall in what the rm is willing to invest to cover the individual project
12The restrictions concerning the change in surplus are of importance in this respect. Only in
case all rms are involved in the research, or in case of an oligopoly, will the surplus always be
higher than in the initial stage with no R&D. In other situations, the change in surplus has to
be analyzed.
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cost. We are subsequently able to show that although the expected contribution
required to initiate the project is equal for funding, tax measures and loans, the
actual support which has to be allocated di¤ers for these instruments. If we apply
the current framework for a di¤erent market structure, their order of performance
would remain unchanged. Such a change in structure will however have an impact
on the e¤ectiveness of regulations. The results suggest also that if we were to
apply a non-linear perception of risk and (or) utility, we would nd a di¤erence in
the performance for all measures.
Our model has limitations that should be considered when applying the results
in practice. We ignore immediate spillover-e¤ects from the RJV to the rms
not involved in the research. This has an impact on the market in equilibrium.
In practice, the amount a rm is willing to invest will therefore be lower than
estimated with our model. Firms will furthermore have an incentive to exaggerate
the risks involved in the project and downplay the expected change in prot. This
will intensify their shortfall in the willingness to invest such that they are eligible
for an extended contribution by the government.
Regardless of these limitations, our results do have implications for the current
practice concerning support of industry-oriented R&D and innovation. The State
Aid rules (Commission of the European Communities 2006) governing government
support for industry-oriented R&D and innovation (which are endorsed also by
the WTO Disciplines on Subsidies) foresee in a xed contribution to the cost of
a project. The contribution is not based on the characteristics of the project
(i.e. risks involved in the R&D, expected outcome, and structure of the market),
and the corresponding willingness to invest by the rm, but dened by the type of
research conducted (e.g. experimental research, or industry-oriented research close
to the market), or actor involved (e.g. SMEs, MNFs).13 Based on our model we
argue that under this legal framework, projects requiring a higher level of support
will not be conducted, as a rm will not receive su¢ cient funding to make up
its willingness to invest in the required research. We therefore claim that under
these conditions the measures are not e¤ective as they are not able to change the
behavior of the rm. We also argue that projects which have been conducted with
13In general (e.g. for almost all of the EU and national programmes), the contribution for
industry-oriented research equals 50% .
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the help of support according to State Aid rules in practice most likely would have
required less contribution than provided. We therefore contend that under these
conditions the instruments are not e¢ cient.
Appendix A: market equilibria and surplus
To demonstrate out framework for the selection of instruments, we need insight
in the market characteristics in equilibrium. We demonstrate the computation for
r > 0. The initial market equilibrium with r = 0 is calculated in a similar way.
We rst rewrite the prot function for rms not involved in research:
i(r) =
h
a  b
hPr
kQk +Qi +
Pn
j 6=i;j 6=kQj
ii
Qi   CQi (2.9)
j(r) =
h
a  b
hPr
kQk +Qj +
Pn
i6=j;i 6=kQi
ii
Qj   CQj
and we do the same for the rms of the RJV:
k(r) =
h
a  b
h
Qk +
Pr
l 6=kQl +
Pn
i6=k;i6=lQi
ii
Qk   CQk  K=r (2.10)
l(r) =
h
a  b
h
Ql +
Pr
k 6=lQl +
Pn
i6=k;i6=lQi
ii
Qk   CQl  K=r
We will assume that each rm maximizes prot based on quantity produced, and
that each rival will consider the others quantity as a xed number that will not
respond to its own product decision.14 Maximizing prot for rms not involved in
14The assumptions of our model allow for the calculation of quantity and prot in equilibrium
according to Cournot:
 There is more than one rm and all rms produce a homogeneous product, i.e. there is
no product di¤erentiation;
 Firms do not cooperate, i.e. there is no collusion;
 Firms have market power, i.e. each rms output decision a¤ects the goods price;
 The number of rms is xed;
 Firms compete in quantities, and choose quantities simultaneously;
 The rms are economically rational and act strategically, usually seeking to maximize
prot given their competitorsdecisions.
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R&D according to Cournot implies:
max
Qi
h
a  b
hPr
l 6=kQk +Qi +
Pn
j 6=i;j 6=kQj
ii
Qi   CQi
which yields as the best-response function:
a  b
hPr
kQk + 2Qi +
Pn
j 6=i;j 6=kQj
i
  C = 0)
a  b
hPr
kQk + 2Qi +Qj +
Pn
h 6=i;h 6=j;h 6=kQh
i
  C = 0 (2.11)
Maximizing prot for rm j according to @j=@Qj gives, in a similar way as a
best-response function:
a  b
hPr
kQk + 2Qj +Qi +
Pn
h 6=i;h 6=j;h 6=kQh
i
  C = 0 (2.12)
With @i=@Qi = @j=@Qj we see that in equilibrium Qi = Q

j . Substituting that
in (2.11) gives:
a  b [PrkQk + (n  r + 1)Q]  C = 0 (2.13)
Optimizing prot with respect to quantity for rms involved in the research project
with @k=@Qk = 0 results in a best-response function according to:
a  b
h
2Qk +
Pr
l 6=kQl +
Pn
i6=k;i6=lQi
i
  C = 0 (2.14)
With @k=@Qk = @l=@Ql we get that in equilibrium Qk = Q

l . Substituting that
in (2.14) leads to:
a  b
h
(r + 1)Qk +
Pn
i6=k;i6=lQi
i
  C = 0 (2.15)
From (2.13) and (2.15) we obtain that in equilibrium the relation between the
output from rms not involved in R&D, and the quantity produced by the members
of the RJV, is given by:
Qk(r) = Q

i (r) +
C
b
(2.16)
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Incremental change in marginal cost
Substitution of Qk(r) according to (2.16) in (2.13) yields for the output by rms
not involved in research:
a  b

r[Qi (r) +
C
b
] + (n  r + 1)Qi (r)

  C = 0,
Qi (r) =
 
a  C  rC
b(n+ 1)
(2.17)
We can see from equation (2.17) that in theory it is possible that rms not involved
in research will seize their production. We dene the change in marginal cost to be
incremental, if it is such that the rms not involved in the research project remain
producing output, given the number of rms participating in the RJV. Equation
(2.17) indicates that Qi (r) > 0 for rC < a  C.
By inserting (2.17) in (2.16) we get the output for rms involved in R&D for an
incremental change in cost:
Qk(r) =
(a  C) + (n  r)C
b(n+ 1)
(2.18)
The corresponding market price in equilibrium equals, after substituting Qi (r)
and Qk(r) in (2.1) becomes:
P

(r) =
a+ nC   rC
n+ 1
With Qi (r) = Q

j(r), equation (2.9) generates the prot for rms not conducting
R&D:
i (r) = [a  b [rQk(r) + (n  r)Qi (r)]]Qi (r)  CQi (r) (2.19)
By substituting Qi (r) and Q

k(r) in (2.19) we can compute this prot as a function
of the changes in marginal cost:
i (r) =
[
 
a  C  rC]2
b (n+ 1)2
In order to obtain the prot for the rms of the RJV, we rewrite (2.10) with
Qk(r) = Q

l (r):
k(r) = [a  b [rQk(r) + (n  r)Qi (r)]]Qk(r)  CQk(r) K=r (2.20)
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Substitution of Qi (r) and Q

k(r) in (2.20) yields as a prot for rms conducting
R&D:
k(r) =
[(a  C) + (n  r)C]2
b (n+ 1)2
 K=r
The corresponding total surplus is calculated according to:
W (r) =
1
2
(rQk(r) + (n  r)Qi (r))
 
a  P (r)+
(rk(r) + (n  r)i (r)) K
=
(n+ 2)

(n  r) (a  C)2 + r(a  C)2
2b (2 + (n  1))2 +
(2n+ 3) r (n  r)C2
2b (2 + (n  1))2  K
Radical change in marginal cost: oligopoly
We dene the change in marginal cost of production to be radical if Qi (r) = 0. In
the given market situation, this will happen if rC  a C. As a consequence the
members of the RJV will act as an oligopoly. The corresponding prot functions
can be rewritten from (2.10) as:
ok(r;K) =
h
a  b
h
Qk +
Pr
l 6=kQl
ii
Qk   CQk  K=r (2.21)
ol (r;K) =
h
a  b
h
Ql +
Pn
k 6=lQk
ii
Ql   CQl  K=r
Maximizing prot according to Cournot implies optimizing (2.21) with respect to
quantity: @k=@Qk = 0. This yields for the best response function:15
a  b
h
2Qk +
Pr
l 6=kQl
i
  C = 0 (2.22)
15Note that if we assume that Qm = Qm with m 6= k ^m 6= l, we get that if we di¤erentiate
the best-response function (2.22) that jdQk=dQlj = 1=2. With a similar assumption, we get that
the absolute value of the slope of the best response function for rm in the neighborhood of the
equilibrium for rm l is also 1=2. With that the stability condition is fullled (Henriques 1990).
In a similar way, we can show that stability conditions are met in case of an incremental change
in marginal cost, and in the initial situation (i.e. without successful implementation of research
results).
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And with @k=@Qk = @l=@Ql we get that in equilibrium: QOk = Q
O
l . Substitution
in (2.22) gives:
a  b 2QOk + (r   1)QOk   C = 0,
QOk (r) =
a  C
b(r + 1)
By substituting QOk in (2.1) we obtain for the price in equilibrium:
PO(r) =
a+ rC
r + 1
With QOk = Q
O
l the expression (2.21) for rms conducting R&D becomes:
ok(Q
O
k ; r) =

a  b rQOk (r)QOk (r)  CQOk (r) K=r
Substitution of the equilibrium quantity QOk (r) gives a prot in equilibrium:
16
Ok (r) =
(a  C)2
b (r + 1)2
 K=r
The corresponding total surplus is calculated with:
WO(r;K) =
1
2
rQOk (r)
 
a  PO(r)+ rOk (r) K
=

1
2
a  1
2
PO(r) + bQOk (r)

rQOk (r) K
=
1
2
r (r + 2)
"
(a  C)2
b (r + 1)2
#
 K
16Note that because the demand function is linear and marginal cost is constant, the second
order condition is met, and the prot calculated is therefore indeed a maximum (Martin 2002).
This condition is also met in case of an incremental change in marginal cost, and in the initial
situation (i.e. without successful implementation of research results).
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Appendix B: regulations and the optimal size of
a consortium
In case of an incremental change in marginal cost, we get that + (r) = k (r).
The corresponding extremes are calculated with:
@
h
[(a C)+(n r)C]2
b(n+1)2
  K
r
i
@r
= 0,
2 (C)2 r3   2C[(a  C) + nC]r2 +Kb (n+ 1)2 = 0
Rewriting this equation with:
 =
 2C [(a  C)  nC]
2 (C)2
 =
Kb (n+ 1)2
2 (C)2
and r = x+ y, we get that:
x3 + (3y + )x2 +
 
3y2 + 2y

x+ y3 + y2 +  = 0
With y =  
3
,  = 1
3
 (+ 5) and  = 2
27
3 +  the equation reduces to:
x3 + x+  = 0
We can now apply "Viatas substitution". With x = z + s
z
we arrive at:
z6 + (3s+ ) z4 + z3 + s (3s+ ) z2 + s3 = 0
By substituting s =  
3
and z3 = t we get:
t2 + t  
3
27
= 0
Solving this gives:
t =
  

2 + 4
3
27
 1
2
2
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Based on the above, we get as a set of solutions:
R =
8>>><>>>:
 	  1
2
i
p
3 + 1
2

+
1
9
(+5)
	( 12 i
p
3+ 1
2)
  
3
;
	
 
1
2
i
p
3  1
2
  19(+5)
	( 12 i
p
3  1
2)
  
3
;
	  19(+5)
	
  
3
9>>>=>>>;
	 =
3
vuuut    2273 +    2273 + 2 + 4( 13(+5))327  12
2
In case of a radical change in marginal cost, we see that +(r) = Ok (r). We rst
note that constraint (2.6 (a)) stipulates that rms will only conduct research if
their willingness to invest meets the project cost. In practice this implies that in
order to invest, rms have to make a prot after implementation of the research
results:
(1  p)  + (r)  0 > K=r ) + (r) K=r > 0) (a  C)2
b (r + 1)2
>
K
r
Maximizing this prot on the interval as dened by constraint (2.6 (b)) gives:
@
h
(a C)2
b(r+1)2
  K
r
i
@r
=  2 (a  C)
2
b (r + 1)3
+
K
r2
< 0
because:
(a  C)2
b (r + 1)2
>
K
r
^ 2
r + 1
 1
r
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Appendix C: decision tree for an optimal policy
mix
Based on our analysis we argue that an optimal intervention supporting industry-
oriented R&D can be depicted as in Figure 2.5.
Figure 2.5: Decision tree for an optimal policy mix
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Appendix D: government intervention and the min-
imal contribution
For an incremental change in marginal cost, we get that + (r) = k (r). Maxi-
mizing the cumulative willingness to invest implies:
@

r (1  p)

[(a C)+(n r)C]2
b(n+1)2
  (a C)
2
b(n+1)2

@r
= 0,
(1  p)
24 [(a C)+(n r)C]2b(n+1)2   (a C)2b(n+1)2 
2rC[(a C)+(n r)C]
b(n+1)2
35 = 0
Reformulating this gives:
3 (C)2 r2   4C [(a  C) + n (C)] r + [(a  C) + n (C)]2    a  C2 = 0
Solving this gives as a solution set:
R =
8><>:
2
h
2 + 3
 
a  C2i1=2
3C
9>=>;
with:  = [(a  C) + nC].
The function for the cumulative willingness is increasing from 0 for r # 0, and
increasing for r !1. If eR 2 N then the local maximum is given by:
r =

2 
h
2 + 3
 
a  C2i1=2 =3C
For an incremental change in marginal cost, we get that +(r) = Ok (r). Maximiz-
ing the corresponding cumulative willingness to invest on the interval dened by
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(2.8 (a)) gives:
@ [rx(r; p)]
@r
= (1  p)
""
(a  C)2
b (r + 1)2
 
 
a  C2
b (n+ 1)2
#
  2r (a  C)
2
b (r + 1)3
#
= (1  p)

Ok (r)  0
  2r
r + 1
Ok (r)

= (1  p)
 r + 1
r + 1
Ok (r)  0

< 0
because:
 r + 1
r + 1
 0
Appendix E: characteristics of multi-stage strate-
gic investment games
In order to dene an optimal policy mix, we build on the results of a multi-stage
strategic investment game. We deviate from the existing literature as to reect
the current practice concerning industry-oriented R&D and innovation, and the
way it is supported by governments (see Table 2.1).
Traditional approach Approach for formulation of the
policy mix
Research driven innovation approach Problem driven innovation approach
All rms of the population conduct
R&D
Only a subset of the population is in-
volved in a research project
Change in marginal cost is a function
of the investment in R&D
Project results and corresponding im-
pact on marginal costs are predened
Project costs are xed
Conducting the project involves a prob-
ability of failure
Government intervention addresses all
rms in the population
Government intervention is directed to
rms conducting the research project
Table 2.1: Assumtions concerning the innovation process for multi-stage strategic
investment games
54 Appendix E: characteristics of multi-stage strategic investment games
The assumptions concerning the innovation process dene the set-up of the multi-
stage strategic investment game. As a result of our approach, the stages of our
game deviate also from those adopted in the existing literature (see Table 2.2).
Traditional approach Approach for formulation of the
policy mix
First stage: government decides on in-
tervention
First stage: government decides on in-
tervention
Contribution is dened such that it
maximizes total surplus
Intervention is dened such that the
costs are minimized
Second stage: rms decide on invest-
ment in research
Second stage: rms decide on what
they are willing to invest in research
Investment is dened such that it max-
imizes prot
Willingness to invest is dened by fore-
seen change in prot and probability of
failure
Foreseen change in prot is dened by
maximizing prot
Third stage: rms decide on output
Output is dened such that it maxi-
mizes prot
Table 2.2: Set-up of multi-stage strategic investment games
Chapter 3
Framework for the design of a policy mix supporting R&D
and innovation
Extension: the optimal set of instruments for di¤erent market struc-
tures
The policy mix concept provides policy makers with a conceptual framework that
allows them to consider the design of an optimal set of instruments supporting
industry-oriented research and innovation (see Chapter 1 ). Optimal in this re-
spect refers to e¤ectiveness in changing behavior of rms regarding investment in
research, and e¢ ciency concerning the cost of the intervention . In Chapter 2 we
dene a theoretical framework that allows for the assessment of the e¤ectiveness
and e¢ ciency of instruments. Our research indicates that funding (e.g. subsidies
or in kind contributions), tax measures and loans perform equally well: they initi-
ate similar levels of innovation, and require equal levels of expected contribution.
Implementation of a regulatory framework allowing for collaboration between rms
entails the lowest cost for the government in comparison to the other tools. Allow-
ing for collaboration however is not always su¢ cient to initiate research. In other
words: regulations are the most e¢ cient, but not always e¤ective.
We demonstrate our framework in Chapter 2 for a market o¤ering similar products,
competing on quantity (i.e. classical Cournot competition model). In this chapter
we analyze if our conclusions hold for di¤erent market structures. Our results in
Chapter 2 reveal that the order of performance of funding, tax measures and loans
does not alter for di¤erent market structures. We therefore focus in this chapter
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on the impact of regulations on collaboration in order to dene an optimal policy
mix.
Our analysis in this chapter shows that for certain market structures, regulations
are not e¤ective at all. We therefore generalize our conclusions concerning an op-
timal policy mix as dened in Chapter 2. We argue that if a rm is not willing
to invest in a predened research project, than a government should rst con-
sider the possibility of allowing for collaboration with the help of a regulatory
framework. If regulations are not e¤ective, a government should provide nancial
support, allocated either by means of funding, tax measures or loans. If possible,
the government should try to impose the appropriate number of partners in the
consortium, such that it minimizes its contribution. The actual intervention is lim-
ited: a government should provide support only if implementation of the research
results lead to an increase in surplus.
In the next section, we present the model to assess the willingness of a rm to invest
in a research project as a basis for intervention for a government, as dened in
Chapter 2. In Section 3.3 we analyze the impact of regulations for a market with
homogeneous products competing on price (i.e. classical Bertrand competition
model), and a market with di¤erentiated products competing on price, and on
quantity (i.e. Bertrand and Cournot for di¤erentiated products). We subsequently
compute the size of the consortium that minimizes the nancial support. In Section
3.4we dene the optimal policy mix. Implications for policy formulation and future
research are given in Section 3.5.
3.1 Investment in R&D by rms
For our analysis, we build on the results of a multi-stage strategic investment game,
as introduced by (dAspremont and Jacquemin 1988).
We assume that there is a total and xed population N containing n rms (with
i 2 N). We further presume that there is a variable sub-population R  N
containing r rms conducting R&D (with k 2 R).
We consider the initial marginal cost c of production to be equal and constant
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for all rms, and determined by the state of the art in production technology
within a certain industry or sector. Reduction of the marginal cost results from
successful completion of a predened research project implemented to explore a
specic idea to improve the production process. As a consequence, the impact of
the results on the change in the cost of production is foreseen. We subsequently
dene the marginal cost as ck = C for k 2 R and ci = C for i 2 N ^ i 6= k,
with 0 < C < C < a. The change in marginal cost resulting from a successful
completion of the research project is represented as C = C   C.
We presume that for r > 1, the rms involved in R&D will form a Research Joint
Venture (RJV). These rms will coordinate their research activities by sharing
R&D results and avoiding duplication for the duration of the project. This implies
that we assume that the internal spillover coe¢ cient equals one (Kamien et al.
1992), and that they share the cost equally. We ignore immediate spill-over e¤ects
to and from rms from outside the RJV while the research project is conducted.
Conducting the research project involves a certain risk of failure. We dene
p 2 [0; 1] as the probability of failure of the project. This probability depends
on the current level of knowledge concerning production for this sector. If the re-
quired knowledge is not available, and lies beyond the current state of the art, the
probability of failure will be close to one. If the required knowledge is available,
this probability will be close to zero.1
We assume that the project cost K of the research are xed, based on an estimation
of the required input (e.g. use of equipment and deployment of researchers). When
producing we suppose that these rms face no xed cost.
We argue that a rm k will decide on joining the RJV and conducting the required
R&D by comparing the expected prot resulting from conducting the research
with the initial prot. If we dene i = 0 as the initial prot in equilibrium,
and (i (r) ; k (r)) = (  (r) ; + (r)) as the prot in equilibrium after successful
implementation of the research results, we get that this investment decision can be
1Our framework ignores immediate spillover e¤ects. The impact of knowledge creation how-
ever is ultimately captured in the probability of failure of research projects.
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represented as:
(1  p)  +(r) K=r+ p  0  K=r ? 0 ,
(1  p)  +(r)  0 ? K=r
The inequality shows that rm k will decide by comparing what it is willing to
invest in R&D (i.e. the expected gross gain in prot) with the individual project
cost. Behavior of rms concerning investment is pivotal in our framework for the
selection of instruments. We will represent the willingness to invest in R&D as:
x(r; p) = (1  p)  +(r)  0
with x(r)  +(r)  0 as the gross investment in R&D.
3.2 Intervention by the government
Firm k will conduct the R&D if the probability of failure of the project is such
that x(r; p) > K=r. But if the rm is not willing to cover the individual project
cost (i.e. x(r; p)  K=r), then k will not consider implementing the project as the
required investment would lead to an expected prot lower than (or equal to) that
in the initial situation. We dene the corresponding shortfall S of the willingness
to invest as:
S (r; p) = K   x(r; p)
If the willingness of the rm does not meet the project cost, a government has the
possibility to intervene, and implement measures such that the rm will alter its
behavior, and decide on conducting the research. The objective is to design an
optimal policy mix, constituted by a set of instruments which is not only e¤ective,
but also e¢ cient. We therefore argue that a government should dene its inter-
vention such that it minimizes its expenditure on a single project. This allows for
support of other additional research, thereby creating additional surplus.
Rationale for intervention by a government in our framework would be an expected
increase in surplus if the research project is conducted. Intervention as such is
limited: the corresponding government cost (on project level) for the intervention
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should never be too high, in that they should not undo the gain in social surplus.
This rationale for intervention and corresponding condition for support will act as
our set of criteria to assess the design of the (set of) measures resulting from our
framework.
3.3 Assessment of instruments
As a starting point for the formulation of an optimal policy mix, we consider
a single rm k from the total population of rms N , which has an idea for an
improvement of its production technology. We assume that the characteristics of
the corresponding research project are such that the willingness to invest does not
meet the project cost. A government has di¤erent measures available to alter the
investment decision of the rm and initiate research. In Chapter 1 we identify four
modalities of support:
 Funding: direct support in the form of subsidies, grants or a rebate on social
insurances, and indirect support such as vouchers and access to research
infrastructure (i.e. in kind contributions).
 Taxation: scal measures o¤ering a tax relief on turnover or prot from
products resulting from the research project.
 Loans: support which has to be reimbursed by the rms involved in research
to the government.
 Regulations such as Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) and laws governing
the functioning and interaction of actors, aimed at establishing cooperation
(between rms and actors of the research infrastructure) and collaboration
(between rms).
Almost all industrialized countries have implemented these types of measures sup-
porting industry-oriented research.2 Note that we assume that each intervention
is targeted, and therefore limited, to those involved in research.
2For an overview, check: www.proinno-europe.eu, www.cordis.europa.eu/erawatch or
www.oecd.org.
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The analysis in Chapter 2 reveals that funding, taxation and loans induce similar
levels of e¤ort in R&D. For a linear perception of risk and valuation of prot and
cost, the expected contribution for these tools is identical, and equal to the shortfall
in investment. This implies that their e¤ectiveness and e¢ ciency is the same. The
order of performance remains unchanged for a di¤erent market structure.
The analysis in Chapter 2 also indicates that measures aimed at allowing collab-
oration between rms do not require a contribution to the cost of the research.
It is however not always possible to establish a consortium with an appropriate
number of participants. The e¤ectiveness of regulations furthermore varies for
di¤erent market structures.
As a result of these ndings, we therefore focus in this chapter on the impact of
regulations on collaboration in order to dene an optimal policy mix. By imple-
menting regulations, a government tries to establish the necessary preconditions
for collaboration between rms within an R&D project. Collaborating rms are
able to share the risks of the research project such that the total project cost will
be equally shared, and thereby lowered. Their prot however will also decrease. In
this paragraph, we will compute the optimal size of an RJV for rm k (i.e. select
an optimal number of research partners) such that that it maximizes its individual
prot, while covering the individual project cost for di¤erent market structures.
If it is not possible to create a consortium such that x (r; p) > K=r, a government
could provide additional nancial support to the regulatory framework. Under
the current assumptions, the government will be indi¤erent between funding, tax
measures or loans. We will compute the appropriate number of partners in the
consortium, such that it minimizes its contribution for di¤erent types of competi-
tion.
Bertrand Classic
We start our analysis of the impact of regulations for a market with rms o¤ering
homogeneous products, but competing on price. The inverse demand function we
use is similar to the one used in Chapter 2, and builds on (Kamien et al. 1992)
(see Appendix A):
P (r) = a  b
hPr
kQk +
Pn
i6=kQi
i
(3.1)
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with P as the market price, Q as the quantity sold, a > 0 as the demand intercept,
and b > 0 to ensure production.
Competing according to Bertrand implies that rms compete by setting prices
simultaneously, and that consumers buy everything from a rm they randomly
select among those that o¤er the lowest price. If no rm is involved in research
than the market price equals the initial marginal cost: P 0 = C, such that the
prot of the rms 0 = 0.
Successful implementation of the project results will allow rm k to o¤er a price
Pk < C such that takes the entire market, with   = 0 and:
k =
(a  Pk) (Pk   C)
b
 K
Maximizing prot yields:
@k
@Pk
=
a  2P k + C
b
= 0,
P k =
a+ C
2
The actual monopoly price in equilibrium P+ is restricted. If the marginal cost
resulting from implementation of the research results are such that P k < C, then
P+ = P k . In the existing literature, this is referred to as a major innovation. If
P k  C however, then P+ = POk = C . This is referred to as a minor innovation.
The corresponding prot is given by:
+ =
8>>><>>>:
(a C)2
4b
 K for C < 2C   a
(a C+)(C )
b
for C  2C   a
Lemma 3.1 In a market under Bertrand with homogeneous products, regulations
are not e¤ective.
Proof. A RJV with r participating rms in a market competing on price will
o¤er rms a price Pk (r) < C such that they take the entire market, and act as an
oligopoly with:  (r) = 0 and:
k(r) =
(a  Pk (r)) (Pk (r)  C)
br
 K=r
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But in a market where rms compete on price, the r rms of the RJVwill inevitably
select a price in equilibrium P+ (r) such that they will make no prot (i.e. +(r) =
0). Firm k will therefore not collaborate in research.
Cournot with di¤erentiated products
Next we analyze the impact of regulations on a market with rms o¤ering hori-
zontally di¤erentiated products, competing on output. "Di¤erentiation is said to
be horizontal when [...] between two products the level of some characteristics
is augmented while it is lowered for some others, as in cases of di¤erent versions
[...] of a car. A consumer will buy the closestproducts in terms of a certain
distance. Di¤erentiation is called vertical when [...] between two products the
level of characteristics is augmented or lowered, as in the case of cars of di¤erent
series [...]. There is unanimity to rank the products according to a certain order."
(Phlips and Thisse 1982)
For the inverse demand curve for a market with di¤erentiated products, we build on
(3.1). We introduce a substitutability coe¢ cient  2 [0; 1] which indicates the level
of di¤erentiation of the products o¤ered by the population of rms (Bowley 1925).3
Pi(r) = a  b
h

Pr
kQk +Qi + 
Pn
j 6=i; j 6=kQj
i
(3.2)
Pk(r) = a  b
h
Qk + 
Pr
l 6=kQl + 
Pn
i6=k; i6=lQi
i
(3.3)
Note that as  is constant in this model, the products o¤ered are di¤erentiated,
but their level of di¤erentiation is equal. In other words, they are equally di¤erent.
In order to dene what the rm is willing to invest, we need to compute the prot
in equilibrium. In a market under Cournot, rms compete on the amount of output
they will produce, which they decide on independently of each other and at the
3For  = 0 the varieties are independent in demand, and each rm acts as a monopolist. For
 < 1 rms o¤er di¤erentiated goods. As  approaches 1, the varieties become closer and closer
substitutes. For  = 1 all goods are perfect substitutes.
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same time. Their prot in equilibrium is given by (see Appendix B):
0 =
 
a  C2
b [2 +  (n  1)]2
+(r) =
8>>><>>>:
k(r) for rC <
(a C)(2 )

Ok (r) for rC  (
a C)(2 )

 (r) =
8>>><>>>:
i (r) for rC <
(a C)(2 )

Oi (r) for rC  (
a C)(2 )

(3.4)
with:
k(r) =

(a  C) + 
2  (n  r)C
2
b [2 +  (n  1)]2  K=r
i (r) =
 
a  C  
2 rC
2
b [2 +  (n  1)]2
Ok (r) =
(a  C)2
b [2 +  (r   1)]2  K=r
Oi (r) = 0
We can see from the expression for i (r) in (3.4) that the rms not conducting
R&D remain producing only in case rC <
 
a  C (2  ) =. We dene this as
an incremental change in marginal cost. These rms however cease production if
rC   a  C (2  ) =. We dene this as a radical change in marginal cost.
The members of the RJV will in that case act as an oligopoly.
With the prot in equilibrium, we can assess the impact of regulations on what a
rm is willing to invest in research. We analyze the possibilities of formulating a
RJV in case x (p)  K.
Lemma 3.2 In a market under Cournot with di¤erentiated products, rm k max-
imizes its prot by establishing a RJV with brC consortium members if x(brC ; p) >
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K=brC such that:
brC =
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
r : + (r) = max (+; + (r) ; + (n)) ;
fr 2 R : r 2 [1; n]g for (a C)(2 )
C
 n
r : + (r) = max

+; + (r) ; +

(a C)(2 )
C

; +
 
rO

; + (n)

;
r 2 R : r 2

1;
(a C)(2 )
C

;
rO 2 RO : rO 2

(a C)(2 )
C
; n

for 1 < (
a C)(2 )
C
< n
r : + (r) = max
 
+; +
 
rO

; + (n)

;
rO 2 RO : rO 2 [1; n]	 for 1  (a C)(2 )
C
with:
R =
8>>><>>>:
 	  1
2
i
p
3 + 1
2

+
1
9
(+5)
	( 12 i
p
3+ 1
2)
  
3
;
	
 
1
2
i
p
3  1
2
  19(+5)
	( 12 i
p
3  1
2)
  
3
;
	   19(+5)
	   

3
9>>>=>>>;
	 =
3
vuuut    227 ()3 +    227 ()3 + 2 + 4( 13(+5))327  12
2
 =  (a  C) +

2 nC

2 C
 =
Kb [2 + (n  1)]2
2


2 C
2
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and with:
RO =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
 	O  1
2
i
p
3 + 1
2
  O  13(O)2 3	O( 12 ip3+ 12)   O3 ;
	O
 
1
2
i
p
3  1
2
  O  13(O)2
3	O( 12 i
p
3  1
2)
  O
3
;
	O  

O  1
3(O)
2

3	O
  O
3
9>>>>>=>>>>>;
	O =
3
vuuut !O  (!O)2 + 4[O  13 (O)2]327  12
2
!O =
2
27
 
O
3   1
3
OO + O
O =
3Kb2 (2  )  2 (a  C)2
Kb3
O =
 Kb ( (2   6+ 12)  8)
Kb3
O =
3Kb (  2)2
Kb3
Proof. The optimal size of the consortium, such that rm k maximizes its prot,
is computed with:
max
r
 
+ (r)

(3.5)
subject to :
x(r; p) > K=r (a)
1  r  n (b)
The computations for this maximization are given in Appendix B.
Constraint (3.5 (a)) stipulates that if it is not possible to formulate a RJV such that
the willingness to invest meets the individual project cost, no research consortium
will be established, and rm k will consequently decide not to conduct the R&D.
The optimal size of the consortium depends on the impact of the research result
on the market (i.e. number of rms operating in the market). Optimizing for
an incremental change in marginal cost, with + (r) = k (r), gives the solution
set R 2 C. On r 2 (0;1) this prot function is continuous. It is increasing
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and concave for r # 0 and convex and increasing for r ! 1. On the interval as
dened by constraint (b), none of the extremes of R can be excluded beforehand,
or subsequently be identied as a local maximum or minimum.
For a radical change in marginal cost we get that + (r) = Ok (r). Optimization
of the prot function gives us as a solution set RO 2 C. Also this function is
continuous on r 2 (0;1). For r # 0, we see that Ok (r) ! 1, and for r ! 1,
we get that Ok (r)! 0. On the interval as dened by constraint (b) however, the
prot function could be increasing as well as decreasing under the given conditions.
Therefore none of the extremes of RO can be excluded beforehand, or subsequently
be identied as a local maximum or minimum.
Lemma 3.2 indicates that regulations have an impact on the investment decision
concerning research of rms. A government could therefore minimize its contribu-
tion to a project to initiate research, by imposing a specic size of the RJV.
Lemma 3.3 In a market under Cournot with di¤erentiated products, a govern-
ment minimizes its contribution to a project in order to initiate research by impos-
ing a size erC on a RJV if x (erC ; p)  K=erC such that:
erC =
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
r : + (r) = max (+; + (r) ; + (n)) ;
fr : r 2 [1; n]g for (a C)(2 )
C
 n
r : + (r) = max

+; + (r) ; +

(a C)(2 )
C

; + (er) ; + (n) :
r : r 2

1;
(a C)(2 )
C

;

rO 2 RO : rO 2

(a C)(2 )
C
; n

for 1 < (
a C)(2 )
C
< n
r : + (r) = max
 
+; +
 
rO

; + (n)

;
rO 2 RO : rO 2 [1; n]	 for 1  (a C)(2 )
C
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with:
r =
2 
h
2   3

2    a  C2i1=2
3
 =

(a  C) + n 
2  C

 =


2  C

and with:
RO =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
 	O  1
2
i
p
3 + 1
2
  O  13(O)2 3	O( 12 ip3+ 12)   O3 ;
	O
 
1
2
i
p
3  1
2
  O  13(O)2
3	O( 12 i
p
3  1
2)
  O
3
;
	O  

O  1
3(O)
2

3	O
  O
3
9>>>>>=>>>>>;
	O =
3
vuuut !O  (!O)2 + 4(O  13 (O)2)327  12
2
!O =
2
27
 
O
3   1
3
OO + O
O =
 3 (  2)

O =
(  2) [2 + (n  1)]2 (a  C)2   [ (2   6+ 12)  8]  a  C2
3
 
a  C2
O =
3 (  2)2  a  C2 + [2 + (n  1)]2 (a  C)2
2
 
a  C2
Proof. The optimal size of the consortium such that the government minimizes
its contribution is given by:
min
r

r

K
r
  x(r; p)

(3.6)
subject to :
x(r; p)  K=r (a)
1  r  n (b)
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In practice this requires computing the size of the consortium that generates the
highest cumulative willingness to invest. The computations are given in Appendix
B.
Constraint (3.6 (a)) stipulates that a government should contribute to a consortium
only if it is not possible to formulate a RJV such that the cumulative willingness
to invest covers the total project cost.
Again the optimal size of the consortium depends on the impact of the research
result on the market. For an incremental change in marginal cost we get that
the cumulative willingness to invest has a maximum at r. The actual size of the
consortium depends on the orientation of r with respect to the interval as dened
by constraint (3.6 (b)).
Optimizing the cumulative willingness to invest for a radical change in marginal
cost gives a solution set RO 2 C. Also this function is continuous on r 2 (0;1).
This function goes through the origin, and for r !1, we get that Ok (r)!  1.
On the interval as dened by constraint (b) however, none of the extremes of RO
can be excluded.
Bertrand with di¤erentiated products
Last we analyze the impact of regulations on a market o¤ering di¤erentiated prod-
ucts competing on price (i.e. Bertrand with di¤erentiated products). We therefore
rst need to invert the demand functions (3.2) and (3.3), which gives:
Qi(r) =
1
1 +  (n  1)
a
b
+

(1  ) [1 +  (n  1)]
Pr
k
1
b
Pk+
  [1 +  (n  2)]
(1  ) [1 +  (n  1)]
1
b
Pi +

(1  ) [1 +  (n  1)]
Pn
j 6=i; j 6=k
1
b
Pj
Qk(r) =
1
1 +  (n  1)
a
b
+

(1  ) [1 +  (n  1)]
Pn
i6=k; i6=l
1
b
Pi+
  [1 +  (n  2)]
(1  ) [1 +  (n  1)]
1
b
Pk +

(1  ) [1 +  (n  1)]
Pr
l 6=k
1
b
Pl
The corresponding prot which we require to get insight in the willingness to invest
in the research project is given by (see Appendix C for computations):
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0 = 

 
a  C2
+(r) =
8>>><>>>:
k(r) for rC <
 
a  C =
Ok (r) for rC 
 
a  C =
 (r) =
8>>><>>>:
i (r) for rC <
 
a  C =
Oi (r) for rC 
 
a  C = (3.7)
with:
k(r) = 
 [(a  C) +  (n  r)C]2  K=r
i (r) = 

 
a  C  rC2
Ok (r) =
(1  ) (1 +  (r   2))
b (1 +  (r   1)) (2 +  (r   3))2 (a  C)
2  K=r
Oi (r) = 0
given that:
 =
 (1 +  (n  2))
(1  ) (2 +  (2n  3))
 =
(1 +  (n  2))
b (1 +  (n  1)) (2 +  (n  3))

 =
(1  )
(2 +  (n  3))
Again we see from expression (3.7) that there is a transition point for which those
rms not part of the RJV cease production. If rC <
 
a  C =, than we dene
this as an incremental change in marginal cost. We refer to a radical change in
marginal cost in case rC   a  C =.
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Lemma 3.4 In a market under Bertrand with di¤erentiated products, rm k will
establish a RJV with brB consortium members if x(brB; p) > K=brB such that:
brB =
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
r : + (r) = max (+; + (br) ; + (n)) ;
fr 2 R : br 2 [1; n]g for  a  C =C  n
r : + (r) = max
 
+; + (br) ; +   a  C =C ; + (n) ;
r 2 R : r 2 1;  a  C =C	 for 1 <  a  C =C < n
r : + (r) = max (+; + (n)) for 1   a  C =C
with:
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(+5))327  12
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 =
  [(a  C) + nC]
C
 =
K
2
2 (C)2
Proof. We adopt a similar approach as for the proof of Lemma 3.2. The optimal
size of the consortium, such that rm k will maximize its prot, is computed with:
max
r
 
+ (r)

(3.8)
subject to :
x(r; p) > K=r (a)
1  r  n (b)
Results of the computation are given in see Appendix C.
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Again constraint (3.8 (a)) ordains that if it is not possible to formulate a RJV
such that the willingness to invest meets the individual project cost, no research
will be conducted.
Optimizing for an incremental change in marginal cost gives the solution set R 2
C. On r 2 (0;1) this prot function is continuous. It is increasing and concave
for r # 0 and convex and increasing for r ! 1. On the interval as dened
by constraint (b), none of the extremes of R can be excluded beforehand, or
subsequently be identied as a local maximum or minimum.
Maximizing prot for a radical change in marginal cost does not give a closed form
solution. We will interpret this as if rm k has no insight in the market and its
competitors. Well therefore assume that rm k will limit its search for an optimal
size of the RJV to the end points of the interval for which it acts as an oligopoly.
Lemma 3.4 indicates that regulations have an impact on the investment decision
of rms concerning research in case of a market with di¤erentiated products com-
peting on price.
Lemma 3.5 In a market under Bertrand with di¤erentiated products, a govern-
ment minimizes its contribution to a project in order to initiate research by impos-
ing a size rB on a RJV if x (r

B; p)  K=rB such that:
erC =
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
r : + (r) = max (+; + (r) ; + (n))
fr : r 2 [1; n]g for  a  C =C  n
r : + (r) = max
 
+; + (r) ; +
  
a  C =C ; + (n)
r : r 2 1;  a  C =C	 for 1 <  a  C =C < n
r : + (r) = max (+; + (n)) for 1   a  C =C
with:
r =
2 ((a  C) + nC) 
h
((a  C) + nC)2 + 3  a  C2i1=2
3C
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Proof. We adopt an approach as used for Lemma 3.3. The minimal government
contribution is calculated with:
min
r

r

K
r
  x(r; p)

(3.9)
subject to :
x(r; p)  K=r (a)
1  r  n (b)
The computations for this problem are given in Appendix C.
Constraint (3.9 (a)) stipulates again that a government should contribute to a
consortium only if it is not possible to formulate a RJV such that the partners are
willing and able to cover the total project cost.
For an incremental change in marginal cost we get that the function for cumulative
willingness to invest has a maximum at r. The actual size of the consortium
depends on the orientation of r with respect to the interval as dened by constraint
(3.9 (b)).
Minimizing the government contribution for a radical change in marginal cost does
not give a closed form solution. We will interpret this also as if the government has
no insight in the market and its actors. Well therefore assume that a government
will impose one of the end points of the interval in which rm k will act as an
oligopoly as the potential optimal size of the consortium.
3.4 Main result: combination of measures in a
policy mix
The results of our analysis of the impact of regulations on the willingness of rms
to invest in research compels us to generalize the main theorem of Chapter 2
concerning the design of an optimal policy mix.
Theorem 3.6 If a rm is not willing to invest in a predened research project
because the expected change in prot does not cover the corresponding xed cost,
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then a government should consider allowing for collaboration.
If it is not possible to formulate a RJV such that the cumulative willingness of the
members covers the total project cost, then a government might consider contribut-
ing to the cost of the project. The government should try to impose a size of the
RJV that minimizes its expected contribution. This contribution could subsequently
be allocated either by means of funding, tax measures or loans.
The actual intervention is constrained: a government should intervene only if it
leads to an increase in total surplus.
Proof. We build on Lemma 3.1 to Lemma 3.5 for the formulation of Theorem
3.6.
As in Chapter 2, we argue that a government should assess the intervention against
the criteria for support as dened in Section 3.1. First, a government should only
contribute to the cost of the project if it leads to an expected increase in the total
surplus. Second, the total government cost should not exceed the gain in surplus.
These total cost consist of the contribution to the project (i.e. the shortfall S (r; p)),
and Implementations cost I, which refer mainly to monitoring and evaluation. We
assume that they are equal for all the instruments. Combining the two constraints
gives us:
(1  p)

W
+
(r) W 0

 I +K
For the sake of completeness, we give the surplus for all market structures analyzed
in this chapter in Appendix D.
3.5 Conclusions and recommendations
The analysis of the impact of successful R&D on the market shows that inno-
vating rms create a competitive advantage over their competitors not involved
in research. This competitive advantage might be such that they take the entire
market. Our results suggest therefore that R&D and innovation policy contributes
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to the strengthening and renewal of the economy. We argue that rms that are
not innovative, and consequently are not able to adapt to the increasing global
competition, are ultimately excluded because of the contribution to research that
is allocated by instruments supporting R&D and innovation.
Our analysis furthermore indicates that for certain market structures, allowing for
collaboration between rms does not change their willingness to conduct research.
We therefore maintain that existing research programmes that compel collabora-
tive industry-oriented research with a xed number of consortium partners (e.g.
the EU framework programmes4) are not e¢ cient. Based on our results we argue
that an optimal policy mix diversies its modality of support to industry, based
on market structure and project characteristics.
The results of our analysis of the market equilibria allow us to compare the contri-
bution required to initiate research for di¤erent forms of competition. Additional
research could subsequently contribute to the identication of a thematic scope
of a policy mix. A government might consider supporting actors operating in a
market that requires a limited contribution in comparison to other markets (as
that would be more e¢ cient in order to initiate research). This additional analysis
could contribute to theory on the formulation of an optimal policy mix in the same
way as (Qiu 1997) contributed to theory on multi-stage strategic investment games
for policy formulation.
Appendix A: demand and prot function
Our analysis builds on the results of a multi-stage strategic investment game.
When applied to analyze the behavior of industry concerning their investment
decision research, this type of game involves a stage where rms determine their
input on R&D, allocated either in order to lower marginal cost or to di¤erentiate
the product. It also includes a stage where rms engage in competition, as to dene
either their output. The entire game is solved by means of backward induction
(De Bondt 1997).
4See www.cordis.europa.eu/fp7.
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When a multi-stage strategic investment game is used to dene an intervention
by a government to support R&D and innovation, an additional stage should be
introduced to assess the contribution required to initiate the research.
The basis for our model for our multi-stage strategic investment game is the one
introduced by (Kamien et al. 1992). Within the framework of this chapter, it is
assumed that all rms participate in R&D and innovation. Firms face an inverted
individual demand function given by:
Pk = a Qk   
Pr
l 6=kQl
with P as the market price, Q as the quantity sold, and a > 0 as the demand inter-
cept. The substitutability coe¢ cient  2 [0; 1] indicates the level of di¤erentiation
of the products o¤ered by the population of rms (Bowley 1925).5
In this model the e¤ective R&D investment is dened as:
Xk = xk + 
Pr
l 6=kxl
with  2 [0; 1] as the spillover parameter, and xk as the individual investments of
the rms in R&D.
The corresponding marginal cost ck > 0 equal a constant minus the impact of the
e¤ective R&D investment on this constant:
ck = c  f(Xk)
There are no additional xed cost. The corresponding prot function than equals:
k =
h
a Qk   
Pr
l 6=kQl
i
Qk   [c  f(Xk)]Qk   xk
Inverting the inverted demand function gives:
Qk =
1
1 +  (n  1)a+
  [1 +  (n  2)]
(1  ) [1 +  (n  1)]Pk+

(1  ) [1 +  (n  1)]
Pr
l 6=kPl
5For  = 0 the varieties are independent in demand, and each rm acts as a monopolist.
For  < 1 rms o¤er di¤erentiated goods.
As  approaches 1, the varieties become closer and closer substitutes. For  = 1 all goods are
perfect substitutes.
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The corresponding prot function becomes:
k = [Pk   (c  f(Xk))]Qk   xk
Appendix B: Cournot with product di¤erentiation
Market equilibria
To see how the rms in the population behave when a RJV is conducting research
in order to lower their marginal cost, we start with the formulation of two prot
functions for rms not involved in the research project, for r > 0:
i(r) =
h
a  b
h

Pr
kQk +Qi + 
Pn
j 6=i; j 6=kQj
ii
Qi   CQi (3.10)
j(r) =
h
a  b
h

Pr
kQk +Qj + 
Pn
i6=j; i6=kQi
ii
Qj   CQj
We will assume that each rm maximizes prot based on quantity produced, and
that each rival will consider the others quantity as a xed number that will not
respond to its own product decision. Maximizing prot for rms not involved in
R&D according to Cournot implies:
max
Qi
h
a  b
h

Pr
kQk +Qi + 
Pn
j 6=i; j 6=kQj
ii
Qi   CQi
which yields:
a  b
h

Pr
kQk + 2Qi + 
Pn
j 6=i; j 6=kQj
i
  C = 0 (3.11)
And with @i=@Qi = @j=@Qj we obtain that in equilibrium: Qi = Q

j . Substi-
tuting that in (3.11) gives:
a  b [PrkQk + [2 + (n  r   1)]Qi ]  C = 0 (3.12)
The prot function for rms of the RJV can be written as:
k(r) =
h
a  b
h
Qk + 
Pr
l 6=kQl + 
Pn
i6=k; i6=lQi
ii
Qk   CQk  K=r (3.13)
l(r) =
h
a  b
h
Ql + 
Pr
k 6=lQl + 
Pn
i6=k; i6=lQi
ii
Ql   CQl  K=r
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Optimizing prot with respect to quantity for rms involved in the research project
with @k=@Qk = 0 results in:
a  b
h
2Qk + 
Pr
l 6=kQl + 
Pn
i6=k; i6=lQi
i
  C = 0 (3.14)
With @k=@Qk = @l=@Ql we get that in equilibrium: Qk = Q

l . Substituting that
in (3.14) leads to:
a  b [[2 + (r   1)]Qk + (n  r)Qi ]  C = 0 (3.15)
From (3.12) and (3.15) we obtain that in equilibrium the relation between the
output from rms not involved in R&D, and the quantity produced by the members
of the RJV, is given by:
Qk(r) = Q

i (r) +
C   C
(2  ) b = Q

i (r) +
C
(2  ) b (3.16)
with C =
 
C   C as the change in marginal cost of production, resulting from
the impact of the research project.
Incremental change in marginal cost
Substitution of Qk(r) according to (3.16) in (3.12) yields for the output by rms
not involved in research:
a  b

r

Qi (r) +
C
(2  ) b

+ [2 + (n  r   1)]Qi (r)

  C = 0,
Qi (r) =
 
a  C  
2 rC
b [2 +  (n  1)] (3.17)
We can see from equation (3.17) that in theory it is possible that these rms will
seize their production for certain levels of change in marginal cost of production,
given the number of rms participating in the RJV.
We dene the change marginal cost to be incremental if it is such that the rms
not involved in the research project remain producing output. Equation (3.17)
reveals that Qi (r) > 0 for rC <
 
a  C (2  ) =.
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By inserting (3.17) in (3.16) we get the output for rms involved in R&D for an
incremental change in cost:
Qk(r) =
(a  C) + 
2  (n  r)C
b [2 +  (n  1)]
The corresponding market price in equilibrium, after substituting Qi and Q

k in
the respective inverse demand curves becomes:6
P

i (r) =
a+ (1 +  (n  1))C   
2 rC
2 +  (n  1)
P

k (r) =
a+ (1 +  (n  1))C + 
(2 ) (n  r)C
2 +  (n  1)
With Qi (r) = Q

j(r), equation (3.10) generates the prot for rms not conducting
R&D:
i (r) =

a  b [rQk(r) + [1 + (n  r   1)]Qi (r)]  C

Qi (r)
By substituting Qi (r)and Q

k(r) in this expression, we can compute this prot as
a function of the changes in marginal cost for rms not involved in research:
i (r) =
 
a  C  
2 rC
2
b [2 +  (n  1)]2
In order to obtain the prot for the rms of the RJV, we rewrite (3.13) with
Qk(r) = Q

l (r) so that we get:
k(r) = [a  b [[1 + (r   1)]Qk(r) +  (n  r)Qi (r)]  C]Qk(r) K=r (3.18)
Substitution of Qi (r) and Q

k(r) in (3.18) yields as a prot for rms conducting
R&D:
k(r) =

(a  C) + 
2  (n  r)C
2
b [2 +  (n  1)]2  K=r
6Note that P

i (r)  P

k (r)  0.
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Radical change in marginal cost: oligopoly
We dene the change in marginal cost of production to be radical if Qi (r) = 0
because of the changes in marginal cost resulting from the research project. In
the given market situation, this will happen if rC   a  C (2  ) =. As a
consequence, the members of the RJV will act as an oligopoly. The corresponding
prot functions can be rewritten as:
ok(r) =
h
a  b
h
Qk + 
Pr
l 6=kQl
ii
Qk   CQk  K=r (3.19)
ol (r) =
h
a  b
h
Ql + 
Pn
k 6=lQk
ii
Ql   CQl  K=r
Maximizing prot according to Cournot implies optimizing (3.19) with respect to
quantity: @k=@Qk = 0. This yields:
a  b
h
2QOk + 
Pr
l 6=kQl
i
  C = 0 (3.20)
And with @k=@Qk = @l=@Ql we get that in equilibrium: QOk = Q
O
l . Substitution
in (3.20) gives:
a  b 2QOk + (r   1)QOk   C = 0,
QOk (r) =
a  C
b [2 + (r   1)]
and a corresponding price in equilibrium:
PO(r) =
a+ C (1 +  (r   1))
2 + (r   1)
With QOk = Q
O
l the prot according to (3.19) for rms conducting R&D becomes:
Ok (r) =

a  b QOk (r) +  (r   1)QOk (r)QOk (r)  CQOk (r) K
Substitution of the equilibrium quantity QOk (r) gives a prot in equilibrium:
Ok (r;K) =
(a  C)2
b [2 + (r   1)]2  K=r
= Ok (r) K=r
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Regulations and the optimal size of a consortium
In case of an incremental change in marginal cost, we get + (r) = k (r). The
corresponding maximum prot is calculated with:
@

[(a C)+ 2  (n r)C]
2
b[2+(n 1)]2   Kr

@r
= 0,

2  Cr
3  

(a  C) + 
2  nC

r2 +
Kb [2 + (n  1)]2
2 
2 C
= 0
Rewriting this equation with:
 =  (a  C) +

2 nC

2 C
 =
Kb [2 + (n  1)]2
2


2 C
2
and r = x+ y, we get that:
x3 + (3y + )x2 +
 
3y2 + 2y

x+ y3 + y2 +  = 0
With y =  
3
,  = 1
3
 (+ 5) and  = 2
27
3 +  the equation reduces to:
x3 + x+  = 0
We can now apply "Viatas substitution". With x = z + s
z
we arrive at:
z6 + (3s+ ) z4 + z3 + s (3s+ ) z2 + s3 = 0
By substituting s =  
3
and z3 = t we get:
t2 + t  
3
27
= 0
Solving this gives:
t =
  

2 + 4
3
27
 1
2
2
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Based on the above, we get as a set of solutions:
R =
8>>><>>>:
 	  1
2
i
p
3 + 1
2

+
1
9
(+5)
	( 12 i
p
3+ 1
2)
  
3
;
	
 
1
2
i
p
3  1
2
  19(+5)
	( 12 i
p
3  1
2)
  
3
;
	   19(+5)
	   

3
9>>>=>>>;
with:
	 =
3
vuuuuut    227 ()3 + 
24   227 ()3 + 2+
4( 13(+5))
3
27
35 12
2
In case of a radical change in marginal cost, we get that +(r) = Ok (r). Maximiz-
ing this prot gives:
@
h
(a C)2
b[2+(r 1)]2   Kr
i
@r
= 0,
r3 + Or2 + Or + O = 0
with:
O =
 
3Kb2 (2  )  2 (a  C)2
Kb3
O =
 Kb ( (2   6+ 12)  8)
Kb3
O =
3Kb (  2)2
Kb3
We solve this equation by substituting r = x+ y:
x3 +
 
3y + O

x2 +
 
3y2 + 2Oy + O

x+ y3 + Oy2 + Oy + O = 0
With y =  O
3
,  = O   1
3
 
O
2
and  = 2
27
 
O
3   1
3
OO + O the equation
reduces to:
x3 + x+  = 0
We can now apply Viatas substitution. With x = z + s
z
we arrive at:
z6 + (3s+ ) z4 + z3 + s (3s+ ) z2 + s3 = 0
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By substituting s =   
3
and z3 = t we get:
t2 + t  1
27
3 = 0
Solving this gives:
t =
 

2 + 4
3
27
 1
2
2
Based on the above we get as a set of solutions:
RO =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
 	O  1
2
i
p
3 + 1
2
  O  13(O)2 3	O( 12 ip3+ 12)   O3 ;
	O
 
1
2
i
p
3  1
2
  O  13(O)2
3	O( 12 i
p
3  1
2)
  O
3
;
	O  

O  1
3(O)
2

3	O
  O
3
9>>>>>=>>>>>;
with:
	O =
3
vuuut !O  (!O)2 + 4(O  13 (O)2)327  12
2
!O =

2
27
 
O
3   1
3
OO + O

Government intervention and the minimal contribution
For an incremental change in marginal cost the prot + (r) = k (r). Maximizing
the cumulative willingness to invest implies:
@

r(1  p)

[(a C)+ 2  (n r)C]
2 (a C)2
b[2+(n 1)]2

@r
= 0,
0 = (1  p)
"
(a  C) + 
2  (n  r)C
2    a  C2
b [2 +  (n  1)]2
#
 
(1  p)
"
2 
2 Cr

(a  C) + 
2  (n  r)C

b [2 +  (n  1)]2
#
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Reformulating this gives:
32r2   4r + 2    a  C2 = 0
with:
 =


2  C

 =

(a  C) + n 
2  C

Solving this gives as a solution set:
R =
2
h
2   3

2    a  C2i1=2
3
The function for the cumulative willingness to invest is increasing from 0 for r # 0,
and increasing for r !1. The local maximum is therefore given by:
r =
2 
h
2   3

2    a  C2i1=2
3
For a radical change in marginal cost we get that + (r) = Ok (r). Maximizing the
cumulative willingness to invest gives:
@r(1  p)

(a C)2
b[2+(r 1)]2  
(a C)2
b[2+(n 1)]2

@r
= 0,
0 = (1  p)
"
(a  C)2
b [2 + (r   1)]2  
 
a  C2
b [2 + (n  1)]2
#
 
(1  p)
"
2r
(a  C)2
b [2 + (r   1)]3
#
Reformulating this gives:
r3 + Or2 + Or + O = 0
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with
O =
 3 (  2)

O =
  [ (2   6+ 12)  8]  a  C2 + (  2) [2 + (n  1)]2 (a  C)2
3
 
a  C2
O =
3 (  2)2  a  C2 + [2 + (n  1)]2 (a  C)2
2
 
a  C2
Solving this gives:
RO =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
 	O  1
2
i
p
3 + 1
2
  O  13(O)2 3	O( 12 ip3+ 12)   O3 ;
	O
 
1
2
i
p
3  1
2
  O  13(O)2
3	O( 12 i
p
3  1
2)
  O
3
;
	O  

O  1
3(O)
2

3	O
  O
3
9>>>>>=>>>>>;
with:
	O =
3
vuuut !O  (!O)2 + 4(O  13 (O)2)327  12
2
!O =
2
27
 
O
3   1
3
OO + O
Appendix C: Bertrand with product di¤erentia-
tion
Market equilibria
To see how the rms in the population behave when a RJV is conducting research
in order to lower their marginal cost, we start with the formulation of two prot
functions for rms not involved in the research project, for r > 0:
i(r) =
 
Pi   C
 
V1
a
b
+ V2
Pr
k
1
b
Pk + V3
1
b
Pi + V2
Pn
j 6=i; j 6=k
1
b
Pj

j(r) =
 
Pj   C
 
V1
a
b
+ V2
Pr
k
1
b
Pk + V3
1
b
Pj + V2
Pn
i6=j; i6=k
1
b
Pi

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with:
V1 =
1
1 +  (n  1)
V2 =

(1  ) [1 +  (n  1)]
V3 =
  [1 +  (n  2)]
(1  ) [1 +  (n  1)]
Maximizing prot for rms not involved in R&D according to Bertrand implies:
max
Pi
 
Pi   C
 
V1
a
b
+ V2
Pr
k
1
b
Pk + V3
1
b
Pi + V2
Pn
j 6=i; j 6=k
1
b
Pj

which yields:
V1
a
b
+ V2
Pr
k
1
b
Pk + 2V3
1
b
P i + V2
Pn
j 6=i; j 6=k
1
b
Pj   V31
b
C = 0 (3.21)
With @i=@Pi = @j=@Pj we obtain that in equilibrium: P i = P

j . Substituting
that in (3.21) gives:
V1
a
b
+ V2
Pr
k
1
b
Pk + ((n  r   1)V2 + 2V3) 1
b
P i   V3
1
b
C = 0 (3.22)
We also formulate two prot functions for rms participating in the RJV:
k(r) = (Pk   C)

V1
a
b
+ V2
Pn
i6=k; i6=l
1
b
Pi + V3
1
b
Pk + V2
Pr
l 6=k
1
b
Pl

 K
l(r) = (Pl   C)

V1
a
b
+ V2
Pn
i6=k; i6=l
1
b
Pi + V3
1
b
Pl + V2
Pr
k 6=l
1
b
Pk

 K
Optimizing prot with respect to price for rms involved in the research project
with @k=@Pk = 0 results in:
V1
a
b
+ V2
Pn
i6=k; i6=l
1
b
Pi + 2V3
1
b
P k + V2
Pr
l 6=k
1
b
Pl   V31
b
C = 0 (3.23)
With @k=@Pk = @l=@Pl we get that in equilibrium P k = P

l . Substituting that
in (3.23) gives:
V1
a
b
+ (n  r)V21
b
P i + ((r   1)V2 + 2V3)
1
b
P k   V3
1
b
C = 0 (3.24)
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From (3.22) and (3.24) we obtain that in equilibrium the relation between the
price set by rms not involved in R&D, and by the members of the RJV, is given
by:
P k (r) = P

i (r) +
V3C
V2   2V3 (3.25)
with C =
 
C   C as the change in marginal cost of production, resulting from
the impact of the research project.
Incremental change in marginal cost
Substitution of our result according to (3.25) in (3.22) yields:
P i (r) =
(1  ) a+ (1 +  (n  2))C   (1+(n 2))
(2+(2n 3))rC
(2 +  (n  3))
P k (r) =
(1  ) a+ (1 +  (n  2))C + (1+(n 2))
(2+(2n 3)) (n  r)C
(2 +  (n  3))
With the price in equilibrium, we can calculate the quantity sold by rms not
involved in research:
Qi (r) = 
 
a  C  rC (3.26)
with:
 =
(1 +  (n  2))
b (1 +  (n  1)) (2 +  (n  3))
 =
 (1 +  (n  2))
(1  ) (2 +  (2n  3))
We can see from equation (3.26) that in theory it is possible also for a market un-
der Bertrand with di¤erentiated products that rms not involved in the research
project will seize their production. We dene the change marginal cost to be incre-
mental if it is such that the rms not involved in the research project remain pro-
ducing output. Equation (3.26) indicates that Q (r) > 0 for rC <
 
a  C =.
The corresponding quantity produced by rms involved in the research equals:
Qk(r) =  [(a  C) +  (n  r)C]
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The prot in equilibrium is consequently given by:
i (r) = 

 
a  C  rC2
k(r) = 
 [(a  C) +  (n  r)C]2  K=r
with

 =
(1  )
(2 +  (n  3))
Note that f;;
g are all positive and larger than zero for n  1.
Radical change in marginal cost: oligopoly
We dene the change in marginal cost of production to be radical if Qi (r) = 0
because of the changes in marginal cost resulting from the research project, given
the number of rms involved in research. In the given market situation, this will
happen if rC   a  C =As a consequence, the members of the RJV will act
as an oligopoly. The inverted inverse demand curve for rms involved in research
is given by:
Qok(r) = V1
a
b
+ V3
1
b
Pk + V2
Pr
l 6=k
1
b
Pl
The corresponding prot functions can be rewritten as:
ok(r;K) = (Pk   C)

V1
a
b
+ V3
1
b
Pk + V2
Pr
l 6=k
1
b
Pl

 K
ol (r;K) = (Pl   C)

V1
a
b
+ V3
1
b
Pl + V2
Pr
k 6=l
1
b
Pk

 K
Optimizing prot with respect to price for rms involved in the research project
with @k=@Pk = 0 results in:
V1
a
b
+ 2V3
1
b
POk + V2
Pr
l 6=k
1
b
Pl   V31
b
C = 0
With @k=@Pk = @l=@Pl we get that in equilibrium POk = P
O
l . Substituting that
in the di¤erentiated prot function gives:
V1
a
b
+ ((r   1)V2 + 2V3) 1
b
POk   V3
1
b
C = 0
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which implies that:
POk (r) =
(1  ) a+ (1 +  (r   2))C
(2 +  (r   3))
By substituting POk in the inverse demand function we obtain for the quantity in
equilibrium:
QOi (r) =
(1 +  (r   2))
b (1 +  (r   1)) (2 +  (r   3)) (a  C)
And by inserting POk and Q
O
i (r) in the prot function we get that the prot for
the rms of the RJV in case of an oligopoly equals:
Ok (r) =
(1  ) (1 +  (r   2))
b (1 +  (r   1)) (2 +  (r   3))2 (a  C)
2  K=r
Regulations and the optimal size of a consortium
In case of an incremental change in marginal cost, we get that + (r) = k (r).
The corresponding maximum prot is calculated with:
@




((a  C) +  (n  r)C)2  K
r

@r
= 0,
Cr3   [(a  C) + nC] r2 + K
2
C
= 0
In a similar way as for a market with di¤erentiated products under Cournot we
get as a solution set:
R =
8>>><>>>:
 	  1
2
i
p
3 + 1
2

+
1
9
(+5)
	( 12 i
p
3+ 1
2)
  
3
;
	
 
1
2
i
p
3  1
2
  19(+5)
	( 12 i
p
3  1
2)
  
3
;
	   19(+5)
	   

3
9>>>=>>>;
with:
	 =
3
vuuut    227 ()3 +    227 ()3 + 2 + 4( 13(+5))327  12
2
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In case of a radical change in marginal cost, we get that +(r) = Ok (r). Maximiz-
ing this prot gives:
@
h
(1 )(1+(r 2))
b(1+(r 1))(2+(r 3))2 (a  C)
2   K
r
i
@r
= 0,
  (1  )
 
2 (r+ 1)2    (8 + 7 (r   1))
b (r  + 1)2 (r  3+ 2)3 (a  C)
2 +
K
r2
= 0
Solving this equation does not give a closed form solution. This implies that in
theory rm k lacks insight in how to formulate a consortium that would maximize
its prot.
Government intervention and the minimal contribution
For an incremental change in marginal cost the prot + (r) = k (r). Maximizing
the cumulative willingness to invest implies:
@
h
r(1  p)

h
((a  C) +  (n  r)C)2    a  C2ii
@r
= 0,
[(a  C) +  (n  r)C]2   2C [(a  C) +  (n  r)C]   a  C2 = 0
Solving this gives as a solution set:
R =
8><>:
2 ((a  C) + nC)
h
((a  C) + nC)2 + 3  a  C2i1=2
3C
9>=>;
The function for the cumulative willingness to invest is increasing from 0 for r # 0,
and increases for r  !1. the local maximum is therefore given by:
r =
2 ((a  C) + nC) 
h
((a  C) + nC)2 + 3  a  C2i1=2
3C
For a radical change in marginal cost we get that + (r) = Ok (r). Maximizing the
cumulative willingness to invest gives:
@r(1  p)
h
(1 )(1+(r 2))
b(1+(r 1))(2+(r 3))2 (a  C)
2   
  a  C2i
@r
= 0,
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0 = (1  p)

(1  ) (1 +  (r   2))
b (1 +  (r   1)) (2 +  (r   3))2 (a  C)
2   
  a  C2 
(1  p)
"
r (1  )  2 (r+ 1)2    (8 + 7 (r   1))
b (1 +  (r   1))2 (2 +  (r   3))3 (a  C)
2
#
Solving this equation does not give a closed form solution. This implies that in
theory the government lacks insight in how to formulate a consortium that would
minimize its contribution.
Appendix D: surplus in equilibrium as a constraint
for intervention
The actual intervention by the government is limited: it should only provide sup-
port in case of an increase in surplus. The total consumer and producer surplus
for Bertrand Classic is given by:
W 0 =
1
2
 
a  P 0nQ0 =  a  C2
2b
W+ =
8>>><>>>:
3(a C)2
8b
for C < 2C   a
(a C+)(a C+2C )
2b
for C < 2C   a
For a market under Cournot with di¤erentiated products, this is given by:
W 0 =
1
2b (2 + (n  1))2
h
(3 + (n  1))n  a  C2i
W+(r) =
8>>><>>>:
W

(r) K for rC < (a C)(2 )

W
O
(r) K for rC  (a C)(2 )

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with:
W

(r) = (n  r)

1
2
(a  P i (r))Qi (r) + i (r)

+
r

1
2
(a  P k (r))Qk(r) + k(r)

=
(3 +  (n  1))
h
(n  r)  a  C2 + r (a  C)2i
2b (2 +  (n  1))2 +

2 
h
(4 +  (n  1)) + 
(2 )n
i
r (n  r) (C)2
2b (2 +  (n  1))2
W
O
(r) = r

1
2
 
a  POk (r)

QOk (r) + 
O
k (r)

=
(3 + (r   1)) r (a  C)2
2b (2 + (r   1))2
For a market under Bertrand with di¤erentiated products, we get:
W 0 =
1
2b (2 + (n  1))2
h
(3 + (n  1))n  a  C2i
W+(r) =
8>>><>>>:
W

(r) K for rC <  a  C =
W
O
(r) K for rC   a  C =
with:
W

(r) = (n  r)

1
2
(a  P i (r))Qi (r) + i (r)

+
r

1
2
(a  P k (r))Qk(r) + k(r)

=
(3 +  (n  4))
h
(n  r)  a  C2 + r (a  C)2i
2 (2 +  (n  3)) +
 [(4 +  (n  5)) (2 +  (2n  3)) + n (1 +  (n  2))]
2 (2 +  (n  3))

r (n  r) (C)2
(1  )
W
O
(r) = r

1
2
 
a  POk (r)

QOk (r) + 
O
k (r)

=
(3 +  (r   4)) (1 +  (r   2)) r (a  C)2
2b (1 +  (r   1)) (2 +  (r   3))2

Chapter 4
R&D collaboration in a hybrid market form of perfect and
monopolistic competition
The behavior of rms concerning investment in R&D has been the subject of
study within the framework of Industrial Organization (IO) theory. The theory of
IO distinguishes two basic modeling approaches for the analysis of this behavior:
tournament and non-tournament modeling (Suetens 2006). A basic feature of
tournament models is that it is like a race where the rst rm that succeeds
in innovating enters the market rst, and subsequently conquers it (e.g. patent
race). A non-tournament model is characterized by the fact that rms can conduct
research successfully at the same time.
The emergence of non-tournament models as the dominant theoretical basis for
the analysis of the investment decision of rms in R&D started with (dAspre-
mont and Jacquemin 1988). It is closely connected to the general recognition of
knowledge spillovers (Suetens 2006). The (dAspremont and Jacquemin 1988)
paper describes the behavior of rms concerning investment in research for dif-
ferent forms of collaboration with the help of a multi-stage strategic investment
game. A research driven innovation model is therefore adopted, in which all rms
of the population get involved in R&D. The impact of this research, conveyed as a
decrease in marginal cost, is dened as a function of the investment on R&D. The
game introduced involves a stage where all rms determine their input on R&D,
given a certain level of spillover from research activity. This spillover coe¢ cient
reects the level of coordination in research. In the nal stage the rms engage in
competition to dene market price and output in equilibrium. The game is solved
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by means of backward induction.
Important other contributions to this line of theory include the analysis of asym-
metric equilibria resulting from for example product di¤erentiation (Lambertini
and Orsini 2000), and asymmetric spillovers (Atallah 2005). Relevant is also the
paper by (Poyago-Theotoky 1995), which analyses expenditure on R&D in equi-
librium if only a subset of the total population establishes the highest level of
coordination in the form of a Research Joint Venture.
For our model we adopt a series of assumptions with which we deviate from the
current literature in order to reect more accurately the current practice concerning
industry-oriented R&D (see Chapter 1 ). We adopt a problem driven innovation
model, in which research originates from an idea addressing a specic problem. We
assume this research is conducted within the framework of a predened project
with corresponding xed cost. The outcome of the R&D process and the impact
it could have on the marginal cost of production is predetermined. Just a subset
of the total population of rms will be involved in the research project, operating
as a Research Joint Venture (RJV). Application of the foreseen results depends
on the successful execution of the project, which involves a certain probability of
failure.
Because of our assumptions the setup of the strategic intervention deviates from
the existing literature. In the nal stage rms involved in research dene the fore-
seen changes in market price and output in equilibrium resulting from successful
implementation of the project results. Based on the corresponding change in prot
and the probability of failure of the research, rms decide on what they are willing
to invest in the R&D project. For the computation of this willingness to invest,
we assume a linear perception of risk and prot. If the willingness to invest does
not meet the foreseen project cost, a rm will decide not to conduct the research.
In the existing literature building on (dAspremont and Jacquemin 1988) assumes
a market structure where rms compete on price or quantity (i.e. Bertrand or
Cournot). In Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 we adopt a similar structure for our model
with its accompanying assumptions, and subsequently expand in for a market
o¤ering di¤erentiated products. In this paper we analyze the behavior of rms
concerning their decision on investment in research for a hybrid market form of
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perfect competition and monopolistic competition, as introduced by (Varian 1980).
Within the framework of this market structure, some consumers seek to buy at
the lowest price without regard for product characteristics, whereas others have a
brand preference. In practice this implies that there is di¤erentiation in supplier
preferences.
Our main conclusion resulting from the analysis of this specic market structure
is that if a rm decides to invest in research, it will either conduct the project all
alone, or it will establish a RJV with all rms of the population as its partners in
the consortium.
In the next section, we dene a model to assess the behavior of rms facing an
investment decision concerning an R&D project. In Section 4.2 we compute the
output in equilibrium for a hybrid market form, to dene the willingness of a rm
to invest in a research. The main result of our analysis are given in Section 4.3.
The conclusions and implications for policy are given in Section 4.4.
4.1 Investment in R&D by rms
For our analysis, we assume that there is a population N containing n rms. We
furthermore assume that there is a variable sub-population R  N containing r
rms conducting R&D.
We consider the initial marginal cost of production ci = C for i 2 N to be equal
and constant for all rms, and determined by the state of the art in production
technology within a certain industry or sector.
We assume rms operate in a hybrid market form of perfect competition and
monopolistic competition, where some consumers seek to buy at the lowest price
without regard for product characteristics, whereas others have a brand prefer-
ence. Let 
 be the number of price-conscious customers. Each price conscious
customer purchases one unit of product from the lowest pricing rm, provided
Pi  bP , with bP as the reservation price. Furthermore let 	 denote the number
of brand-conscious customers, which is equal for all rms of the population. Each
brand conscious customer purchases one unit of product from their preferred rms
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product, provided Pi  bP . If Pi > bP , customers will refuse to buy from rm i,
and purchase from  i.
Suppose a rm k has an idea for an improvement of its production technology,
such that it reduces its marginal cost: ck = C for k 2 R, with 0 < C < C and
C = C   C.1 Reduction of the marginal cost results from successful completion
of a predened research project with xed project cost K. Conducting the research
project involves a certain risk. Let p 2 [0; 1] be the probability of failure of the
project. This probability depends on the current level of knowledge concerning
production for this sector. If the required knowledge is not available, and lies
beyond the current state of the art, p will be close to one. If the required knowledge
is available, p will be close to zero.
We presume that for r > 1, the rms involved in R&D will form a Research
Joint Venture (RJV). These rms will coordinate their research activities by shar-
ing R&D results and avoiding duplication for the duration of the project. This
implies that we assume that the rms in the consortium share the project cost
equally (Kamien et al. 1992), and that the internal spillover coe¢ cient equals one.
We ignore immediate spill-over e¤ects to rms from outside the RJV while the
research project is conducted. When producing we suppose that these rms face
no additional xed cost.
Based on the above, we get the following prot functions:
i (P ) = PiQi (P )  CQi (P )
k (P; r) = PkQk (P )  CQk (P ) K=r
We subsequently dene k (P )  PkQk (P )  CQk (P ) as the gross prot for rm
k (i.e. the maximum possible prot, without the project cost).
We argue that a rm k will decide on joining the RJV and conducting the required
R&D by comparing the expected prot resulting from conducting the research with
the initial prot. We dene i (P ) = 0 (P ) as the initial prot in equilibrium, and
(i (P ) ; k (P; r)) = (
  (P ) ; + (P; r)) as the prot in equilibrium after successful
implementation of the research results. We get that this investment decision can
1Note that implementation of the research results has no inuence on the characteristics and
preferences of the consumers.
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be represented as:
(1  p)  +(P; r) K=r+ p  0 (P ) K=r ? 0 (P ),
(1  p)  +(P )  0 (P ) ? K=r
The inequality shows that rm k will decide by comparing what it is willing to
invest in R&D (i.e. the expected gross gain in prot) with the individual project
cost. It implies that if (1  p) (+(P )  0 (P ))  K=r, then rm k will not
consider implementing the project. The required investment would in that case
lead to an expected prot lower than (or equal to) that in the initial situation. If
on the other hand the project cost are covered by the expected gross gain in prot,
then rm k will conduct the research required to lower the project cost.
4.2 Market equilibria
Initial equilibrium with no research
In order to dene the amount a rm is willing to invest in research, we rst analyze
the initial equilibrium and prot. We therefore need to assess the implications for
a rm selecting a price Pi. Based on the above, we argue that the initial output
equals:
Q0i (Pi) =
8>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>:

 +	 for Pi < P i  bP
	 for P i < Pi  bP
	+ 
=m for Pi = Pj = ::::: = Pm  bP
0 for Pi > bP
(4.1)
Lemma 4.1 There exists a unique symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium if rm i
of the population chooses a price Pi 2 S0i at random from a distribution function
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F 0i (P ) such that E
0
i (P ) =
 bP   C	, with:2 , 3
F 0i (P ) = 1 
0@
bP   P	 
P   C

1A
1
n 1
(4.2)
Our result implies that each rm is torn between low pricing to capture the price
conscious customers, and a high price to exploit its monopolistic power over the
brand loyal customers. These two repelling forces can be balanced by following a
mixed pricing strategy.
Proof. The strategy space for the rms of the population is given by:
S0i =
h
P 0; bPi =
24C +
 bP   C	
	+ 

; bP
35
The left end point of the strategy space is dened such that i (P 0) = i
 bP. On
this interval F 0i (P ) is a well-dened distribution function, as it is continuous and
increasing, with F 0i (P
0) = 0 and F 0i
 bP = 1 (see Appendix A).
To calculate the distribution function, we dene the probability that rm i chooses
a prices such that it is higher than the price of rm j as (Pi > Pj) = Fj (Pi).
Firm i chooses a price Pi 2 S0i , such that:
(Pi < P i) =
nY
j 6=i
(1  Fj (Pi))
 (Pi > P i) = 1 
nY
j 6=i
(1  Fj (Pi))
with corresponding expected prot:
E0i = (Pi > P i)
 
P   C	+(Pi < P i)  P   C (	 + 
)
2The results are in line with (Varian 1980)
3There is also a continuum of asymmetric equilibria but nevertheless mixed if n > 2, see
(Baye et al. 1996).
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On S0i the highest pay-o¤ rm i can obtain with certainty equals i
 bP = bP   C	. With F 0i (P ) = F 0j (P ) in equilibrium, we get that: bP   C	 = 1   1  F 0i (P )n 1  P   C	+ 
1  F 0i (P )
n 1  
P   C (	 + 
)
which results in (4.2) after solving for F 0i (P ).
The rms of the population have no incentive to select a price outside the strategy
space or to deviate from their strategy (i.e. the distribution function). A price
above bP implies zero demand, and pricing below P 0 yields a similar demand as
pricing at P 0.
Research by a single rm
Next we analyze the impact on the market if a single rm k conducts a successful
research project lowering its marginal cost. Our approach is as in the previous
section, but we only show the most important steps. We rst note that Q i = Q
0
i
and:
Q+k (P ) =
8>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>:

 +	 for Pk < Pi  bP
	 for Pi < Pk  bP
	+ 
=m for Pk = Ps  bP with s = f1; :::;mg
0 for Pk > bP
(4.3)
Lemma 4.2 There exists a semi-symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium if the rms
(i; k) choose a price (Pi; Pk) 2
h
P 0; bPi at random from  F i (P ) ; F+k (P ) such that
E i (P ) =
 bP   C	 and E+k (P ) =  bP   C	+C (	 + 
) K, with:4
F i (P ) =
8>>><>>>:
1 


C+( bP P)	
(P C)

 1
n 1
for Pi 2
h
P 0; bPE
1 for Pi = bP (4.4)
4The equilibrium is symmetric for the rms not involved in innovation.
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with a mass point  at Pi = bP according to:
 = 1  lim
Pi! bP F
 
i (P ) =

C=
 bP   C 1n 1
and:
F+k (P ) = 1 
 bP   P	 
P   C

0@
C +
 bP   P	
(P   C) 

1A 
n 2
n 1
(4.5)
Proof. For the rms not involved in research, the strategy space remains un-
changed: S i = S
0
i . On this interval F
0
i (P ) is a well-dened distribution func-
tion. It is continuous and increasing (see Appendix A), with F i (P
0) = 0 and
F i
 bP = 1.5 6
We see that k (P+) = k
 bP for P+ = C +  bP   C	= (	 + 
). But If Pk 2
[P+; P 0) then Pi = bP and +k (Pk) < +k (P 0). The strategy space for the rm
involved in research is therefore also given by: S+k = S
0
i . In practice, this implies
that it does not pay to undercut the price.
On this interval dened by S+k the distribution function F
+
k (P ) is a well-dened
distribution function, as it is continuous and increasing (see Appendix A), with
F+k (P
0) = 0 and F+k
 bP = 1.
To calculate the distribution functions, we st analyze the expected pay-o¤ for
rm k. If Pk 2
h
P+; bPi then:
(Pk < Pi) =
nY
i6=k
(1  Fi (Pk))
 (Pk > Pi) = 1 
nY
i6=k
(1  Fi (Pk))
and the corresponding expected prot in that case equals:
E+k = (Pk > Pi) ((Pk   C)	 K) +  (Pk < Pi) ((Pk   C) (	 + 
) K)
5Note that the function is discontinuous for P < P 0, at P =
 
C  C.
6In practice F i
 
PR

< 1 and therefore by denition: F i
 
PR

= 1.
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For rm k the highest prot it can obtain with certainty on its strategy space
equals +k (P
0) = (P 0   C) (	 + 
) K =
 bP   C	+C (	 + 
) K. With
F i (P ) = F
 
 i (P ) in equilibrium, we subsequently get: bP   C	+C (	 + 
) K = 1   1  F i (P )n 1 ((P   C)	 K)+ 
1  F i (P )
n 1
((P   C) (	 + 
) K) (4.6)
For rm i we get for P i 2
h
P 0; bPi that:
(Pi < P i;k) = (1  Fk (Pi))
n 1Y
j 6=i
(1  Fj (Pi))
 (Pi > P i;k) = 1  (1  Fk (Pi))
n 1Y
j 6=i
(1  Fj (Pi))
with a corresponding expected prot given by:
E i = (Pi > P i;k)
  
Pi   C

	

+
(Pi < P i;k)
 
Pi   C

(	 + 
)
On S0i the highest sure pay-o¤ for rm i (i.e. the rms not involved in research)
equals  i
 bP =  bP   C	. With F+k (P ) = F+ k (P ) in equilibrium we get: bP   C	 = 1   1  F+k (P )  1  F  i (P )n 2  P   C	+ 
1  F+k (P )
  
1  F i (P )
n 2  
P   C (	 + 
) (4.7)
Solving the system of equations (4.6) and (4.7) gives (4.4) and (4.5). Note that all
the rms of the population have no incentive to select a price from outside their
strategy space, or to deviate from their strategy.
Note that F+k (P ) > F
 
i (P ) on

P 0; bP (see Appendix A), so that rm k is more
likely to charge lower prices than rm i, and therefore will capture the price-
conscious customers more often. The fact that F i (P ) has a mass point  > 0
implies that rm i will charge Pi = bP with positive probability. The probability
102 4.2. Market equilibria
that two rms charge the same price however is zero, as F+k (P ) is continuous atbP (see (Baye and de Vries 1992)).
Research within a RJV
In case rm k decides to share its idea and conduct a research project within a
RJV, we get that Q i is given by (4.1), Q
+
k by (4.3).
Lemma 4.3 There exists a symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium if rms k choose
a price Pk 2
h
P+; bPi at random from a distribution function F+k (P ) such that
E+k (P; r) =
 bP   C	   K=r, and Pi = bP = 1 such that E i (P ) = bP   C	, with:
F+k (P ) = 1 
0@
bP   Pk	
(Pk   C) 

1A
1
r 1
(4.8)
In practice Lemma 4.3 implies that the rms involved in research randomize their
price, while the rms outside the RJV price at bP .
Proof. The strategy space for the rms involved in research is now given by:
S+k =
h
P+; bPi =
24C +
 bP   C	
(	 + 
)
; bP
35
On this interval, F+k (P ) is a well-dened distribution function as it is continuous
and increasing with F+k (P
+) = 0 and F+k
 bP = 1 (see Appendix A).7
To compute the cumulative distribution function, we assume that rm k chooses
a price Pk 2
h
P+; bPi such that:
(Pk < P k;i) =
rY
k 6=l
(1  Fl (Pk)) ;
(Pk > P k;i) = 1 
rY
k 6=l
(1  Fl (Pk)) ;
7Note that the function is discontinuous for Pk < P+, at P =
 
C  C.
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and the corresponding expected prot in that case equals:
E+k = (Pk > P k)

(Pk   C)	  K
r

+
(Pk < P k)

(Pk   C) (	 + 
)  K
r

On S+k the highest sure pay-o¤ for rms involved in research equals 
+
k
 bP ; r = bP   C	  K=r. In equilibrium, with F+k (P ) = F+ k (P ), we subsequently get
that:
 bP   C	 K=r = 1   1  F+k (P )r 1(Pk   C)	  Kr

+ 
1  F+k (P )
r 1
(Pk   C) (	 + 
)  K
r

Solving this for F+k (P ) gives the distribution according to (4.8).
In order to prove that 

Pi = bP = 1 the following should hold:
 
R  C	 > (Pi > Pk; i)  Pi   C	+(Pi < Pk; i)  Pi   C (	 + 
)
with:
(Pi < Pk; i) =
rY
1
(1  Fk (Pi)) ;
(Pi > Pk; i) = 1 
rY
1
(1  Fk (Pi)) :
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Substituting Fk (Pi) according to (4.8) gives:0@
bP   P	
(P   C) 

1A
r
r 1
<
 bP   P	 
P   C
 ,
 
P   C

((P   C) 
) rr 1
 bP   P	 rr 1 bP   P	 < 1,
 
P   C

((P   C) 
)
 bP   P	 1r 1
((P   C) 
) 1r 1
< 1,
 
P   C

(P   C) 

0@
 bP   P	
((P   C) 
)
1A
1
r 1
< 1
This holds because:
 
P   C

(P   C) 
 < 1 ^
0@
 bP   P	
((P   C) 
)
1A
1
r 1
< 1
Again the rms of the population have no incentive to select a price outside the
strategy space, or to deviate from their strategy.
The rationale behind the behavior of rm i can be explained by the fact that S i 6=
S+k . Firm k competes with rm  k on Pk 2 [P+; P 0] and therefore (Pk  P 0) >
0. As a consequence Pi = bP as 0i (P 0) =  P 0   C	 < h0i  bP =  bP   C	i.
We consequently argue that if Pk 2
h
P+; bPi then Pi = bP = 1.
4.3 Main result: investment decision and size of
the RJV
Base on the previous analysis, we obtain conclusions concerning collaboration in
R&D for a hybrid market form of perfect competition and monopolistic competi-
tion.
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Theorem 4.4 If E+k (P )  E+k (P; n) and the expected change in marginal cost
is larger than the foreseen total cost of the project per product sold, a rm will
invest in the required research, but it will not form a RJV.
If E+k (P ) < E
+
k (P; n) and the expected change in marginal cost is larger than
the total cost of the project per total population of brand-loyal customer, a rm
will implement the research project, but with a RJV containing all rms of the
population.
In all other cases, the rm will not pursue the potential change in marginal cost
by means of conducting a research project.
Recapitulating this gives for the optimal size of the RJV:
r =
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
1 for n 1
n
K


 C ^ (1  p)C > K
	+

n for n 1
n
K


> C ^ (1  p)C > K
n	
0 for all other cases
(4.9)
Proof. For our proof, we build on Lemma 4.1, Lemma 4.2 and Lemma 4.3
for the expected prots in the di¤erent equilibrium. We see that E+k (P; n) 
E+k (P; r) > E
0
i (P ), and E
+
k (P ) > E
0
i (P ), indicating that rms have an
incentive to innovate, as it increases their prot. It also shows that if rm k de-
cides to conduct research within a RJV, it will formulate a consortium such that
r = n. This is caused by the fact that the gross earnings of the rm (i.e. the
prot without the project cost) are dened by the characteristics of the market
and the (change in) marginal costs, and not by the number of rms in the RJV.
The actual project cost however are equally shared by the research partners, and
subsequently will be lower if all rms of the population are involved.
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Firm k will decide on the size of the consortium by comparing prot for r = 1
with that for r = n:
E+k (P; n) ? E+k (Pk), bP   C	+C	  K
n
?
 bP   C	+C (	 + 
) K ,
n  1
n
K


? C
Firm k will decide on actually conducting the research by comparing the individual
project cost with what it is willing to invest in R&D, given the foreseen change in
prot and the probability of success of the research project:
(1  p)  +(P; r)  0 (P ) ? K=r ,
(1  p)C ? K
(	+
)
for r = 1
(1  p)C ? K
n	
for r = n
Our result according to (4.9) implies that in practice, rm k will decide about
conducting the research project, and subsequently about the number of partners
in the research project, by comparing the expected prot for di¤erent sizes of the
consortium. The expected prot is dened by the pricing strategy of the rm
when engaging in competition with the other rms of the population. Within our
setting, this pricing strategy is dened by the marginal cost and its anticipated
change.
4.4 Conclusions and recommendations
In the traditional approach of a multi-stage strategic investment game (i.e. with a
market under Cournot or Bertrand), we see that rms involved in successful R&D
will dominate the market for a certain change in marginal cost and size of the
consortium (see Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 ). Our result indicates that successful
implementation of the research results will not lead to an oligopoly, such that the
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rms not involved in research are driven out of the market. In practice we will
have to assume however that for a hybrid market form of perfect and monopolistic
competition, rms not involved in successful research will eventually loose also
their brand-conscious customers. Because these rms would charge a price which
consistently exceeds that of the consortium members, even the brand-conscious
customers would ultimately change their preferences.
Our results furthermore indicate that if a rm decides to pursue innovation, it
either conducts the required research by itself, or it involves all rms of the pop-
ulation in the project. This last conclusion seems inconsistent with common eco-
nomic intuition that the rm would give away its potential competitive advantage
by sharing its idea with all of its competitors. One might argue that this is caused
by the fact that we ignore immediate spillover e¤ects in our approach. We con-
tend however that the impact of knowledge creation is ultimately captured in the
probability of success of research projects. This result is explained by the charac-
teristics of the prot function: within the framework of our model, a rm might
want to share its idea because the prot increases with the number of rms in the
project.
In practice we should interpret this result as though rms want to collaborate
in research by establishing a consortium, and subsequently increase its size to an
extend that is practically possible and strategically desirable. In reality, this does
happen for pre-competitive research, as illustrated for example by the EU Technol-
ogy Platforms.8 But it also happens for example within the automobile industry,
a sector operating in a market pre-eminently characterized by brand-conscious
and price-conscious customers. Multiple car manufacturers jointly develop and
share essential parts, such as platforms and engines, in order to divide the cost for
development.9
8See www.cordis.europa.eu/technology-platforms.
9As an example of collaboration within the automobile industry on platfroms: the PSA/Fiat
joint venture for the development of large MPVs such as the Citroën Evasion (Synergie), Fiat
Ulysse, Lancia Zeta, Peugeot 806 and its successors Fiat Freemont, Lancia Grand Voyager and
Citroën DS5. But also smaller cars are jointly developed, such as the Peugeot 107, Citroen C1
and Toyota Aygo.
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Appendix A: characteristics of the distribution
function
Initial equilibrium with no research
In order to verify that the distribution functions are well-dened, we have to
analyze if they are increasing on the interval from which the rm selects its price.
If no rm is involved in research (i.e. r = 0), we get that:
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Research by a single rm
If a single rm is involved in research (i.e. r = 1), we see for its distribution
function:
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Reformulating gives:
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In order to prove that rm k is more likely to charge lower prices than rm i, we
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Research within a RJV
If rm k establishes a Research Joint Venture to conduct the research project (i.e.
r > 1), then we see for the distribution function:
dF+k (P )
dP
=
d
 
1 

( bP P)	
(P C)

 1
r 1
!
dP
=
1
(r   1)
	
 bP   C

 (P   C)2
0@
bP   P	
(P   C) 

1A 
r 2
r 1
)
dF+k (P )
dP
> 0 for P 2
h
P 0; bPi :
Chapter 5
The e¢ ciency of instruments providing nancial support to
industry-oriented R&D and innovation1
Cost of intervention, given the willingness of rms to invest
The global economy is showing signs of recovery after an unprecedented nancial
crisis initiated one of the most virulent recessions in decades (OECD 2010a). These
turbulent times have indicated again the importance of policies aimed at creating
stable and sustainable economic growth. Countries therefore need to increase their
labour productivity levels by strengthening their research and innovation capacity.
Governments have acknowledged the relevance of long-term innovation driven
growth strategies. They have consequently implemented specic interventions
aimed at increasing public as well as private expenditure on research (Commission
of the European Communities 2010) (OECD 2010b). In general, a government has
several instruments at its disposal encouraging rms to invest in research. Within
the framework of this paper, we focus on the following modalities of support: fund-
ing (e.g. subsidies or in kind contributions), tax schemes, and loans. Almost all
industrialized countries have implemented these types of specic and dedicated
measures supporting industry-oriented research.2
In order not to impede future economic recovery, most countries have decided
to further rationalize their national budgets. The consequential retrenchments of
1This chapter has been co-authored with Amit Kothiyal.
2For an overview, check: www.proinno-europe.eu, or www.cordis.europa.eu/erawatch, or
www.oecd.org.
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public expenditure requires them to consider the e¢ ciency of instruments. In
other words, and adapted from (Flanagan et al. 2010), countries are looking for:
"[...] the cheapest one (i.e. measure) to implement, which least distorts the market
whilst still achieving its objective."
In this paper, we present a theoretical framework that allows for a comparison of
the e¢ ciency of instruments. Within the framework of this paper e¢ ciency refers
to: the costs of the government intervention required to change the behavior of
the rm concerning investment in R&D, and initiate research.
Analysis of the literature reveals that little is known about the performance of a
single instrument in comparison to other tools (Boekholt et al. 2006). It is even
argued that "[...] from a purely logical and technical point of view, policy tools
appear to be perfectly interchangeable." (Landry and Varone 2005)
Theoretical research on policy formulation focusses on the impact of measures
enabling collaboration in research between rms, in combination with subsidies and
generic tax measures (Hinloopen 2001) (Spencer and Brander 1983) (Inci 2008).
Empirical research, such as (Guellec and De La Potterie 2003), indicates that direct
government funding and tax incentives have an immediate and positive e¤ect on
business-nanced R&D. But it also reveals that direct government funding and
R&D tax incentives are substitutes: increased intensity of one reduces the e¤ect of
the other on business R&D. Policy evaluations seem limited to individual measures,
and do not address a set of instruments (Flanagan et al. 2010). A rare exception
such as the evaluation of the Dutch scal measure WBSO3 indicates, on the basis
of results of a questionnaire, that rms and governments favor tax-deductions over
other forms of nancial support. Rationale for this preference is the simplicity of
the application process, and the fact that a large part of the infrastructure required
for the policy delivery is available (Brouwer et al. 2002).
For our analysis of the e¢ ciency of instruments, we adopt a series of assumption
in order to reect the current practice concerning industry-oriented research (see
Chapter 1 ). We embrace a problem driven innovation model, in which R&D is
conducted within the framework of a predened project, originating from an idea
addressing a specic issue. We assume that the accompanying cost of the project
3WBSO: "Wet Bevordering Speur- en Ontwikkelingswerk" or "R&D Work Stimulation Act".
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are predetermined, and the outcome of the R&D process is foreseen. Successful
execution of a research project involves a certain probability of failure, which is
known in advance. Only a subset of the population of rms will conduct research.
Intervention is directed towards those involved with the idea and the related R&D.
Our assumptions concerning the characteristics of the innovation process are in
line with how industry-oriented research and innovation is supported under the
EU State Aid rules (Commission of the European Communities 2006) and the
WTO Disciplines on Subsidies.
In order to assess the willingness of the rm to invest in this research project
with an associated risk, we apply Prospect Theory as introduced by (Kahneman
and Tversky 1979). The willingness to invest is dened by the valuation of the
potential gains and losses associated with the implementation of the project, and
the weighing of the risk involved in conducting the research.
We argue that if a rm is not willing to invest, a government has the possibility
to intervene, and implement measures so that the rm will alter its behavior, and
decide to conduct the R&D. For each instrument we calculate the exact amount
of support required by the rm from the government to implement the project.
We identify the most e¢ cient instrument by comparing the expected earnings
resulting from the intervention for a government. We apply Expected Value theory
to describe the behavior of a government concerning valuation of its earnings
Our choice for these specic behavioral models is motivated by the characteris-
tics of the actors in our analysis. In decision analysis, Expected Utility theory
(EU) is considered to be the right normative model for decision under uncertainty
(Bleichrodt et al. 2001). We therefore apply EU to analyze the behavior of a gov-
ernment. As the expected contribution required to initiate the research is relatively
small for a government, we assume that its utility function can well be approx-
imated by a linear function. EU consequently reduces in our case to Expected
Value theory, as suggested in (Arrow 1970). Prospect Theory (PT) on the other
hand does a much better job than EU in predicting the behavior of individuals and
small entities (e.g. SMEs) in risky situations (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). We
therefore analyze the behavior of the rm under uncertainty using PT. In order
to verify our conclusions, we also compare our outcome under PT with the result
obtained in case the behavior of rms is described by EU.
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Our analysis indicates that there exists a critical value for the probability of failure
of the project at which the modality of the most e¢ cient instruments changes. For
a probability of failure exceeding the critical value, a tax measures o¤ering support
only in case of successful completion of the project is preferred. For a probability
smaller than the critical value, a loan is most e¢ cient. The value of the critical
probability depends on the perception of risk and loss aversion of the rm involved
in the research.
Our results for EU conrm at least partly the order of e¢ ciency under PT (i.e.
the results for a probability smaller than the critical value). But the preference in
case of EU does not change for the probability of failure of the project. This is
caused by the inability to assess the perception of risk of rms under EU.
Our paper shows furthermore that the current approach towards support for
industry-oriented research, which is dened by the State Aid rules (Commission of
the European Communities 2006) and the WTO Disciplines on Subsidies, results
in the implementation of measures such that they are not e¤ective in initiating
research, and not e¢ cient with respect to the contribution required to start an
R&D project.
The next sections describe the model used, the main results, and the conclusions
and recommendations with emphasis on the implications for policy formulation.
The annex includes the technical proofs.
5.1 Investment in R&D by a rm
For the assessment of the e¢ ciency of the instruments, we analyze an industry-
sector consisting of two rms with corresponding initial prot 0 = f01; 02g. Firm
1 now has an idea to increase its prot. Successful translation of this idea into
a market application requires conducting a research project with cost K, and
probability of failure p 2 [0; 1]. The project cost K are predened, and budgeted
according to foreseen allocation of resources. The probability p depends on the
current level of knowledge and state of the art in the research eld of the project.
If the required knowledge is not available, and lies beyond the current state of the
art p will be close to one. If the required knowledge is available p will be close
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to zero. Successful implementation of the research results will lead to a change
in prot according to + = f+1   K;  2 g, with +1 > 01 + K.4 If the research
project fails, the corresponding prot remains unchanged.
Investing in the research project involves a risk, and we assume that Prospect
Theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979) describes the behavior of the rm in this
situation. Within the framework of Prospect Theory (PT), losses and gains relative
to some predened reference point are the carriers of value (Wakker 2010). It is a
well known empirical phenomenon that losses loom larger than gains(Kahneman
and Tversky 1979). PT models this phenomenon by weighting the losses relative
to gains with a loss aversion parameter  > 1.
Also in Prospect Theory, probabilities are distorted by a probability weighting
function, which over-weighs low probabilities and under-weighs high probabilities.
(Kahneman and Tversky 1992) propose the following family of weighting functions:
w(p) =
p
(p + (1  p)) 1
(5.1)
with parameter  2 [0:28; 1). On this interval the lower the value of  the more
the distortion in probabilities ((Kahneman and Tversky 1992) estimate  = 0:61,
see Figure 5.1).5
In Prospect Theory, gains and losses are furthermore evaluated by means of a
utility function. We will assume however that the risk attitude of the rm is
reected in the probability distortion function and loss aversion parameter. For
simplicity, we therefore assume the utility function to be piecewise linear within
the framework of our paper.
The outcome of the investment in the research project as described in this paper
can be represented as a binary prospect yielding (+1  K) with probability (1  p),
4Our model can be applied for di¤erent market structures. As an example, consider two rms
competing in a market on quantity (i.e. Cournot competition). Now assume that rm 1 has an
idea that will change the marginal cost of production. Successful implementation of the research
results will increase the pay-o¤ for the innovating rm, while decreasing the prot for the other
rm.
5For  < 0:28 the probability weighting functions are not strictly increasing; for  > 1 they
over-weight small probabilities rather than under-weight them; and for  = 1 the function is
linear (i.e. no distortion of the probabilities).
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Figure 5.1: Weighting function
and (01   K) with probability p. We adopt a notation which represents this as
(01  K)p(+1  K). The decision problem for the rm is to choose between this
prospect or the initial prot before innovation. The natural reference point for
this decision problem is 01.
The value function, which shows the result of the aggregation of gains and losses
of the rm (Kahneman and Tversky 1979) (Kahneman and Tversky 1992), is
consequently given by:
V = w (1  p)  (1  f)   +1  K  01+ w(p) (  (1  f)K) (5.2)
In our model, we assume a fraction f of tax collected by the government on the
prot. The value function shows the gain as the prot after successful implemen-
tation of the research result, minus the project cost, relative to the reference point.
The loss reects the other outcome of the binary prospect relative to the reference
point. Both the gain and the loss are weighted, but only the latter includes the
loss aversion parameter.
The rm will decide on investing in the research project if and only if the result
of the value function is not less than zero.
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5.2 Intervention by the government
If the result of the value function is negative, a government has the possibility to
intervene, and implement policy instruments such that rm 1 will consider altering
its behavior, and decide on conducting the R&D. The rationale for government
intervention supporting basic research has been established by (Nelson 1959) and
(Arrow 1962). They argue that the di¢ culty of selecting potentially marketable
research and the uncertainty with respect to its successful outcome limits incen-
tives of industry to conduct R&D. The indivisible and non-excludable character
of this type of research, and the fact that its results are almost freely available
in scientic publications further enhances the tendency to under-invests in R&D.
This market failure argument has been further developed by (Ja¤e 1996) as a
rationale for supporting pre-competitive industry oriented research. In his work
he identies additional types of spill-overs that negatively a¤ect decisions of rms
concerning investments in research. These types refer to appropriability of knowl-
edge (for example through imitation), the benets to users of the innovation not
captured in its price, and network spill-overs (when successful innovation relies
upon developments in related technologies.
We argue that a government should select the instrument that maximizes its ex-
pected earning Ey. The subindex represents the type of measure. The earnings
are dened by the taxation on rms with a fraction f on the prot, and the ex-
pected contribution Iy corresponding to a specic instrument required to initiate
the research:
Ey = (1  p) f
  
+1  K

+  2

+ pf
  
01  K

+ 02
  Iy (5.3)
5.3 Assessment of instruments
We identify four di¤erent modalities of support for rms conducting research. The
contribution is provided in di¤erent stages of the project, depending on success or
failure of the outcome.
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Funding
A government can contribute to the project cost by o¤ering direct funding (e.g.
subsidies and grants), or indirect funding (e.g. as access to research infrastructure,
vouchers, rebate on social insurance, and advice). The rst type of funding involves
an actual transfer of funds, which are not recoverable by the government from the
beneciary. With the latter, a government tries to compensate for the cost by
providing in kind resources. We assume that funding is allocated unconditionally
(i.e. it is allocated in case of success as well as in case of failure of the research
project).
If F is the minimum amount of funding required to initiate the research project,
then the corresponding value function of the rm, as given in (5.2) becomes:
w (1  p)  (1  f)   +1  K  01+ F+ w(p) (F   (1  f)K) = 0 (5.4)
And the corresponding expected government earnings EF (5.3) is:
EF = (1  p) f
  
+1  K

+  2

+ pf
  
01  K

+ 02
  F (5.5)
Unconditional tax-rebate
Support can also be o¤ered proportional to the expected prot. We rst analyze
a tax rebate given unconditionally on whether the project succeeds or fails. Let
t be the minimum fraction of tax rebate required to initiate the research project,
then the value function of the rm is:
w (1  p)  (1  f)   +1  K  01+ t+1 + w(p)  t01   (1  f)K = 0 (5.6)
with corresponding expected government earnings Et denoted by:
Et = (1  p) f
  
+1  K

+  2

+ pf
  
01  K

+ 02
  t  (1  p)+1 + p01
(5.7)
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Conditional tax-rebate
A tax rebate can be provided also only in case the project is completed successfully.
Let  be the minimum fraction of conditional tax rebate, then the value function
of the rm is:
w (1  p)  (1  f)   +1  K  01+ 1+ w(p) (  (1  f)K) = 0
with corresponding expected government earnings E denoted by:
E = (1  p) f
  
+1  K

+  2

+ pf
  
01  K

+ 02
  (1  p) +1
Loans
Loans involve the allocation of funds which have to be reimbursed by the rm to
the government in case the research project is implemented successfully. Let L be
the minimum amount provided by means of a loan required to initiate the research
project, then the value function of the rm is:
w (1  p)  (1  f)   +1  K  01+ w(p) (L  (1  f)K) = 0
with corresponding expected government earnings EL denoted by:
EL = (1  p) f
  
+1  K

+  2

+ pf
  
01  K

+ 02
  pL
5.4 Main result: order of preference of instru-
ments
By comparing the expected earnings from the government resulting from the imple-
mentation of the di¤erent instruments, we can assess the performance of measures
compared to other tools.
Theorem 5.1 there exists a critical probability of failure of the research project,
given by:
pc =
1
1 + 
 1
1 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for which the order of preference for the instruments changes. For p > pc the order
of measures in terms of e¢ ciency from best to worst equals: conditional tax-rebate,
unconditional tax-rebate, funding, loan. For p < pc the above ordering is reversed.
For p = pc all instruments perform equally well.
The proof for Theorem 5.1 is given in Appendix A. The intuition behind the the-
orem can be explained by the risk attitude of the rm. For p > pc (i.e. for a
relatively high probability of failure) a scal measure that allocates support only
in case of success provides the highest actual transfer of resources to a rm in
comparison to the other tools. For a conditional tax-rebate, this contribution is of
course granted only in case the research project is conducted successfully. But the
the weighing of the probability of success and the loss aversion of the rm are such
that it is willing to take the risk, and conduct the research for an indemnication
that results in the lowest expected contribution by a government. For a relatively
high probability of success of the research project, this reasoning is similar for a
loan. In practice, a measure is preferred over other instruments if its corresponding
expected contribution, allocated by a government to a rm, is lower than that of
other tools
Corollary 5.2 For p > pc a conditional tax-rebate is most e¢ cient. For p < pc a
loan is the optimal strategy.
With the help of our model, we are able to dene for each of the instruments the
exact contribution required by the rm to alter its decision. The change in market
equilibria causing the expected gain in prot by the rm results from the foreseen
implementation of the research results, and not from the transfer of support. The
contribution itself is appropriated merely to amend the prospect of the rm such
that it will initiate the project. We also have dened our model such that all
measure induce a similar level of e¤orts in R&D. We therefore argue that we are
able to compare the cost of the intervention, and as a consequence also the earnings
of a government. Based on our analysis, we thereupon conclude that unconditional
tax rebates and loans are most e¢ cient.
Remark 5.3 If we assume  =  = 1 within the framework of our model, Prospect
Theory reduces to Expected Value theory, and all instruments perform equally well.
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When applying a linear perception of risk and no loss aversion, we nd that all
instruments require the same level of expected contribution to initiate research.
This is in line with what is argued in the literature (Landry and Varone 2005).
Our framework indicates that there are di¤erences in the e¢ ciency of instruments,
resulting from our assumptions concerning loss aversion and the perception of risk
involved in conducting the research by the rm.
5.5 Comparison of outcome with results under
Expected Utility theory
In order to verify our conclusions, we compare the outcome of our analysis under
PT with results obtained with EU. We therefore assume that the rm evaluates
the potential outcomes of its decision on investing in the research project with a
concave utility function U (x) such that:
(1  p)U((1  f)  +1  K) + pU((1  f)  01  K) ? U((1  f)01) (5.8)
Firm 1 will decide on investing in the project if and only if the expected utility
of the total prot with R&D exceeds the utility of the initial total prot without
research. If this is not the case, the government might intervene as specied in
the previous sections. We subsequently compute the contribution required for the
di¤erent instruments in order to initiate research. For funding this implies that
if F is the minimum amount of funding required to initiate the research project,
then:
(1  p)U((1  f)  +1  K+ F ) + pU((1  f)  01  K+ F ) = U((1  f)01)
For the other instruments of our analysis, the approach is as in Section 5.3. For
an unconditional tax-rebate we get that:
(1  p)U((1  f)  +1  K+ t+1 ) + pU((1  f)  01  K+ t01) = U((1  f)01)
For a conditional tax-rebate we subsequently get that:
(1  p)U((1  f)  +1  K+ +1 ) + pU((1  f)  01  K) = U((1  f)01
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and for a loans we see:
(1  p)U((1  f)  +1  K) + pU((1  f)  01  K+ L) = U((1  f)01
We do not change our approach towards how we describe the behavior of the gov-
ernment. The government earnings in case of funding are consequently described
according to (5.5). The earnings for the government for the other tools are as
given in Section 5.3. By comparing the expected earnings for the government re-
sulting from the implementation of the di¤erent instruments, we can assess the
performance of each measure compared to other tools.
Theorem 5.4 The order of performance, from most e¢ cient to least e¢ cient
instrument is: loan, funding, unconditional tax-rebate, conditional tax-rebate.
The proof for Theorem 5.4 is given in Appendix B. The intuition behind the the-
orem can be explained by the perception of value of the rm. The pay-o¤ in case
of successful implementation of the research results is higher than the pay-o¤ for
failure. Because of the concavity of the utility function, this pay-o¤ for success
is distorted more than that for failure. Additional contribution allocated in case
of success is consequently also undervalued more than support in case of failure.
A loan allocates no contribution in case of success, while a conditional tax rebate
provides the most support. The order of e¢ ciency of the instruments in practice
is reected in the amount of contribution required in case of failure.
The results with Expected Utility theory are similar to those for Prospect Theory
for a probability of failure smaller than the critical value. This can be explained
by the loss aversion parameter. For p < pc, the probability of failure is lower than
for p > pc. The potential loss in that case is therefore less over-valued by rms
with this parameter. The e¤ect of increasing undervaluation in case of success as
we have seen for EU, is the same as diminishing over-valuation in case of failure
as we get with PT for p < pc. We therefore get the same order of preference.
Prospect Theory however performs better in describing the behavior of rms than
Expected Utility theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1992). Applying PT allows us
therefore to provide insight in how to diversify the support in order to increase the
e¢ ciency of instruments supporting industry-oriented research, and to calculate
the exact amount of contribution required to initiate research.
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5.6 Conclusions and recommendations
Theorem 5.1 indicates that our results do not depend on initial prot, or a change
in pay-o¤ after implementation of the project. This implies that the result holds
under di¤erent market structures (e.g. di¤erentiated markets under Cournot or
Bertrand). We therefore argue that our result is robust.
Our conclusions do have an immediate relevance for the current practice con-
cerning funding of (collaborative) research. As an example, the State Aid rules
(Commission of the European Communities 2006) governing government support
for industry-oriented R&D and innovation (which are endorsed also by the WTO
Disciplines on Subsidies) foresee in a xed contribution to the cost of a project. The
contribution is not based on the characteristics of the project (i.e. risks involved in
the R&D, expected outcome, and structure of the market), and the corresponding
willingness to invest by the rm, but dened by the type of research conducted
(e.g. experimental research, or industry-oriented research close to the market), or
actor involved (e.g. SMEs, MNFs).6 Based on our model we argue that under
this legal framework, projects requiring a higher level of support will not be con-
ducted, as a rm will not receive su¢ cient funding to make up its willingness to
invest in the required research. We therefore claim that under these conditions
the measures are not e¤ective as they are not able to change the behavior of the
rm. We also argue that projects which have been conducted with the help of
support according to State Aid rules in practice most likely would have required
less contribution than provided. We therefore contend that under these conditions
the instruments are not e¢ cient.
Our paper suggests that redening the approach towards support for industry ori-
ented research, and the legal framework governing it, could improve the e¢ ciency
of policy aimed at strengthening the innovation system. Adopting our model as
a basis for policy delivery however requires further analysis of the factors which
dene the investment decision of rms (i.e. perception of risk and loss aversion),
and how they vary (e.g. for type of rm, or sector). As an example, if we assume
the perception of risk to be given and constant, we see that the critical probability
6In general (e.g. for almost all of the EU and national programmes), the contribution for
industry-oriented research equals 50% .
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of success changes with the loss aversion of the rm involved. This implies that if
rms within a certain sector are more risk averse than those in other sectors, their
corresponding pc is di¤erent, and as a consequence a loan might be more attractive
as a tool to support their research projects.
Our results seem to contradict the conclusions of (Tinbergen 1952), which states
that: "Consistent economic policy requires that the number of instruments equal
the number of targets. [...] More instruments than targets makes instruments al-
ternative; that is, one instrument may be used instead of another or a combination
of others." We argue however that R&D and innovation with a high probability of
failure is di¤erent from that with a large probability of success. It involves di¤er-
ent actors, knowledge and technologies, and should consequently be supported in
di¤erent ways, with di¤erent instruments. We therefore endorse the conclusions
by (Tinbergen 1952).
Appendix A: proof for Prospect Theory
The proof of Theorem 5.1 follows from Lemma 5.5, Lemma 5.7 and Lemma 5.6
below. Since the proofs of these lemmas are similar, we only provide the proof for
Lemma 5.7.
Lemma 5.5 For p > pc conditional tax-rebate is more e¢ cient than unconditional
tax-rebate, and for p < pc reverse is true.
Lemma 5.6 For p > pc funding is more e¢ cient than a loan, and for p < pc
reverse is true.
Lemma 5.7 For p > pc unconditional tax-rebate is more e¢ cient than funding,
and for p < pc reverse is true.
Proof. Funding is more e¢ cient than unconditional tax-rebate if and only if
EF > Et, where EF and Et are dened according to equation (5.5) and (5.7).
From (5.4) and (5.6) we get:
(w (1  p) + w(p))F = (w (1  p)+1 + w(p)01)t
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If we let  = +1 =
0
1 then from the above equation it follows that:
EF > Et () w((1  p)) + w(p)
((1  p)  + p) (w (1  p) + w(p)) < 1
With (5.1) we get that:
EF > Et () (1  p)  + p < ((1  p)  + (p))((1  p) + p)
Let r = (1  p) =p, then:
EF > Et ()
r +  < ((1  p)  + p)(r + ) ()
rp  rp < ((1  p)  + p  1) ()
pr(   1) <  (1  p) (   1) ()
r 1 < 
EF > Et () r > 
 1
1  as  < 1
EF > Et () p < 1
1 + 
 1
1 
For p < pc funding performs better than unconditional tax-rebate, and for p > pc
reverse is true.
Appendix B: proof for Expected Utility theory
The proof of Theorem 5.4 follows from Lemma 5.8, Lemma 5.10 and Lemma 5.9
below. Since the proofs of these lemmas are similar, we only provide the proof for
Lemma 5.10.
Lemma 5.8 A loan is more e¢ cient than funding.
Lemma 5.9 An unconditional tax-rebate is more e¢ cient than a conditional tax-
rebate.
Lemma 5.10 Funding is more e¢ cient than an unconditional tax-rebate.
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Proof. Let F be the minimum amount of funding required to initiate research,
then:
(1  p)U((1 f)  +1  K+F )+pU((1 f)  01  K+F ) = U((1 f)01) (5.9)
Let a = (1  f)  +1  K and b = (1  f) (01  K) then (5.9) can be written as
(1  p)U(a+ F ) + pU(b+ F ) = U(b+ (1  f)K) (5.10)
The corresponding government earnings EF is given by:
EF = (1  p) f
  
+1  K

+  2

+ pf
  
01  K

+ 02
  F (5.11)
In a similar way we get for t as the minimum unconditional tax-rebate that:
(1  p)U(a+ t+1 ) + pU(b+ t01) = U(b+ (1  f)K) (5.12)
The corresponding expected earnings by the government Et is given by:
Et = (1  p) f(+1 +  2 ) + pf(01 + 02)  t((1  p)+1 + p01) (5.13)
With (5.10) and (5.12) we get that:
(1  p)U(a+ F ) + pU(b+ F ) = (1  p)U(a+ t+1 ) + pU(b+ t01),
(1  p) (U(a+ t+1 )  U(a+ F )) = p(U(b+ F )  U(b+ t01))
By applying the Mean Value Theorem we get, with  2 (a + F; a + t+1 ) and
 2 (b+ t01; b+ F ), that:
(1  p)  t+1   FU 0() = p(F   t01)U 0() (5.14)
Since U is concave and  >  we get that U
0
()  U 0(). With (5.14) we
subsequently get that:
(1  p) (t+1   F )  p(F   t01),
(1  p) t+1 + (p)t01  F ,
EF  Et
Chapter 6
The choice for thematic policy1 2
An important policy question for a government when optimizing the policy mix
in order to e¤ectively enable future sustainable economic growth is whether to
implement a generic set of instruments, adopt a thematic policy focus, or embrace
a combination of both policy settings.
In case of a thematic focus, a government identies and selects specic sectors or
technologies, and designs an accompanying set of instruments directing resources
and corresponding research e¤orts towards this target. In (Gassler et al. 2004)
the following rationale for priority setting in research and innovation policy are
identied: (1) As a reaction to the emergence of new scientic or technological
paradigms (also known as science push). (2) In order to promote key sectors of
strategic industrial importance (i.e. industrial missions). (3) To anticipate and
react to new societal challenges, as a form of policy-pull. (4) In order to ensure
presence on emerging future markets (i.e. anticipated demand-pull). (5) To adapt
to international trends in science and technology, and act as a fast second mover.
In case of a generic policy, a government implements a policy mix which provides
optimal support for R&D and innovation in general. A government chooses for a
generic approach if it assumes that the innovation system will either create new
scientic or technological paradigms by itself, or adopt that technology which is
most promising for growth. Either way, the government feels that it is not able,
1The author wishes to thank Hugo Erken for his contribution.
2Thematic policy is also referred to as specic policy in the policy formulation domain.
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or not in the position, to identify the appropriate sector or technology eld.
Within the framework of this thesis, we intended to analyze the e¤ectiveness of
thematic R&D and innovation policy. Our plan was to assess the impact of gov-
ernment intervention on labour productivity growth for di¤erent countries, with a
divergent approach towards focus in policy. We chose labour productivity growth
as the dependent variable because it reects the innovative performance of the en-
tire innovation system as addressed by the policy mix. The characteristics of the
mix itself, such as focus, modality and intensity of support, were to be represented
in the explanatory variables.
Based on the results from the data-collection process, we conclude that an empir-
ical analysis of the impact of specic policy supporting R&D and innovation on
labour productivity on sector level is not feasible. Due to a lack of data on the
characteristics of policy, and contribution allocated by means of the supporting
instruments, it is not possible to conduct an econometric analysis that will result
in reliable conclusions.
This chapter provides a short overview of our data collection process, as a basis
for the subsequent conclusion concerning the feasibility of an empirical analysis.
The results of the analysis could consequently form a basis for future research on
the e¤ectiveness of thematic policy.
6.1 Priority setting: objective and scope
Priority setting as a basis for research and innovation policy is not something from
recent date. As described in (Gassler et al. 2004), during the post-war period it
was assumed that priority setting could be left best to the science and technology
community. In the then prevailing science-push paradigm based on the linear
model of innovation, there consequently was no need for focus in scientic research.
Unguided, curiosity driven, mostly basic research would lead to results which then
would (occasionally) be taken up by society and industry. In the 1960s and 1970s
this model of priority setting was expanded to include commercial and market-
oriented R&D in single large-scale projects. In the late 1970s and early 1980s,
some countries even went a step further by identifying priorities for the whole of
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public R&D and innovation policies. In general, the results were not as successful
or as e¤ective as expected: governments seemed unable to predict developments in
the market. Especially when the thematic area prioritized was outside the public
domain, the success rate of programmes became smaller. In the 1990s, after some
disillusion about priority setting following the experiences of the 1970s and 1980s,
the main focus of R&D and innovation policy was on general improvement of the
systemic performance of innovation systems.
Recently, more and more countries have adopted a thematic scope for their policy
mix, inspired by successful examples from Korea, Finland and Singapore. This
renewed interest emanates from retrenchments in public expenditure, and from
further internationalization of research. Governments respond to these develop-
ments by concentrating research e¤orts on a limited set of thematic areas as to try
to improve the e¤ectiveness and e¢ ciency of their intervention.
6.2 The impact of specic policy supporting R&D
and innovation
The history of research and innovation policy includes examples where government
policies have had an inuence on the speed and direction of technological change.
But there are also many other unsuccessful examples of thematic policies and
instruments. We argue in line with (Arnold et al. 2007) that priority setting
is context dependent, changes over time in rationale and goals, and alters for
di¤erent innovation systems. In practice, "[...] it is not appropriate to give a
general assessment of whether these type of programmes work or not. The outcome
depends on the specic context of each of these programmes (e.g. scope, size,
match with existing actors, programme management, timing, etc.). An overall
and systematic assessment of all innovation programmes in a country is hardly
ever done." (Arnold et al. 2007)
Within the framework of this thesis, we therefore tried to assess the impact of a
policy mix on labour productivity growth for countries with divergent approaches
towards focus in policy. We choose labour productivity growth as the dependent
variable because it reects the innovative performance of the entire innovation
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system as addressed by the policy mix. The characteristics of the mix itself,
such as focus, modality and intensity of support, are reected in the explanatory
variables.
Model for the analysis of the impact of thematic policy
As a starting point for the assessment of the impact of thematic policies, we dene
a simplied model (based on (Solow 1956), (Solow 1957), (Mankiw et al. 1992),
(Romer 1996)) with parameters k, l to be estimated with the help of the following
two stage least square model:
 ln
Yi;t
Li;t
= 0 + 1 ln
Ki;t
Li;t
+ 2 lnRDCi;t+
3 lnHCi;t + 4dumi:t + "i;t
 lnRDCi;t = 0 + 1 lnRD
gov
i;t + 2 lnRD
firm
i;t +
3specdumi;t + i;t
with i as the index for the sector, and t for the year. In the model, RDgovi;t represents
R&D expenditure by rms funded by government, and RDfirmi;t the expenditure
on R&D by rms. Additional variables are: Yi;t as gross output, Li;t as labour,
Ki;t as capital and HCi;t as human capital. E¤ects of other drivers of labour
productivity growth (as mentioned in for example (Erken et al. 2008)), such as
knowledge produced abroad (i.e. catching up e¤ects), and entrepreneurship are
obviated with the help of dumi:t. The R&D capital stock is represented by RDCi;t.
For simplicity, R&D expenditure by others than rms and depreciation of capital
stock is disregarded. Qualitative aspects of the policy mix, such as modality and
focus, are to be captured by a policy matrix specdumi;t. An important issue
not yet addressed in our model is that although a policy mix and its supporting
instruments might be generic and not targeted, they might still be absorbed by
a single dominant sector or technology in the economy or system. In that case,
generic policy is absorbed by the innovation system as specic policy. Analysis of
the parameters for di¤erent countries should provide the basis for conclusions on
the e¤ectiveness of specic policy.
The critical set of data required for the successful completion of the analysis is
RDgovi;t . The type of data chosen to represent R&D expenditure by rms funded
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by government subsequently denes the representation of RDfirmi;t and the charac-
teristics and dimensions of the policy matrix. In the following sections, we describe
in detail our e¤orts concerning the collection of these critical data, and the di¢ cul-
ties encountered in nalizing the research. We provide an overview of the di¤erent
options for RDgovi;t we tried, and their implications for the model.
Impact of ICT policy in the UK, the Netherlands and Finland
In order to analyze the e¤ectiveness of specic policy, we rst tried to compare and
assess three countries with comparable innovation systems, but with di¤erent ap-
proached towards specic policies: the UK (with almost no targeted instruments),
Finland (with almost only targeted instruments) and the Netherlands (with a bal-
ance in generic as well as specic policy).
Because of the comparability of the innovation system (in role and functioning
of actors of the innovation system, political and social system, structure of the
economy), we assume that the policy matrix could be limited to a dummy ad-
dressing just this di¤erence in policy orientation. The Impact of the policy would
be measured by means of labour productivity growth in the ICT sector.3
An elaborate analysis of public data sources from the OECD and Eurostat indi-
cates that no gures are available on contribution to research by governments to a
specic sector. A series of meetings with representatives from relevant ministries
in the Netherlands, and contacts with statistical o¢ ces and ministries in the UK
and Finland, reveals that these countries do not have mechanisms implemented
which oversee policy delivery. Budgets are dened on aggregated level, but the
actual resources allocated (by instrument) to the actors of the innovation system
are not monitored. The reason is that in general the framework of support is
structured such that di¤erent measures allocate resources from a number of spe-
cic and dedicated funds. These funds are not structured according to a specic
technology.
An equally insurmountable problem is that labour productivity data on sector
3Note that we focus on the ICT sector, and not on the contribution of ICT in general to
labour productivity.
We limit the ICT sector, in line with the relevant literature, to the sector represented as
computer related activities according to NACE rev1.1 code 72.
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level are not available for the UK and the Netherlands.
Impact of ICT policy in a selection of OECD countries
As data on labour productivity and nancial support by the government are not
available for our selected countries, we decided to expand our selection of countries,
and search for other data sources covering government contribution to industry-
oriented research and innovation. We therefore considered next the OECD Going
for Growth database. This set contains data on Direct public funding of business
R&D and Rate of tax subsidies for one dollar R&D for almost all OECD countries.
In practice, all public nancial support for industry-oriented research is covered
under these headings. Applying these data for di¤erent countries in our model
would in practice imply that the policy matrix should address not only the focus of
the mix, as the innovation systems are no longer comparable. It should furthermore
be extended to capture also the intensity of the support towards the ICT sector.
Due to the limited number of data-points (8 data points from 2000 - 2008), we
have to conclude that also this data-set is not suitable.
As an alternative, we also analyzed the possibility of using data on GBAORD
(Government Budget Appropriations or Outlays for R&D) from the Eurostat and
OECD databases. GBAORD covers both current costs and capital expenditure.
It includes government-nanced R&D and GUF (public general university funds).
We have to exclude also this set as data are not available on industry-sector level,
but only by socio-economic objective.
Impact of sector specic policy in a selection of OECD countries
Analysis of the previous data-sets indicates that information on contribution by
governments to expenditure on R&D by rms is not available in a way such that
we can apply it for this study. We therefore decided to analyze the possibility of
using data collected on industry-level (i.e. rms reporting on the contribution to
research by government). Relevant data on R&D expenditure reported by rms is
given by GERD (Gross Domestic Expenditure on R&D). This is dened as total
intramural expenditure on R&D performed by the business sector on the national
territory during a given period. It includes R&D performed within a country and
funded from abroad but excludes payments for R&D performed abroad. Appendix
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A gives the characteristics of BERD and GERD, and the di¤erence with GBOARD
data.
Part of the GERD data cover BERD (Business Enterprise Expenditure on R&D).
RDgovi;t could be represented by BERD nanced by government on sector level
(according to NACE rev1.1 code 72). We will represent this as BERDgovi;t . And as
a consequence, RDfirmi;t could be represented by BERDi;t BERDgovi;t . The use of
BERDgovi;t data within the framework of this study is not without consequences:
 The data set covers all nancial contributions by a government to R&D
expenditure by rms. This implies that besides subsidies and tax measures
also payments resulting from contract research are included. Loans however
are excluded, as there is a possibility that they could be refunded (OECD
2002).
 Furthermore, the data-set for BERDgovi;t for the ICT sector for countries
for which we have labour productivity data on sector level is in practice
limited.4 An econometric analysis will therefore not result in a basis for
reliable conclusions on the e¤ectiveness of specic policy. As a consequence,
we decided to enlarge the data-set, and include other sectors with su¢ cient
data points for the selected ten countries, and within the time frame of our
analysis.5
The limitations of the resulting data-set are such that we have to dene a policy
matrix that addresses the characteristics of the policy mix in order to analyze
the e¤ectiveness of specic policy. There is a vast collection of publications on the
policy mix in di¤erent countries. The most relevant sources describing policies and
instruments providing to industry-oriented research and innovation are, besides
national sources, the EU and its PRO-INNO and ERAWATCH initiatives, and
the OECD.6
4The dataset with BERDgovi;t covers the period 1987 - 2007 for: Australia, Austria, Finland,
France, Germany, Japan, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, US.
5The sectors which are covered are (dened according to NACE rev1.1.): A, C, D: 15-16,
17-19, 20-22, 20, 21, 22, 23-25, 24, 24 (less 24.4), 24.4, 25, 26, 27, 28-35, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34,
35, 36, E,F, G-Q, H, I, J, K: 72, 72.2, 73, 74, L-Q.
6As an example for some relevant sources of information:
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The information gathered has to be translated into the policy matrix. There
is very little relevant literature on quantifying the measures providing nancial
contribution to industry oriented research. A potential basis for quantifying non-
nancial support (e.g. a regulatory framework) is given by for example (Nicoletti
and Scarpetta 2003) and The Global Competitiveness Report from the World
Economic Forum7.
In order to analyze the feasibility of the formulation of the policy mix, we analyzed
the above mentioned data-sources on the availability of information on instruments
supporting industry-oriented R&D and innovation. We focus on instruments as
they represent the actual interventions by a government in the innovation system.8
 www.ec.europa.eu/invest-in-research, a website of the 3% Action Plan, which acts as a
portal to studies commissioned by the EC on policy mix.
 www.proinno-europe.eu and more specically www.proinno-europe.eu/trendchart, the
Trendchart homepage, with info on industry-oriented policy.
 www.cordis.europa.eu, and specically www.cordis.europa.eu/erawatch.
 www.europa.eu/pol/enter/index_en.htm (EU legislation on competitivenss and innova-
tion)
 www.weforum.org/en/initiatives/gcp/index.htm, a website on intellectual property pro-
tection.
 The OECD International Regulation Database
7See www.weforum.org.
8We reject the use of data on public policy. A policy is dened as: "a plan of action of a gov-
ernment to guide decisions, and achieve rational outcomes which are set out in broad objectives
and goals." These plans are than implemented by means of instruments. As such, policies are
merely intentions to intervene (and in practice sometimes nothing more than words). Including
these policies in the policy matrix would not contribute to a successful econometric analysis of
the impact of specic policies. As an illustration of this point an example from Spain and Por-
tugal. For the EU presidencies in 2002 (Spain) and 2000 (Portugal), both countries drafted well
formulated policies on R&D and innovation in the ICT sector (i.e. in accordance with OECD
best practices, and after thorough international scientic consultations), following the example of
Finland. These policies however have never been translated into concrete actions and measures
due to the limited absorptive capacity of the respective innovation systems. Furthermore, these
policies have never been properly assessed, making it impossible to include them into the policy
matrix.
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Our analysis indicates that the information available is not su¢ cient to design an
appropriate policy matrix because the OECD and EC data-sources do not provide
information on instruments for the period before the year 2000. Furthermore, they
contain hardly any information on instruments which are terminated.9
6.3 Conclusions and recommendations
When designing a set of measures supporting the innovation system, many govern-
ments seem particularly concerned with how to identify sectors (or technologies)
that, in comparison to others, have the potential to create additional growth.
Analysis of the relevant literature indicates however that there is no theoretical or
empirical evidence that specic policy is preferred over generic policy. Identica-
tion of thematic priorities in existing R&D and innovation policy seems therefore
to be infused by the interests of dominant actors within of the innovation system
(e.g. the EU Framework Programmes), or clearly politically motivated (as in the
case of the US with its focus on defence related R&D and innovation policy).
The scope of the policy mix in many EU countries seems to change in time from
a generic focus of the set of instruments to a thematic policy approach, with a
combination of these policy settings in between. This change in time is being
pushed by the di¤erent stakeholders involved in the process of policy formulation.
We classify these stakeholders in two groups. On one side of the spectrum we
have the engineers. They have a problem driven view on innovation, and embrace
the concept of System of Innovation (SI) (Nelson 1993) as the basis for policy
formulation. They believe in a thematic focus in policy, with priorities dened
bottom-up. On the other side we have the economists, with a more top-down
view on how innovation policy should be formulated. They have adopted the
market failure approach (Nelson 1959), (Arrow 1962), (Ja¤e 1996) as a rationale
for intervention. They believe in research driven innovation, and subsequently
adhere to a generic scope as the basis for the policy mix.
9As an example to illustrate this point: an average-sized country like the Netherlands has
currently over 90 instruments on national level addressing industry-oriented R&D and innovation
active. The OECD and EC data-sources provide insight on about 40 of these tools.
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Our assessment indicates that it seems not possible with the current (publicly)
available information to conduct an empirical analysis of the impact of thematic
policy on labour productivity. Such an analysis would require the set-up of a
database with information on the characteristics of the policy mix for countries for
which labour productivity data on sector level are available. A rst step would be
the collection of data on allocated funding and other forms of support at micro-
level (i.e. rm-level), as administered by organizations involved in policy delivery.
A next step would be the gathering of information on the scope of the measures
constituting a policy mix from local data-sources (i.e. on country-level). Such data
collection is hindered by the absence of a format for structuring information (such
as present in the OECD and EC data-sources). Also information with respect
to policies and instruments from the past (especially if they are proven to be
ine¤ective or ine¢ cient) is limited. And in some countries, measures are dened
as a law providing a certain modality of support (e.g. subsidy, tax reduction, loan).
This tool is then to be used for di¤erent interventions, not specically targeted at
industry-oriented R&D or innovation.
Appendix A: data on R&D expenditure
BERD data are a subset of GERD (see Figure 6.1). The main di¤erences with
GBAORD data are:
 Government-nanced GERD and GERD objectives data are based on reports
by R&D performers, whereas GBAORD is based on reports by funders. Sec-
ond, the GERD-based series cover only R&D performed on national territory,
whereas GBAORD also includes payments to foreign performers, including
international organizations.
 Di¤erences may also occur because the periods covered are di¤erent (calendar
or scal years), because the money is nally spent by the performer in a later
year than the one in which it was committed by the funder, and because the
performer may have a di¤erent and more accurate idea of the R&D content
of the project concerned.
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 In addition to the general di¤erences, government-nanced GERD should
include R&D nanced by central (or federal), provincial (or state) and local
government, whereas GBAORD excludes local government and sometimes
also provincial government.
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Figure 6.1: Data on R&D expenditure: GERD and BERD.
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Summary in Dutch
Nederlandse samenvatting
Het policy mix concept is door de geïndustraliseerde landen omarmt als een basis
voor consultatie en discussie over de ontwikkeling van overheidsbeleid voor O&O
en innovatie. Verdere implementatie van het concept als theoretisch kader voor
beleidsformulering wordt echter gehinderd door een een beperkte theoretische on-
derbouwing, en een niet eenduidige denitie en scope.
Wij denieren de policy mix in dit proefschrift als de totale set van instrumenten
die O&O en innovatie ondersteunen. Een belangrijk aspect van het concept is
de notie dat deze instrumenten elkaars werking beïnvloeden. Toepassing van het
concept verschaft een theoretische basis voor de coördinatie van instrumenten tot
een optimale set, dusdanig dat deze e¤ectief (doeltre¤end) is in het initiëren van
onderzoek en innovatie en e¢ ciënt (doelmatig) wat betreft de kosten van de inter-
ventie.
In het eerste deel van het proefschrift deniëren we een theoretisch framework
voor de selectie van een optimale set van instrumenten ter ondersteuning van
industrie-georiënteerd onderzoek. We doen hierbij een aantal aannames over hoe
innovatie plaatsvindt bij bedrijven. We gaan uit van een innovatieproces waar-
bij onderzoek voortkomt uit een idee, gericht op het oplossen van dat specieke
probleem (probleemgedreven innovatie in plaats van een onderzoeksgedreven inno-
vatie). We nemen aan dat het benodigde onderzoek wordt uitgevoerd in de vorm
van onderzoeksproject. De uitkomst bij een succesvolle afronding van het project
en de bijbehorende impact op het bedrijf zijn daarom voorzien. De kosten van
het project worden constant geacht, en gebaseerd op een inschatting van de ben-
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odigde middelen. De uitvoering van het onderzoek is niet zonder risico: de kans
op falen van het project is van te voren bekend, en bepaald door de beschikbare
kennis op het gebied van het onderzoeksproject. Het onderzoek wordt uitgevoerd
door een subset van de totale populatie van bedrijven, die zal opereren als een
Research Joint Venture (RJV). We verontachtzamen kennis-spillover e¤ecten van
het consortium naar bedrijven van buiten het RJV die niet betrokken zijn bij het
onderzoeksproject.
Met als basis deze aannames wat betreft het innovatieproces redeneren we nu dat
een bedrijf zal besluiten om te investeren in het onderzoek door de verwachte
verandering van de winst te vergelijken met de kosten van het project. Als deze
kosten niet gedekt worden, en het bedrijf zou besluiten het project niet uit te
voeren, dan kan de overheid besluiten in te grijpen. De interventie moet dan
dusdanig zijn dat deze e¤ectief alsmede e¢ cient is. Dit betekent dat we aannemen
dat de overheid haar bijdrage aan het project moet minimaliseren zodanig dat deze
juist genoeg is om het onderzoeksproject te initieren. De overheid moet alleen dan
ingrijpen als haar bijdrage de verwachte toename in welvaart niet ongedaan maakt.
Voor het onderzoek analyseren we de volgende instrumenten: subsidies (nanciële
tegemoetkoming in de projectkosten alsmede in-kindondersteuning), scale stim-
ulering (tegemoetkoming proportioneel aan omzet of winst), leningen (subsidie die
moeten worden terugbetaald in geval van succes) en regelgeving gericht op het
creëren samenwerking tussen bedrijven.
Onze aannames wat betreft het innovatieproces en de bijbehorende projectmatige
interventie geven een accurate weergave van de praktijk van overheidsonderste-
uning voor O&O en innovatie, zoals gereguleerd door de internationale afspraken
(EU en WTO regels voor staatssteun).
In hoofdstuk 2 van dit proefschrift analyseren we de doeltre¤endheid en de doel-
matigheid van de instrumenten middels een multi-stage strategic investment game.
In the laatste fase van het spel bepalen de bedrijven van het RJV wat zij bereid zijn
te investeren in het onderzoeksproject, gegeven de kans op falen van het project en
de verwachte winst bij toepassing van de onderzoeksresultaten. Uitgangspunt is
een markt waar geconcurreerd wordt met homogene producten op basis van output
(klassieke Cournot-competitie). We nemen aan dat bedrijven een lineaire perceptie
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hebben van de risicos van het project en de verwachte winst. In de eerste fase van
het spel bepaalt de overheid haar optimale interventie. Het spel wordt opgelost
middels achterwaartse inductie. Onze resultaten geven aan dat de instrumenten
die een nanciële tegemoetkoming leveren aan de projectkosten gelijkwaardig zijn.
Dit betekent dat het initiëren van onderzoek middels een een subsidie, een scaal
voordeel of een lening een gelijke verwachte bijdrage vereist. Regelgeving gericht
op samenwerking is het meest e¢ cient, maar niet altijd e¤ectief.
In hoofdstuk 3 herhalen we de analyse voor een zelfde markt waarbij bedrijven
concurreren op prijs (klassieke Bertrand-competitie), en voor een markt met ged-
i¤erentieerde producten met competitie op prijs en op output. Op basis hiervan
concluderen we dat voor bepaalde marktstructuren samenwerking niet leidt tot
een verandering in de investeringsbeslissing van bedrijven, en dat regelgeving der-
halve helemaal niet e¤ectief is. Wat betreft de ordening naar doeltre¤endheid
en doelmatigheid van de instrumenten die een nanciële bijdrage leveren aan de
projectkosten verandert niets.
Op basis van de resultaten van deze twee hoofdstukken concluderen we dat een op-
timale policy mix samenwerking tussen bedrijven in de vorm van een RJV toestaat
middels specieke gerichte regelgeving. Bedrijven zullen een consortium vormen
met het aantal partners dat hun winst maximaliseert. Alleen indien samenwerking
niet voldoende is om het onderzoeksproject te initiëren (omdat de cummulatieve
investering van de projectpartners de kosten niet zal dekken) moet de overheid
een additionele nanciële tegemoetkoming in de projectkosten geven. De overheid
moet daarbij het aantal partners van het consortium bepalen, dusdanig dat haar
bijdrage wordt geminimaliseerd.
In hoofdstuk 4 analyseren we de e¤ectiviteit van regelgeving voor een hybride
marktstructuur van perfecte mededinging en markt monopolie (zoals geintroduceerd
door (Varian 1980)). Bij deze marktvorm zal een bedrijf, als het besluit te in-
vesteren in een onderzoeksproject, dat alleen willen uitvoeren of een RJV willen
vormen met alle andere bedrijven van de populatie.
In hoofdstuk 5 onderzoeken we de e¢ ciëntie van de verschillende instrumenten die
voorzien in een nanciële tegemoetkoming in de projectkosten. We passen Prospect
Theory toe (zoals geïntroduceerd door (Kahneman and Tversky 1979)) om de in-
150 Summary in Dutch
vesteringsbeslissing van bedrijven te analyseren. Dit betekent in de praktijk dat we
aannemen dat bedrijven een niet-lineaire perceptie hebben van de risicos van het
project. Ons onderzoek geeft aan dat deze instrumenten alleen voor een bepaalde
kritische kans op falen van het onderzoeksproject hetzelfde presteren. Voor een
project met een verwacht risico hoger dan deze waarde is het gebruik van een
voorwaardelijke belastingbijdrage (die alleen in werking treedt in geval dat de on-
derzoeksresultaten succesvol worden geïmplementeerd) het meest e¢ ciënt om een
onderzoeksproject te initiëren. In volgorde van doelmatigheid komen vervolgens:
onvoorwaardelijke belastingbijdrage, subsidie en een lening. Voor een verwacht
risico lager dan deze kritische kans is deze ordening omgekeerd.
Onze theoretische resultaten laten de beperkingen van de huidige praktijk van
ondersteuning voor industrie-georiënteerd onderzoek zien. De internationale af-
spraken die overheidsondersteuning voor O&O en innovatie reguleren voorzien in
een specieke, vaste bijdrage voor onderzoek voor en door bedrijven aan de projec-
tkosten. Het exacte niveau van de tegemoetkoming wordt bepaald door het type
bedrijf (bijvoorbeeld MKB of grotere onderneming) en onderzoek (bijvoorbeeld
fundamenteel of toegepast). Risicos wat betreft de uitvoering van het onderzoek
of de potentiële verandering van de winst worden niet meegenomen in de besliss-
ing over de hoogte van de ondersteuning. De implicatie van toepassing van een
vaste vergoeding is dat bedrijven die een hogere tegemoetkoming nodig hebben,
niet zullen innoveren. Dat betekent dat de regelgeving een e¤ectieve onderste-
uning verhindert. Daarnaast zou het kunnen dat bedrijven die wel besluiten te
innoveren voor de toegestane vaste vergoeding dit misschien ook hadden gedaan
voor een lagere bijdrage. Dit betekent dat ondersteuning volgens de internationale
regelgeving niet e¢ ciënt is.
Naast de formulering van een theoretisch framework voor de selectie van een opti-
male set van instrumenten hebben we getracht inzicht te krijgen in de e¤ectiviteit
van thematisch O&O en innovatiebeleid. Overheden proberen de policy mix verder
te optimaliseren door de instrumenten te focussen op die sectoren of technologieën
waarvan men verwacht ze additionele groei creëren. Hoofdstuk 6 geeft een kort
overzicht van onze poging om te komen tot een econometrische analyse van de
impact van thematisch innovatiebeleid op de arbeidsproductiviteit in specieke
sectoren. Door een gebrek aan bruikbare data hebben we moeten concluderen dat
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zon analyse niet mogelijk is. Het hoofdstuk geeft aanbevelingen over hoe deze
analyse in de toekomst zou kunnen worden uitgevoerd.
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The policy mix concept provides policymakers with a conceptual
framework that allows them to consider the design of an optimal set
of instruments supporting R&D and innovation. Optimal in this respect 
refers to effectiveness in changing behavior of firms regarding investment 
in research, and efficiency concerning the cost of the intervention.
In practice, little is known about the performance of an instrument
in comparison to other tools. In this thesis we therefore formulate a
theoretical framework for the selection of instruments supporting
industry-oriented research, which contributes to the formulation of
an optimal policy mix. We focus on instruments providing funding,
tax measures, loans and regulations aimed at creating collaboration in
research. We apply this framework for different forms of competition
(i.e. Cournot and Bertrand for a market with homogeneous products,
and with differentiated products). We extend the potential application of 
our results by analyzing the effectiveness of collaboration in R&D for a 
hybrid market form of perfect and monopolistic competition. We also apply 
different decision models to describe the behavior of firms concerning their 
investment in research, in order to assess the efficiency of instruments 
providing financial contribution to research projects.
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